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Abstract 
The politics of Taxation in Central America 
 
 
Nicolás Pablo González Galeotti 
 
How do dictators take decisions on tax policy? Building on the basic intuitions of “theories 
of political survival”, this thesis offers an argument to account for tax-policy variation in 
authoritarian Central America. By focusing on instances of major tax reforms during the 
second half of the 20th century, this thesis draws links between reform outcomes and 
coalitions supporting authoritarian governments in Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
Broad-based coalitions enabled governments to establish progressive taxation in the form 
of income, property and agricultural-exports taxes. Narrow coalitions, by contrast, 
translated into the pre-eminence of regressive taxes exempting elites and targeting 
consumers at large. Case studies show how regime change, and the associated shifts in the 
composition of supporting coalitions, was conducive to some traceable changes in the 
orientation of tax policies. A comparative research design allows ruling out alternative 
explanatory factors. 
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1. Introduction and Puzzle 
 
Scholarship on the history of 20th century Central America has accounted for 
distinctive trajectories among apparently similar countries. A number of regional surveys 
contrasted developments in the long-term and provided grand narratives addressing 
structural commonalities as well as hypotheses for divergences in outcomes (e.g.: Booth 
and Walker 1999; Dunkerley 1989; Pérez-Brignoli, 2000; Woodward 1999). Case studies 
provided detailed accounts about the origins and the character of local autocracies and 
domestic political actors during the 20th century (e.g.: Adams 1970; Black 1984; Crawley 
1979; Euraque 2001; Millet 1977; Morris 1984; Walter 1993).  
Comparative-historical analyses on Central American politics typically focus on "grand 
questions" such as the occurrence of revolutions and civil war (Bataillon 2008; Goodwin 
2001; Paige 1997) and regime transitions (Mahoney 2001; Marti i Puig 2004; Yashar 
1997). In these accounts, contrasting outcomes are explained as the result of "critical 
junctures" which led to country-specific configurations of otherwise similar causal factors 
(Mahoney 2001; Yashar 1997). Detailed historical research pointed at the interplay of key 
variables at specific moments, as well as the legacies of these causal configurations over 
the long-run.  
Central American dictators of the 20th century are often described by these authors as 
guardians of the conservative order. For historian James Dunkerley, for example, 
dictatorship represented a “dominant block” allowing local oligarchies, the military and 
conservative political organizations control key state resources and repress social dissent. 
A similar interpretation can be found in Jeffrey Paige' research on coffee elites. Paige 
argues that Central American authoritarian regimes are better understood as resulting from 
the trade-off between "the right to rule for the right to make money" between the military 
and economic elites of agrarian origin, at the expense of peasants and workers (Paige 1997, 
22). This informal alliance would explain the longevity of Central American autocracies, 
the prevalence of the economic interests of the national oligarchies and the brutality of the 
means used by the state to maintain order.  
While these perspectives may shed light on the fundamental power arrangements 
sustaining authoritarian regimes in Central America, they often obscure the fact that the 
“tacit alliance" between military and economic elites were ridden by conflict. Indeed, as 
this thesis shows, the relations between military dictators and domestic economic elites 
were far from harmonious. These internal disputes constitute the main focus of this thesis, 
which posits taxation as a particularly fruitful arena to examine the relations between 
dictators and the economic elites backing authoritarian regimes.  
 
Pre-examination Thesis, July 18th 2016                Page 10 
Puzzle  
The decades studied in this thesis were a period of major political change in Central 
America. Conservative dictatorships established in the early 1930s were gradually replaced 
by governments with a mandate to transform state functions by enacting a number of long-
delayed institutional reforms aimed at modernizing domestic economies. 
Economic modernization at the time essentially meant diversifying export agriculture and 
promoting Import Substitution Industrialization--the cornerstone of the development 
paradigm that would mark Latin American policies in the 1950s and 1960s. Matching these 
twin objectives required granting the state a more activist role into the economy by 
introducing major institutional changes. Central Banks, Development Banks, Social 
Security Institutes, Planning bodies and an array of new Ministries and autonomous 
institutions were founded. The new developmental states also increased public investment 
on health, education and productive infrastructures (mainly roads, ports and power 
facilities).  
Growing state functions required additional public revenues, but existing sources were ill-
suited to cover the large budgets required by the new “developmental” states (Adler, 
Schlessinger and Olson 1951; Garvy 1952; IBRD 1951; 1953). As Figure 1 shows, total 
tax collections (as percentage of the Gross Domestic Product) remained around 5% in the 
late 1940s. Although the reforms introduced by governments in the 1950s increased tax 
revenues, total tax collections remained below 12% of GDP until the late 1970s.  
Figure 1. Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua: Tax revenues as percentage of GDP. 
(Central government) 
 
Source: Reports of Ministries of Finance and Central Banks, Various years. 
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By 1950, the tax structures or the countries studied here were biased towards regressive 
taxes.1 The lion's share of government resources originated in excises, custom and stamp 
duties. Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua had avoided income taxation, and levies on 
business profits, property and personal wealth yielded anecdotal gains. Moreover, families 
and firms involved in export agriculture, the most dynamic economic sector in all three 
countries, went basically untaxed. 
The magnitude of the investments planned by modernizing leaders required revamping the 
old-fashioned tax systems that were in place. The concentration of wealth in these three 
countries made taxing the income and assets of wealthy sectors the preferred choice of 
reformers. Indeed, various missions of foreign experts deployed to the region by the 
recently-created International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and UN Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLAC) explicitly recommended increasing the tax burden held by upper-income groups 
(Adler, Schlessinger and Olson 1951; Garvy 1952; IBRD 1951; IBRD 1953). 
Recommendations emphasized strengthening direct taxation by reforming property and 
wealth taxes, increasing taxes to agricultural exporters and, above all, introducing income 
taxation, seen at the time as “the foundational stone of all modern tax systems" (Garvy 
1952: 8). 2  
Establishing progressive taxation was a major challenge in the context of Central America 
both for technical and political reasons. On the technical side, governments had to build 
from scratch the institutional and technical capacities required to administer modern 
taxation. Treasury offices were inefficient, severely ill-staffed and had a limited territorial 
reach. Tax farming was still a common practice in rural areas and in Guatemala public 
works were carried out using compulsory work on the part of indigenous communities.  
On the other hand, and perhaps more decisively, progressive taxation was politically 
challenging because it directly affected the interests of groups with major power resources. 
Taxing upper-income groups represented a definitive breakdown with the previous 
conservative order, where powerful local oligarchies had long enjoyed veto powers over 
fiscal matters (ICEFI 2007). Remarkably, despite the resistance of richer groups, 
progressive taxation was introduced in all three countries, although with different degrees 
of success. . As Figure 2 shows, rulers in Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua increased 
the share of direct taxes as percentage of GDP between 1944 and 1980. However, as 
                                                          
1 A tax is said to be regressive when an inverse relation exists between tax rates and the ability to pay of 
taxpayers, measured by income, property or consumption. Regressive taxes take a large percentage of income 
from low-income than from high-income payers.  
2 Direct taxes are taxes paid to the government directly by the final tax payers. Indirect taxes are paid by 
someone other than the person on whom it is imposed. 
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Figures 3 to 5 show, the yields of taxes on capital, income, property and export agriculture 
varied across cases.  
 
Figure 2. Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua: Income + Property + Export Tax 
Collections (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Reports of Ministries of Finance and Central Banks, Various years.  
And countries look even more divergent when these taxes are considered separately. As 
Figure 3 shows, Nicaragua collected higher taxes on property than Guatemala.  
Figure 3. Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua: Property Taxes (% of GDP) 
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Source: Reports of Ministries of Finance and Central Banks, Various years.  
 
Guatemala, by contrast appears as a case where governments were able to substantially 
increase the tax burden of agricultural exports during specific junctures (Figure 4).3  
Figure 4. Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua: Export taxes (percentage of GDP)  
 
 
Source: Reports of Ministries of Finance and Central Banks, Various years.  
 
Finally, as shown in Figure 5, neither Nicaragua nor Guatemala collected substantial 
amounts of public revenue through income taxes, but Honduras did. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Similar trends are evident when taxes are reported as percentage of total tax collections. The corresponding 
figures can be found in the Annexes, which also include country tables.  
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Figure 5. Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua: Income Taxes (%of GDP) 
 
Source: Reports of Ministries of Finance and Central Banks, Various years.  
 
What explains these distinctive country trajectories? Under what conditions are 
authoritarian rulers more likely to succeed in mobilizing domestic resources through 
progressive taxation?  
 
Plan of the thesis 
The thesis is divided in four sections. A literature review follows this introduction. Section 
3 presents the criteria for case selection and the methodological approach chosen to 
analyse the cases. Section 4 presents case studies on Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua 
and Section 5 present some general conclusions.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
  This chapter presents an argument about the literature that aims to justify the 
relevance of the research question and the approach chosen for answering it (McMenamin, 
2006: 133). The chapter begins reviewing some of the main theories on the political 
determinants of progressive taxation, building on successive debates about the relevance of 
structural factors, agency and institutions in accounting for the emergence and evolution of 
welfare states in advanced capitalist societies. It then discusses the limitations of these 
general approaches to explain policy outcomes in non-democratic developing countries. A 
theoretical perspective that sheds light on policy variation in poor, authoritarian countries is 
introduced in the second part of the chapter. The last section reviews relevant comparative 
work on taxation in Central America, pointing out its strengths and weaknesses and arguing 
in favour of the approach chosen in this thesis.  
The determinants of progressive policies in democracies 
Despite the centrality of taxes in the functioning of modern states, studies on taxation 
remained relatively marginal in political science and sociology until the 1990s (Lieberman 
2002). In recent years, however, taxes had attracted increasing scholarly attention as a 
factor capable to illuminate major research agendas. These include problems of collective 
action, state-building, governance, state-society relations, state capacity and distributive 
justice (Lieberman, 2002; Moore, 2008; Prasad et al., 2009).  
As fiscal-sociology proponents argue, taxation stands as a fruitful arena for research 
because of the ready availability of highly standardized data covering most countries in the 
world for considerable time-spans (Campbell, 1993; Lieberman, 2002). Some of the most 
innovative contributions on fiscal sociology have linked tax outcomes to previously-
neglected explanatory variables, including identity politics, regionalism, power inequality, 
ideologies and grassroots mobilization (Lieberman 1998; Prasad and Morgan 2009; Martin 
2013).  
Our understanding of the political economy of progressive taxation, however, continues to 
be deeply influenced by the debates about the origins and development of tax-financed 
systems for social protection in advanced capitalist societies. The literature on welfare 
states has provided some of the leading theories to explain cross-national variation in social 
expenditures, and with these, differences in the way states pay for the costs of increasing 
social protection policies.  
Broadly speaking, the massive scholarly work on welfare states has taken three distinctive 
focuses. While some scholars explain variation across countries putting forward structural-
functional explanations, others emphasize agency and power resources, and yet others 
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concentrate on the role of bureaucracies and institutions (Hill, 2006: 25-26).  
Early scholarship on the origins and evolution of welfare states in advanced capitalist 
societies was puzzled by the positive correlation between levels of economic development 
and aggregate social expenditures (Wilensky 1975). In short, the size of the public sector 
relative to the national economy was larger in wealthiest nations, which also tended to 
spend more in the provision of social protection.  
In accounting for these patterns, structural arguments linked welfare-statism to the process 
of modernization. Countries of the North were the first to experience “high levels of 
economic growth, industrialization and demographic change” (Olsen and O’Connor, 1998: 
4). Welfare states were established in the decades of economic expansion following the 
Second World War in order to protect citizens against the shocks of industrial change 
(May, 2008: 425). Wilensky, for instance, argued that economic growth and its associated 
demographic and bureaucratic changes led to the establishment of comprehensive welfare 
programmes and an increase of overall social expenditures to protect workers (Wilensky, 
1975: xiii).  
Many of these works assumed that policy innovation was a product of the tensions 
associated to the transit from traditional agrarian to modern industrial economies. However, 
they provided no specification of the ways in which modernization led to specific policy 
outcomes. Countries were expected to converge in an equilibrium of increased social 
protection and decreasing class-based political tensions (Skocpol and Amenta, 1986; Olsen 
and O’Connor, 1998). The consolidation of the fiscal technology associated to the modern 
"tax states" was seen as a by-product of the process of economic modernization, which 
allowed for an ever expansion of public revenues as the economy grew and tax bases 
broadened and diversified (Tarsychs 1988). 
Marxist-inspired theories of the welfare state also focused on the functional needs of 
capitalist societies in light of major structural change (Hill, 2006: 24; Skocpol and Amenta, 
1986). Under these perspectives, social policies were seen as mere mechanisms for the 
social-reproduction needs of advanced capitalism (O’Connor, 1975; Skocpol and Amenta, 
1986: 134). For some Neo-Marxists, welfare policies were a “conscious effort to increase 
output, stabilize or revitalize the economy, and pre-empt or defuse working-class 
militancy” (Olsen and O’Connor, 1998: 4). Besides helping to pre-empt class-warfare, 
social protection allowed capitalists to retain democratic legitimacy while making society 
assume the costs of securing the welfare of workers in the form of contributory schemes or 
taxes (Hill, 2006: 24) 
Structural arguments resulted of little help to explain cross-country variation in the 
provision of welfare and its associated financing schemes. The effect of political agency, in 
particular, remained obscured in structural-functionalist accounts. As a result, a new 
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generation of “society-centred” scholars focused on the influence of political actors which 
included class-based collective actors, as well as an array of interest groups and political 
organizations (Immergut, 2008: 558).  
Pluralists explained variation in policy outcomes among advanced democracies as the result 
of the pressure of competing societal interests on policy-makers. Scholars on this tradition 
proposed a dispersed view of power where no single group or faction could prevail in the 
policy-making process. Pluralists argued that numerous interest groups had the capacity to 
influence policies in different moments and at different arenas in the policy-making process 
(e.g. Dahl, 1971). Policy outcomes were seen as the result of a process of lobbying and 
bargaining among social groups with equivalent access to policy-makers. In these views, 
which were rooted the analysis of policy-making in the US and liberal political philosophy, 
governments acted as mere arbiters of interest group competition. Hence, policy outcomes 
reflected a "natural equilibrium of citizen and group preferences" (Immergut, 2008: 558; 
Olsen and O’Connor, 1998; Pollack, 1996). 
Critics disregarded pluralist theories for failing to take into account differences in power 
resources among social groups and the relevance of class-based cleavages (Hill, 1997: 41; 
McLennan, 1997: 53, 54). Society-based theories, by contrast, associated distinctive policy 
outcomes to the power of collective actors and their political organizations (Korpi, 1983; 
Esping Andersen, 1985a). In power-resources theories, democratic politics allowed workers 
to gain control over the state despite the superior power resources of the “capitalist class” 
(Skocpol and Amenta, 1986: 140-141). Generous welfare provision was related to labour 
mobilization and the influence of reformist political parties at foundational moments. Large 
labour unions and strong social democratic parties were necessary for the establishment of 
universal social protection schemes and generous benefits in northern European countries 
(Esping Andersen, 1985b; Korpi, 1983; Skocpol and Amenta, 1986). Where the left was 
strong, social expenses were mainly financed through regular tax revenues, while 
contributive schemes and market mechanisms were prevalent in liberal Anglo-Saxon and 
conservative European welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
"Society-centred" approaches were in turn criticized for failing to consider the state as a 
relevant actor in itself (Skocpol and Amenta, 1986; McLennan, 1997). Power-resources 
theories were accused of treating the state as "something neutral to be captured” (Hill, 
1997: 42). A new research agenda emerged as scholars called to stop treating political 
institutions as epiphenomenal and "bringing the state back in" (Skocpol and Amenta 1986; 
Olsen and O’Connor, 1998: 19). In these views, states were more than mere “arenas of 
political conflict or passive administrative tools to be turned to the purposes of any social 
group that gains governmental power” (Skocpol and Amenta, 1986: 147, 149). 
The next breakthrough in the literature on welfare policies was thus a renewed interest on 
institutions. After many decades of relative neglect, institutions regained a privileged status 
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as key explanatory variables to account for variation in politics and policy outcomes in 
advanced capitalist societies. In line with the emerging neo-institutional research agenda in 
economics, "institutionally-centered" approaches to the welfare state saw states as 
intervening variables capable of shaping the political process in two important ways. On the 
one hand, bureaucrats and politicians could be autonomous actors advancing their own 
interests. On the other, institutions could restrain political access, influence the preferences 
and choices of relevant stakeholders, structure the policy-making process and establish 
patterns of policy implementation (Immergut 2008: 559).  
Historical, neo-institutional analysis proposed studying institutions as both a dependent 
variable and as an explanatory variable in its own right (Peters 2001: 306). For Sven 
Steinmo, for instance, variations in tax policies between Sweden, the United States and 
Britain can be explained as a result of the way in which different institutional 
configurations structured politics (Steinmo, 1996). A model of fragmented decision-making 
permeable to particularistic demands would explain why the US ended having an inefficient 
tax system, where high income taxation coexists with multiple loopholes in the tax code. 
Meanwhile, the argument goes, a more corporatist decision-making structure made harder 
for interest groups to influence policy outside broader, hegemonic coalitions in Sweden. As 
a result, the Swedish tax system was more efficient, benevolent with capital and relatively 
less progressive. Finally, a unique constitutional structure and a "party government" type of 
political process would explain Great Britain's complex and incoherent tax structure.  
The study of structures, agency and institutions centred many of the debates on the 
evolution of welfare states and the associated models of public finance. This accumulated 
knowledge has also informed the study of social and fiscal policy beyond advanced 
capitalist societies. To name but an example of a large literature, the Inter-American 
Development Bank has advocated for a “systemic approach” to study tax policy-making in 
contemporary Latin America (IADB 2007). While recognizing the relevance of the effects 
of “structural variables on the configurations of polities, policy-making and policies”(IADB 
2007: 11), the Bank called for an understanding of the policy-making process “in all its 
complexity, [with the] multiplicity of actors with diverse powers, time horizons, and 
incentives that participate in them; the variety of arenas in which they play the game; and 
the diversity of rules of engagement that can have an impact on the way the game is 
played” (IADB 2007: 7). 
Broadening the sample 
Some scholars have called into question the capacity of this literature to explain variation in 
policy outcomes beyond OECD countries (Mares and Carnes 2009). Although capitalist 
countries in the developing world adopted the development paradigm set by industrialized 
countries and implemented similar social and fiscal policies, policy outcomes did not 
converge with those of advanced capitalist societies. The results brought about by similar 
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social and fiscal policies varied widely across countries in the developing world (Mares and 
Carnes 2009).  
There are issues of scale behind this variation. . Different resource endowments, economic 
trajectories and models of economic development led to distinctive economic outcomes. 
Poor countries tend to have smaller economies and many are dependent on the export of 
commodities. Diverse economic structures constrained tax bases and set objective 
limitations on the capacity of governments to mobilize domestic resources for social 
protection.  
But there are also crucial differences in the political conditions that led to the adoption of 
broad social policies. Social protection and fiscal policies were mostly introduced by 
authoritarian rulers in the developing world. As Mares and Carnes (2009) note in their 
analysis of a sample of 73 developing countries, disability benefits were first introduced by 
non-democracies in about 9 out of each 10 cases. Similarly, twice as many autocracies as 
democracies instituted old-age and health insurance schemes (Mares and Carnes, 2009: 97). 
Theories of the welfare state seem of limited use to explain policy variation under 
authoritarian regimes for two important reasons. First, the formal political institutions of 
authoritarian regimes hardly conformed to the open, accountable and relatively predictable 
institutions of the advanced democracies. Legislatures and the Judiciary were often co-
opted by authoritarian rulers; electoral competition was constrained and elections often 
ridden. Bureaucracies usually were key mechanisms of patronage; and decisions on 
taxation and the provision of public goods were often made by political reasons. Secondly, 
state-society relations were different from those prevailing in democracies. In authoritarian 
Central America, for instance, labour unions and leftist political parties were directly 
targeted by state violence. Some dictators build temporary, tactic alliances with labour 
unions, but in general workers had little voice in policy-making. 
Understanding authoritarian politics: the logic of political survival 
The study of authoritarian regimes has boomed in recent years. Much of the early work on 
autocracies produced classifications of types of regimes that described the singularities of 
particular cases (Brooker, 2000; Linz and Stepan, 1996). The lack of a unified theoretical 
framework and the relative scarcity of systematic comparative work on the politics of 
authoritarian regimes generated a taxonomy of authoritarian regimes including "neo-
sultanistic, neo-patrimonial, personal, bureaucratic authoritarian, military, inclusive 
military, exclusive military, single party, dominant (or hegemonic) party, semi-
authoritarian, autocratic, and totalitarian” (Haber, 2006: 694; Mares and Carnes 2009). 
However, as Mares and Carnes point out, this literature demonstrated to be of little help to 
account for the variation in policy outcomes among non-democracies (Mares and Carnes 
2008: 98).  
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Efforts to theorize on the policy output of non-democratic regimes have increased 
substantially. Prominent among this growing body of work have been attempts to model the 
internal dynamics of autocracies and their distinctive distributional consequences (Olson, 
2000; Haber, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 2005; Mares and Carnes, 2009). Unlike 
early research on dictatorships, based on the in-depth study of single cases and typologies, 
this literature proceeds deductively building theoretical models that then are tested across 
cases and epochs. 
Bueno de Mesquita and his co-authors argue to have found the “essence of politics” in 
dictatorships and democracies in the logic of survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005: 28, 
29). Similarly, Stephen Haber drafts an overarching "logic of authoritarianism" applicable 
to all types of non-democratic regimes (Haber 2006: 694). For these authors, the output of 
authoritarian regimes is best understood as a result of rulers' calculations about how to 
retain the loyalty of their core supporters and building a stable coalition to back their 
regimes. That is, dictators' take decisions on the allocation of public and private goods 
aiming at securing their political survival.  
Bueno de Mesquita et al. build on the premise that no leader can rule alone and even brutal 
dictators cannot survive the loss of support among their core supporters (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 2005: 28, 29). The size and nature of the "winning coalition" backing 
autocrats vary from case to case and can be highly idiosyncratic, but they control “the 
essential features that constitute political power in the system” and thus have the capacity to 
maintain or depose the leader (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005: 7).  
The leader, which can be an individual or a group, uses the tools at hand to punish 
opposition groups and reward supporters. Their capacity to reward depends on their ability 
to take binding decisions regarding taxation and the distribution of private or public goods. 
Examples of private goods would include “special privileges, access to graft and bribes, 
favourable tax terms, favourable contracts, judicial favouritism, and the like” (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 1999: 149). By contrast, public goods benefit everyone in the state, and can 
take the form of “political freedoms, national security, general economic growth policies 
that lift the total size of the pool of resources in the state, and the like” (Bueno de Mesquita 
et al., 1999: 149).  
The authors of the "selectorate model" have developed some theoretical implications for tax 
outcomes (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005: 87). In this view, rulers are revenue maximizers 
which prefer high taxes to increase the pool of resources available for graft and co-opt 
members of their winning coalitions. Where coalitions are small, leaders compensate their 
supporters for the losses associated to high taxes allocating private goods. By contrast, 
large coalitions produce low taxes because autocrats cannot compensate all of their 
supporters for the costs of high taxation.  
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Similarly, Stephen Haber developed a theory building on an equivalent logic to understand 
the internal political dynamics non-democratic governments (Haber 2006). Like in the 
"selectorate model", Haber's "logic of authoritarianism" builds on the assumption that the 
main end of non-democratic leaders is securing their own survival. Autocrats are 
“inherently insecure” since they cannot know for sure who supports them. Dictators 
establish strategic interactions with the members of the coalition that launched their regime 
and keeps them in power. Thus, for Haber, leaders and supporters engage in permanent 
power disputes (Haber 2006: 704).  
The interactions between autocrats and their core supporting coalitions can take four main 
forms. Dictators can become “benign despots” to avoid conflict with the members of the 
launching coalition. More likely, they may try to impose their will by terrifying the 
leadership of the launching organization. This strategy, however, may undermine the ability 
of the government to function, as coalition members permeate the formal organizations 
within the state that allow leaders to “run the country”. As Haber puts it, “the dictator 
cannot simply declare the dissolution of the launching group: it is integrated into the state” 
(Haber, 2006: 696). State terror will also dampen investment by undermining security of 
property rights, and will increase the appropriative character of the regime.  
Alternatively, dictators can choose to co-opt the leadership of the launching group. This 
strategy implies establishing rent-sharing arrangements that require narrowly distributing 
rents and privileges. According to Haber, “the heart of this system is the creation of 
economic rents by reducing competition through regulatory barriers to entry, such as 
narrowly allocated import permits, preferential tax treatment, or the requirement of licences 
or concessions to enter particular lines of economic activity” (Haber, 2006: 701).  
Finally, the ruler may choose the strategy of founding competing organizations to 
undermine the capacity of the coalition to solve collective-action problems. “Organizational 
proliferation” will require dictators to confer economic rights and opportunities to a broader 
percentage of the population, although these may coexist with selective benefits to 
individual coalition-members. “Property rights to secure jobs, loans from government-run 
banks, and the opportunity to receive bribes and kickbacks must be provided to rank and 
file members, while the selective allocation of trade protection, tax preferences, or contract 
enforcement must be provided to the organization’s leaders” (Haber, 2006: 701).  
Building on these theories, Mares and Carnes advance a number of hypotheses about the 
consequences of the strategies of autocrats on the design of social protection policies 
(Mares and Carnes 2009). While no particular social policies should be expected from a 
despotic, predatory ruler, the strategy of collusion may lead to the creation of restrictive 
social policies, directed to narrow clienteles. By contrast, a “chaotic mix of economic 
policies granting selective benefits to a variety of groups” can be expected in contexts 
where dictators choose the strategy of organizational proliferation (Mares and Carnes 2009: 
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100).  
As we have seen, leading theories of political survival develop hypothesis about the logic 
behind the decisions of autocrats regarding taxation. Most of these, however, focus on total 
tax revenues and are insensitive to the distributive consequences of different types of taxes. 
As explained in detail at the next chapter, this thesis will try to deal with this simplification 
by focusing on progressive taxation.  
Existing comparative research on the politics of taxation in Central America 
Central American tax systems have attracted the attention of various generations of 
scholars. One of the early comparative attempts to explain variations in tax outcomes in 
Central America was made by Michael Best in 1975. Best argued that economic variables 
could not explain differences in the tax effort shown by these countries. Alternatively, he 
suggested that the explanation lied in distinctive patterns of political power among social 
actors. The influence of landed elites prevented the tax effort of Guatemala, El Salvador 
and Nicaragua to match that of Honduras and Costa Rica, where tax revenues were higher. 
Since the tax system was biased towards indirect taxation (8% of GNP) and against direct 
taxation (2% of GNP), he concluded that the power of the landlord class, and to a lesser 
extent industrial and merchant classes, had blocked attempts to increase direct taxation.  
Best linked the preferences of specific social classes on taxation (which he assigned 
arbitrarily based on incidence assumptions) with the actual tax structure, concluding that 
“the preferred tax ordering for the great majority of the population is almost exactly 
opposite the actual ordering of taxes by absolute magnitude in the government budgets (…) 
The actual composition of taxes is in fact nearly the same as the hypothetical preference 
ordering for only one group – the large landowners” (Best, 1975: 71).  
Best, however, did not elaborate on the causal mechanisms that explained such outcome. 
Although he mentioned as possible explanations the lack of channels of participation for 
popular sectors, the deterrent effect of the anticipation of sanctions, lack of information, 
and the “hegemony of individualistic ideologies”, he did not attempt to measure their 
impact. Best suggested further research to test his hypothesis using the “reputational 
method”, [i.e. studies of access to positions of government authority] and analysing the 
“successful initiation and veto of policy proposals within governmental arenas” (Best, 
1975: 74).  
In a paper published in 2006, the economist Juan Alberto Fuentes echoes Best's hypothesis 
about the lack of channels of popular participation to explain the divergence in the 
distribution of tax burdens in Central American. Fuentes argues that Guatemala and El 
Salvador may have smaller states (measured as the size of the public sector as percentage of 
GDP) than the rest of the countries in the region, and lower taxes, because of their "closed 
political systems". By contrast, the exceptional welfare policies of Costa Rica and the 
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relatively higher tax revenues of the Honduran state reflected their relatively longer 
representative tradition. Finally, Fuentes argues, the fact that poor Nicaragua has a bigger 
state than their richer neighbours at the north of the isthmus was as a legacy of leftist 
governments following the Sandinista revolution of 1979 (Fuentes 2006: 44, 45). Fuentes 
offers an argument that point to the internal working of authoritarian regimes. However, his 
analysis lacks a systematic consideration the interaction between economic and military 
elites and is insensitive to variations in tax structure.  
Aaron Schneider proposes an alternative argument in his classification of the distinctive 
political trajectories of the countries of the isthmus (Schneider 2006). According to 
Schneider, Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua are countries that experienced an 
aborted liberalism. Traditional elites, the military and external actors conspired to avoid the 
liberalization of politics, and created an authoritarian political model that distorted their 
fiscal practices and biased them towards the interest of the conservative groups. Therefore, 
“ineffective tax capacity, inadequate social spending, increasing inequality and failing 
social indicators” were the outcomes in these countries (Schneider 2006: 10). Costa Rica 
and Belize, by contrast, are cases of smooth liberalism, where modernizing elites 
incorporated middle groups and popular classes to displace the powerful local elites, and 
therefore established “modern, liberal, and progressive fiscal practices appropriate to 20th 
century development strategies”. Finally, Honduras and the Dominican Republic are cases 
of delayed liberalism from above, an intermediate category in which modernizing elites 
emerged from the military and traditional elites, imposing a liberal transition from above. 
However, "there was not a wholesale deepening of the fiscal and political system, perhaps 
because they occurred at a later moment in historical time when 20th century fiscal models 
were less viable” (Schneider 2006: 5).  
A recent comparative study of the political economy of taxation in Central America also 
underscores authoritarian politics (ICEFI, 2007). The authors argue that the interests of 
powerful agrarian elites dominated taxation during the first half of the 20th century. 
However, they took different paths of political reform during the 1940s and 1950s. While 
Costa Rica emerged as a democratic polity, authoritarianism prevailed in the rest of the 
isthmus. The consolidation of authoritarian regimes meant that the actors which could 
counterbalance the power of the economic elites remained excluded from the policy 
process. “The unstable and often repressive political conditions, with the exception of Costa 
Rica and (partially) Honduras, did not favour the creation of ample alliances that could face 
or weaken the strong and concentrated opposition of agrarian elites” (ICEFI, 2007: 140). 
Income tax regimes were weakened because economic elites forced governments to 
introduce an array of exceptions. Calls for increasing export taxes and taxing capital gains 
were fruitless for the very same reason.  
The approach of ICEFI is more sophisticated than other comparative studies since it 
includes considerations about the influence of economic factors, regional political 
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processes and international actors along with its narrative on the distinctive influence of 
social groups. Moreover, it frames changes in tax policies under the successive phases of 
the isthmus’s economic history, distinguishing between the early economic model based on 
export-agriculture, the years of Import Substitution Industrialization and a more recent 
period of “crisis and adjustment in globalization”. However, the research of ICEFI was not 
designed as a structured, controlled comparison, with well-specified variables and a 
discussion of alternative explanations. Moreover, it focuses excessively on business 
interests as a whole, failing to acknowledge divisions among economic elites.  
A comparative analysis like the one proposed in this thesis may help to overcome some of 
the limitations identified in the existing literature. The next chapter present the research 
design and methods.  
 
*** 
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3. Research design and methods 
 
Why did dictators ruling over similar countries made different choices regarding the 
allocation of fiscal burdens and privileges? This thesis intends to examine the logic behind 
dictators’ decisions on taxation in authoritarian Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. The 
key intuition this dissertation intends to test is the hypothetical relation between the 
composition of the coalition that sustained autocratic leaders and the allocation of tax 
burdens and privileges.  
Authors working on theories of political survival have called to test their hypotheses in 
different empirical contexts (Haber, 2006: 711; Mares and Carnes, 2009: 101; Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 2005). This thesis will examine the implications of the logic of political 
survival on taxation, a policy area that is only partially explored in the literature reviewed. 
As noted in the previous chapter, the expectation is that broad coalitions allowed tax 
reformers to introduce income, property and export taxes targeting upper-income groups. 
Restrictive coalitions should lead to weaker direct taxation, regressive tax systems targeting 
consumers at large tax and fiscal measures aimed at punishing opposition groups. Finally, 
changes in the composition of the winning coalition should lead to changes in the 
distribution of privileges and the tax burden.  
In their influential book about research design, King, Keohane and Verba argue that, in 
addition to contribute to an identifiable scholarly literature, a relevant research project 
“should pose a question that is important in the real world” (King et al. 1994: 15). This 
thesis deems to be relevant in these terms for two reasons. First, the 2009 military coup 
against President Manuel Zelaya in Honduras demonstrate that authoritarian reversals 
remain a realistic scenario in “third wave” democracies. In the light of these developments, 
improving our understanding of the logic that governs the politics of authoritarian regimes 
appears as a valid endeavour.  
Secondly, I shall argue that in order to improve the odds of reforming the tax systems of 
Central America to make them more efficient and equitable, it is essential to know the 
forces that have limited progressive policies in these countries through history. It is 
common to hear Central Americans complaining about poor tax collections, regressive tax 
systems and numerous loopholes and particularistic privileges eroding the fiscal capacity of 
states. However, our understanding of the causes lying at the roots of these outcomes 
remains limited.  
In the next section I explain the analytical strategy chosen to account for variation among 
cases and justify the selection of cases. I also present substantive reasons for studying these 
cases for the period roughly between 1940 and 1980. Next I describe in greater detail the 
logic of authoritarianism as developed by theorists of political survival, discussing its basic 
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assumptions. A description of the operationalization of key variables follows. The control 
variables which are “held constant” by studying these specific cases are described in the 
last section of the chapter.  
Research design 
This thesis study how authoritarian rulers in Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua took 
decisions on tax policy during the second half of the 20th century. As noted in the 
introductory chapter, despite the commonalities that these countries show in a number of 
relevant variables, autocrats’ capacities to enforce progressive taxation varied across cases. 
Part of the explanation for such variation, this thesis will argue, was due to the fact that 
different leader-coalitions configurations existed in these countries.  
The core of this thesis consists in a comparative analysis of the evolution of tax systems in 
three Central American countries. In this chapter I describe the methods chosen to make 
causal inferences based on both primary and secondary sources. The proposed analytical 
strategy implies a combination of comparative and historical approaches. Comparing cases 
allows for significant variation in both, the dependent and independent variables. Studying 
intra-case variation across time increases the leverage of the research design. This mixed 
strategy can render much analytical leverage for making valid scientific inferences in small-
N comparative research (Lieberman, 2001).  
Comparative analysis helps defining the empirical problem by identifying unexplained 
variance on the dependent variable and ruling out rival hypotheses (Lieberman, 2001: 
1015). In turn, intra-case analysis allows testing “the effect of over-time change of key 
explanatory variables on over-time change in the dependent variable” (Lieberman, 2001: 
1017). Studying intra-case variation over time may also help to reduce some of the 
problems associated with small-N research designs, as comparing different periods for the 
same country allows increasing the number of observations while holding background 
variables constant. 
  Comparative design 
The logic that governs the research design behind this thesis is that of establishing a 
controlled comparison. The rationale behind the selection of cases lies in the analytical 
leverage that can be gained by choosing countries similar in as many ways as possible but 
which show varying values in both the dependent variable and key explanatory variables. 
Such is the basic logic of the comparative method.  
The comparative method is a distinctive method in political science which aims to establish 
empirical propositions with a limited level of generality. It can be distinguished from other 
scientific methods, such as experimental, statistical and case studies (Lijphart 1971: 682). 
Similarly to experimental research in natural sciences, proponents of the comparative 
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method argue in favour of setting research designs that compare cases that are as similar in 
as many ways as possible, so that it is feasible to determine the isolated effect of a given 
explanatory variable on the outcomes of interest (Lijphart 1971: 687; Pollock 2003). 
Establishing designs that compare across “most similar systems” has long been recognized 
in the literature on comparative politics as a valid analytical strategy in order to develop 
causal explanations (Przeworski and Teune, 1970).  
Establishing a controlled comparison is also a way to partially overcome the “fundamental 
problem of scientific inference” in social sciences (King et al., 1994: 199), i.e.: the 
impossibility of rerunning history and applying different “treatments” to the same 
observation, so that the effect of our hypothesized explanatory variable can be fully 
determined. In social science research, comparing partially homogeneous observations is 
the best way to deal with this issue.  
By choosing cases that vary in the outcome to be explained and in the main explanatory 
variables, while “holding constant” the values of other potentially relevant explanatory 
factors, we set ourselves in the position to rule out alternative explanations. Thus, in a first 
instance the decision to narrow my study to the Central American region and the cases of 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua is justified by their similarities in variables that may 
otherwise be relevant for explaining variation in tax policies. Importantly, these cases also 
show variation in the explanatory variable, i.e.: there were different leader-coalition 
configurations in each country.  
Designing a research project in this way implies a number of challenges. An important 
caveat identified by both, proponents and critics of small-N comparative research, lies in 
the risk of trying to derive causal inferences from an indeterminate research design (King et 
al., 1994: 118). A research design is said to be indeterminate when there are more 
explanatory variables than cases. This situation is problematic because it makes it difficult 
to attribute causality to any given variable when other potential explanations also have 
explanatory power. Indeterminacy may render a causal hypothesis useless.  
Lijphart argues in favour of well-designed, controlled comparisons as a partial remedy for 
that problem. According to Lijphart, “by using comparable cases in which many variables 
are constant, one can reduce considerably the number of operative variables and study their 
relationships under controlled conditions without the problem of running out of cases” 
(Lijphart 1971: 687, emphasis in the original). Real-world complexity, however, makes it 
almost impossible to rule out all competing explanations in this way.  
Increasing the number of cases seems to be the only way out. Lijphart calls for designs that 
allow for intra-case comparison (Lijphart, 1971: 689), and specifically to extend the 
number of cases geographically or longitudinally (Lijphart, 1971: 686). King and his co-
authors also point in that direction for making causal inferences in small-N research 
Pre-examination Thesis, July 18th 2016                Page 28 
designs. In addition to adding new observations to the sample, they suggest modifying or 
substituting the dependent variable; or, depending on the research subject, testing the same 
causal logic with new dependent and explanatory variables (King et al., 1994: 219-228).  
In order to try to come to grips with the problem of many variables and few cases, in this 
research project I opt to use the “standard” approach; that is, testing how theory performs at 
different instances in each case (King et al., 1994: 221). In other words, in order to increase 
the leverage of this research design I will study intra-case variation over time. This requires 
analysing how the hypothesized logic of authoritarianism worked at different periods. In 
other words, studying junctures in each country when distinctive leader-coalition settings 
were at function, as well as subsequent periods of change. If leader-coalition configurations 
did not change substantially, there should be little variation in the trajectory of each 
country. But if original leader-coalition settings were modified, a different policy 
orientation should be observable.  
In sum, in order to account for intra-case variation on the independent variable and its 
effect on tax policies, I will proceed in two-steps. First, the moments in which new leader-
coalition settings were established at about mid-century are studied. The aim is to show that 
the creation of such arrangements put these countries in different paths. Secondly, instances 
of tax reform at later periods will be studied. Where changes in leadership were not 
accompanied by substantial changes in the size and composition of the coalition backing 
authoritarian regimes, the general orientation of policies should remain stable. By contrast, 
substantial changes in the composition of the ruling coalition should have observable 
effects in the fiscal realm.  
This thesis covers a period that goes roughly from the late 1940s to the early 1980s. I 
decided to set the beginning of this study at the mid-20th century because in those years the 
countries of the isthmus experienced important political transformations. A decisive 
“critical juncture” occurred at the equator of the 20th century, establishing certain directions 
of change and foreclosing others (Collier and Collier, 1991; Yashar 1997).  
In their path breaking study on Latin American labour unions, Collier and Collier define a 
critical juncture as “a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways 
in different countries and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies” (Collier and 
Collier, 1991: 29). A critical juncture brings about a chain of reactions and counter 
reactions that do not necessarily coincide with the direction of change expected by the 
forces that triggered the original changes. Collier and Collier point out that the “legacies of 
some critical junctures are stable, institutionalised regimes, whereas others produce a 
political dynamic that prevents or mitigates against stable patterns” (Collier and Collier, 
1991: 34).  
Similarly, according to Mahoney, the ways in which these chains of events evolve 
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constitutes the “aftermath” of a critical juncture and eventually give way to more stable 
final outcomes (Mahoney, 2001: 10). These final outcomes “typically entail the formation 
of new institutional or structural patterns, such as national regimes, party systems, types of 
industrial economies, national value systems, class structures, or electoral realignments” 
(Mahoney, 2001: 11).  
This thesis argues that the distinctive relationships between authoritarian leaders and their 
backers, which explain differences in decisions on tax policy across countries, were set in 
the aftermath of that critical juncture. These arrangements shaped politics in the years to 
come, and thus shaped tax policies during the rest of the authoritarian period. As 
democratisation during the 1980s brought new actors to the political arena, changing the 
composition of coalitions and the way in which of political leadership was elected, this 
study ends at the years these countries began transiting to democracy.  
By studying the critical juncture and its aftermath in each country I will put the logic of 
political survival to a test. A further test of the theory will be carried by studying how these 
original arrangements were expressed in later periods. Significant changes in the internal 
dynamics of authoritarian regimes (i.e., leader-coalition configurations) should have 
observable consequences over tax policies.  
The black-box of authoritarianism 
In order to account for tax policy variation in authoritarian Central America, this research 
will proceed deductively. That is, it will attempt to account for variations in specific 
outcomes relying on an existing theoretical model. As Héritier explains, when choosing to 
proceed deductively, “the objective is not to describe minutely a situation given in reality in 
all its details, but to focus on what one deems the most important aspects of the situation” 
(Héritier, 2008: 63). Theoretical analysis builds on a specific conceptualization of the 
empirical situation to be explained, and its purpose is to “shed light on the real-world 
situation the model is intended to explain” (Héritier, 2008: 63).  
This thesis does not assume that the way in which theories of political survival conceive the 
political economy of authoritarianism is a perfect reflection of reality. As seen in the 
previous section, theories of political survival link policy outcomes to the relationships 
between autocrats and their core supporters--i.e., groups and individuals whose backing is 
necessary for the survival of governments (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005; Haber, 2006).  
Authors working on theories of political survival see the relationship between rulers and 
coalitions as an iterative game where rational, self-interested actors interact strategically. 
For our purposes here, we can depict this game in its most basic form as implying the 
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participation of two key actors, the “leader” and the “winning” or “launching coalition”.4 In 
this section I discuss the nature of each of these actors as described in the literature.  
 a. The leader 
There are differences in the way leaders are conceptualized by authors working on theories 
political survival. Bueno de Mesquita et al., write that the leader can be “one or more 
central individuals” endowed with the capacity to raise revenues through taxes and to take 
decisions on the allocation of public revenue. Leaders need not to be an individual, or a 
single corporate entity. Where decision powers are divided among different actors who 
collectively have the authority to set taxing and spending (e.g.: the president but also the 
legislative chambers), all participants can be considered the leadership (Bueno de Mesquita 
et al., 2005: 38).  
By contrast, Stephen Haber, does not provide a definition of leadership. In his theoretical 
definition of authoritarian government, however, he refers to dictators as "individuals" who 
have the capacity to “run the country”. Through the text he attributes dictators a set of 
specific capacities which include providing public and private goods; allocating economic 
rents; repressing and practising graft, corruption and nepotism (Haber 2006, 693-705). 
Haber acknowledges the possibility of the existence of the “formal organizations of the 
government”, adding that pre-existing organizations and institutions “not least of which are 
constitutions, legislatures, political parties, opposition political movements, trade unions, 
police forces and militaries” constrain the game dictators and coalitions play (Haber 2006, 
696).  
Portraying non-democratic leadership in this way implies accepting a number of 
assumptions. First of all, we have to assume that the decisions of rulers prevail. These 
theories argue that leaders have the capacity to decide, and once a choice is made, to 
enforce their decisions. As Bueno de Mesquita et al. recognize, their theory has to assume 
that taking and implementing decisions is never problematic (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 
2005: 74). Moreover, the model does not account for group dynamics when decisions are 
taken by more than one person, when members of the leading group have diverging 
preferences or when represent competing interests (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005: 74).  
Equally important, theories of political survival assume that rulers are self-interested 
individuals who decide rationally about the course to follow. Other possible driving 
motivations, including values, ideology, identity politics or exogenous shocks, are 
                                                          
4 Like in Haber’s conceptualization, here the focus is put on the interaction between leaders and their core 
backers. Thus, no attention will be put to the “selectorate”, a passive, non-organized group which Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. include in their general models but which they argue to be irrelevant in decision-making. They 
are but beneficiaries of decisions related to the mix of public and private goods in a given polity (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2005: 37).  
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subordinated to the logic of political survival. As noted above, the theory requires assuming 
that leaders take and enforce decisions always thinking above all in their own political 
survival.  
 
 b. The supporting coalition 
The other key player in accounts of the logic of authoritarianism is the “winning coalition” 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). Members of this coalition control “the resources vital to 
the political survival of the incumbent” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005: 38). If the leader 
loses the support of the members of this coalition, her rule is over. The groups and 
individuals that compose a winning coalition do not necessarily belong to specific groups 
(i.e., the economic elite) or have a particular, fixed identity. They do not, by necessity, 
represent a class-cleavage or advance equivalent interests across countries. Indeed, as noted 
above, both the size of the coalition and the characteristics required for membership in each 
political system can be very idiosyncratic (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005: 51-57).  
Haber adds that the organized group that launches a dictator is usually the same that keeps 
her in power (Haber, 2006). Like Bueno de Mesquita et al., Haber assumes that the size and 
composition of the launching coalition will vary from case to case. There may also be 
important differences in the degree to which this coalition is institutionalized:  
“Some of these groups, such as the military, a political party, or a royal family, are 
formally constituted, have rules governing their internal workings, and may already 
be part of a pre-existing government. Others, such as a revolutionary movement, a 
military splinter group, or a federation of warlords, are less institutionalised” 
(Haber, 2006: 696).  
Coalition-members support the leader with the expectation of receiving public or private 
goods, or a combination of both. Like in the case of dictators, the theory assumes that 
coalition members act moved by of self-interest. Coalition leaders are rational individuals 
who might want to launch their own bids for power. These political entrepreneurs are 
capable of coordinating with each other, although they may well co-exist with minimum 
contact. They must also be capable of mobilizing the rank and file for or against the dictator 
(Haber, 2006: 695-696). Finally, rank and file coalition members are also self-interested 
individuals, who act together to obtain personal benefits.  
Coalition members remain loyal to the extent that the dictator can provide them with 
benefits more attractive than those offered by challengers (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). 
In order to retain the support of the core allies, leaders must make bids greater than those of 
challengers. Coalition members will risk defecting in favour of a challenger only if their 
inclusion in the challenger’s coalition is guaranteed (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). The 
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new leader can in turn opt to maintain the original supporting coalition in place, reconfigure 
it or build a new coalition from scratch (Haber 2006).  
As mentioned above, assuming that coalitions have the power to install or depose leaders is 
essential for the theory. Since members of the coalition were able to solve collective-action 
problems to launch a dictator, they can also solve them if willing to depose the leader 
(Haber, 2006: 696). In turn, leaders' actions may have an effect on the composition and 
effectiveness of the winning coalition. As Haber argues, the strategy chosen by the dictator 
to deal with the coalition could have an impact on the capacity of the coalition to solve 
collective-action problems: dictators can terrify, co-opt factions or create competing 
organizations (Haber 2006: 702)  
Finally, the stakes of leaders and coalitions are also constrained by the specific “set up” of 
economic and political factors that characterize each country when the game is played. As 
Haber puts it, “neither side of this game plays from a state of nature. They inherit an 
economy, a system of property rights, a class of wealth holders, and a range of pre-existing 
organizations and institutions” (Haber 2006: 697).  
Operationalization of variables 
a. The dependent variable 
When trying to examine the relevance of the logic of authoritarianism in the context of 
Central America, I will be looking for “observable implications” of the theory in the real 
world (King et al., 1994). The outcome to be explained in this thesis are decisions on tax 
policies under authoritarianism. That is, decisions about the distribution of tax burdens and 
privileges. In testing the theory I will focus on differences in the way authoritarian 
governments determined tax bases, rates, and exemptions affecting.  
The emphasis will be put on instances of progressive tax reform. The focus will be put on 
taxes whose incidence was assumed to be progressive at the time of implementation. 
Although the actual incidence of specific taxes is still subject to debate in the specialized 
literature and can only be established with rigorous empirical testing (see for example 
Prasad & Deng 2009), this dissertation will build on typical “incidence assumptions” as 
these were held during the period under study (Best 1976).  
Hence, the thesis focuses on income, property and exports taxes. Taxes on income, profits 
and capital gains are paid directly to the state by individuals and firms and are broadly 
perceived as the most progressive types of taxes because of their usually graduated rates for 
different levels of income (Lieberman 2001). The incidence of property taxes is also 
generally perceived as progressive, as property owners are taxed directly, usually with a 
proportional rate, and cannot easily shift the burden to others. Like personal and corporate 
income taxes, the enforcement of property taxes require substantial administrative 
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capacities on the part of governments, as well as a degree of voluntary compliance on the 
part of taxpayers. Finally, the taxing of agricultural exports stands as a crucial arena in the 
countries studied here, for it represented the most dynamic economic sector and the origin 
of the wealth of traditional upper-income groups.  
I expect that the implications of the theory in relation to leaders’ decisions should be 
observable in the national laws and rules that codify taxation. However, this thesis is not 
interested in tracking minute changes in tax laws and codes. Instead, the focus is put on 
general tax developments and major reforms—both failed and successful. The decision to 
focus on major tax reforms also makes sense for these are more amenable for empirical 
research than minor, less contentious changes in tax legislation. In seeking for observable 
implications of the theory, I conducted archival research in Central America focusing on 
instances of progressive tax reform.  
b. The independent variable: leaders and their core supporters  
As mentioned above, leaders are conceived as those who had the power to decide on taxing 
and spending. Identifying the “leader” in the context of the Central America is relatively 
straightforward, especially when these countries were ruled by military caudillos acting as 
presidents or de facto chiefs of state.  
The operationalization of the concept of winning coalition also has to be done in relation to 
the specifics of each case. As we have seen, the size of the winning coalition and the 
requisites for membership varies across cases. It is not possible to know who composes the 
winning coalition in any given country ex ante. What we know from theory is that core 
supporters are organized in groups and that coalitions may, but need not, last for long 
periods of time. They need not be united in a single entity, nor be institutionalized, but 
some degree of coordination among their leaders is necessary. Finally, we know that they 
need the leader as much as she needs the support of the coalition: much the welfare of 
coalition members depends on their inclusion in the leader’s core coalition. Exclusion from 
this coalition may represent the loss of protection and privilege.  
In the context of Central America, where conservative military dictatorships ruled for 
almost the entire period covered by this study, I expect that core regime supporters 
included, at least, members of the military and domestic business elites. There are 
substantive reasons for expecting this. On the one hand, the survival of military leaders 
depended on the continuing support of their comrades-in-arms. Indeed, the frequent coups 
and counter-coups launched by the military in these countries seem to prove that their 
support was essential for the survival of any individual in the exercise of power.  
There are also substantive reasons to posit the support of owners of key economic assets as 
essential for the survival of non-democratic leaders. Authors theorizing on the political 
economy of non-democratic governments provide some clues in this regard. At a general 
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level, as in the Olsonian model of “stationary banditry” (Olson, 2000), it may be argued 
that autocrats have incentives to enforce property rights and investing in public goods 
instead of expropriating wealth holders. The logic is that maintaining the economy at work 
may be for the best interest of autocrats in capitalist societies. A working economy would 
guarantee a steady stream of tax revenues and loans. These, in turn allow leaders to have 
enough resources to provide private goods to core supporters and accumulating substantial 
surpluses for themselves. Hence, dictators will take care not to alienate those economic 
sectors whose support is necessary for the working of the economy.  
A variation of this theory argues that autocrats can enforce property rights selectively. That 
is, in contexts of political instability, rulers may opt to establish property right systems only 
for particular economic sectors (Haber, Razo, Mauro, 2003). In these accounts, autocrats’ 
driving motivation is again to have access to credit in moments of crisis and to rely on a 
constant flow of tax revenues on the part of dynamic economic sectors. Besides guarantees 
of non-expropriation, asset holders obtain special privileges and quasi-monopolistic rights, 
if not the opportunity to directly decide themselves the regulations affecting their 
businesses (Haber, Razo, Mauro, 2003).  
Regardless of whether dictators choose to protect rights universally or only in a handful of 
economic sectors, what is clear is that “benign despots” need to cultivate the support of at 
least one faction among wealth holders in capitalist societies. Hence, there are reasons to 
expect that members of the business elites were included in the winning coalitions of 
Central American dictators. In fact, as mentioned in the literature review, most previous 
analyses of the political economy of taxes in the region identify business elites as a key 
actor in the fiscal arena (Best, 1975; Schneider, 2006; ICEFI, 2007; Valdez and Palencia 
1998). 
What is held constant? “Control variables”  
As noted above, the analytical strategy chosen in this research design builds on 
"controlling" similar variables across countries to rule out their explanatory relevance. 
These “control variables” are succinctly described in this section. Detailed accounts are 
provided in the country chapters.  
 a. Historical legacies 
Studying neighbouring countries allows controlling for historical legacies. The three cases 
compared in this dissertation were colonies of the Spanish Crown until the 1820s, when 
they gained full independence. After a brief interlude of political unity under a Central 
American Federation (1824-1839) attached to Mexico, the new independent republics 
began to live as sovereign nation-states building on relatively similar institutional legacies.  
The early institutional configuration of these states resembled each other in a number of 
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important ways. They established similar administrative divisions in their territories, and 
built centralized state institutions concentrating political power in the capital cities. All 
countries built presidential regimes and, except for Nicaragua, where a dysfunctional 
Senate existed, all established unicameral parliaments largely submissive to the power of 
strong Executives. Like elsewhere in Latin America, the franchise was only extended to the 
illiterate men and women well into the 20th century.  
Importantly, the countries of Central America also share a rather limited democratic 
experience before the 1980s. With the exception of post 1944 Costa Rica, all countries 
spent most of their national history under authoritarian rule. Aside from brief democratic 
interludes at the mid-20th century, non-democratic, military leaders ruled these countries 
until the late 1980s, when all began transiting to democracy. Although elections were 
celebrated in all countries during the 20th century, these were uncompetitive and 
systematically rigged by authoritarian incumbents. Finally, two of the three countries 
studied here faced revolutionary wars confronting Marxist guerrilla organizations with 
military autocrats between the 1960s and the 1980. While the Nicaraguan revolution ended 
in 1979 with a victorious guerrilla marching over the streets of Managua, the civil war in 
Guatemala only ended after the signature of Peace Accords in 1996. Although armed 
opposition was residual in Honduras, the National Army became a key political player in 
the context of Cold War anticommunism.  
 b. Economic structure 
During the period studied here, the economies of the countries of Central America evolved 
in roughly similar ways. By the 1950 they all began transiting from an economic model 
built on the export of a few crops to one based on agricultural diversification and the 
substitution of imports by domestic manufactures.  
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua built export economics based on the production of 
coffee and bananas since the second half of the 19th century. The political economy of both 
crops were very different. While bananas were first cultivated by small local producers, 
these were gradually absorbed by American fruit companies. By the 1920s bananas were 
directly produced and exported from American-owned companies in economic enclaves. 
The cultivation of coffee, by contrast, was monopolized by a small local network of 
powerful landowners. The indigenous population was generally deprived of land and 
provided the workforce necessary for cultivating coffee in private large states. Coffee 
processing and exporting was monopolized by individual producers with strong family 
links with landowners.  
Bananas were the single most important export crop in Honduras well into the 20th century. 
Coffee, and to a lesser extent bananas, were prominent in the export profile of Guatemala 
and Nicaragua. The cultivation of cotton was incorporated in the export profile of the three 
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countries during the late 1940s and by 1955 it had already surpassed coffee as the main 
export crop in Nicaragua. By the 1950s, agriculture accounted for 40% of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in Guatemala and 30% in Nicaragua (1958). Manufacturing, by 
contrast, accounted for less than 14% of GDP in all countries.  
The occupational profile of these countries was modelled accordingly. By 1958 agriculture 
employed up to 68% of the labour force in Guatemala and 70% in Nicaragua. The 
agricultural profile of these countries also implied a large rural population, with urban 
settlers representing between a third of the total population in Nicaragua and a fourth in 
Guatemala. The vast majority of the labour force was involved in subsistence agriculture or 
worked in the informal sector.  
 c. The fiscal profile of states 
Having a fundamentally agricultural, rural economy and large agrarian workforce had 
important implications for taxation. A great part of daily economic transactions operated in 
the shadow economy. The predominance of a rural, mostly illiterate population suggests 
that monetary practices and quantifiable norms, essential for the working of modern 
taxation, were not extended among economic actors. Indeed, according to the 1951 IBRD 
report on Guatemala, smaller communities lacked enough educated residents to staff even 
local administrative bodies (IBRD 1951: 263).  
Importantly, distinctive choices on tax policies were not caused by differences in budgetary 
constraints. All dictators ruled poorly-financed states. Indeed, during the period studied 
here, most infrastructural investment was financed with foreign credits. None of the 
countries studied counted with natural resources under government control capable of 
providing significant economic rents. Government current revenues were financed by 
custom revenues, stamp taxes, excises and the profits of a number of public enterprises. As 
noted above, these sources fell short of the budgetary requirements associated to 
modernization.  
 d. Policy framework 
This thesis compares processes that took place in similar countries at roughly the same time 
and under the influence of similar external factors. As it will be detailed in country 
chapters, fiscal innovation in Central America was not independent of contemporary ideas 
about fiscal reform. Policy-makers modelled the tax system imbued by the ideas and values 
that marked the “progressive era” of taxation (Steinmo 2003; Bird 2003; Bird 2012). 
Technical missions of foreign experts recommended tax policy-makers making similar 
reforms at roughly the same years. The orientation of these recommendations was 
progressive and targeted upper-income groups. The existence of such a common influence 
makes variation on tax policies more striking and supports the claim that the decisions of 
rulers were conditioned by variables endogenous to the political system.  
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4. Case studies 
a. Guatemala 
 
Guatemala collects the lowest tax revenues in Central America. Except for a few 
exceptional years, tax collections remained below 10% of GDP through the past century. 
This chapter explains low tax collections as a result of the interaction between political 
leaders and their supporting coalitions under authoritarian regimes (1954-1982). The case 
of Guatemala seems to follow the basic intuitions of the logic of political survival. While a 
broad coalition allowed governments to temporarily establish direct taxes targeting the 
property and profits of the upper classes, the shift from a democratic to an authoritarian 
regime sustained by a narrow, exclusionary coalition limited the capacity of governments to 
enforce progressive taxation.  
 
Antecedent conditions  
The countries of Central America emerged from the 1929 Great Depression under the rule 
of authoritarian caudillos. The collapse of international markets for Central American 
exports preceded the ascent of strong military figures to secure the agrarian order. Like 
General Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua (1936-1956), General Tiburcio Carías in Honduras 
(1932-1949) and General Maximiliano Hernández in El Salvador (1931-1944) Guatemala’s 
General Jorge Ubico (1931-1944) ruled the country for more than a decade. Like his 
autocratic peers, the rule of Ubico was based on the support of agrarian elites and the 
Army. 
The Guatemalan economy was largely dependent on the exports of a monoculture. Coffee 
had become the backbone of the Guatemalan economy since the late 19th century. It 
accounted for the lion’s share of export earnings until the 1910s, when the country began 
producing bananas. While the latter was a business largely dominated by vertically-
integrated American companies, coffee exports were controlled by a small, cohesive 
agrarian oligarchy.  
The legendary cohesion of the Guatemalan landed elites was based on three factors. Firstly, 
landlords shared a common identity based on their European descent and racial 
differentiation with respect to the large indigenous population (Casaús Arzú 2010; Dosal 
2005). Secondly, these family networks controlled all stages of the coffee business, 
including the cultivation, processing and marketing of the crop. Closed, long-established 
family networks also allowed these groups to secure prominent positions in emerging 
economic sectors including trade, finance and manufacturing, thus effectively maintaining 
its dominion over the domestic economy. Finally, Guatemalan elites benefited from the 
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absence of significant regional cleavages like those dividing economic elites in Honduras 
and Nicaragua. These factors allowed the Guatemalan oligarchy to solve collective-action 
problems and reduced the capacity of governments to build support among competing 
factions (Marti 1994; Dosal 2005).  
General Jorge Ubico was both a coffee baron and an Army General. The son of a former 
Ministry of War, Ubico had a meteoric military career. Once at the presidential office, he 
gained ascendancy over the extensive police and intelligence bodies built by previous 
authoritarian rulers, as well as over a network of local military commissioners. This 
apparatus allowed the regime to silence opposition, secure order in the countryside and 
enforce compulsory indigenous labour in coffee states and public works. 
Ubico was a fiscal conservative. His government managed to obtain permanent budgetary 
surpluses even in the context of declining public revenues caused by the Great Depression 
and the beginning of the Second World War. Massive dismissals of public workers and 
drastic budget cuts were the typical response of Ubico when confronting major exogenous 
shocks, producing regular budget surpluses (Torres-Rivas, 2006: 34, 35; Arévalo 2006). 
Ubico even attempted to extinguish Guatemala’s public debt in the midst of major fiscal 
crises. If by 1937 public debt amounted to about 14% of GNP, by 1944 Ubico had 
managed to reduce it to 1.66% (Adler, Schlesinger and Olson, 1951: 27, 87-88). By the 
fiscal year of 1944, the share of taxes in the economy represented a mere 6.5% of GNP. 
Despite the fiscal hardships of the 1930s, Ubico was reluctant to tax the income and 
property of the Guatemalan upper classes. The tax reforms attempted by the dictator 
consisted mainly in rising excises and stamp taxes. A tax on business profits was enacted in 
1938, but the dictator was careful to exempt agricultural firms, thus reducing the 
profitability of the tax. By the early 1940s direct taxation contributed just about 8.4% of 
total taxes (IBRD 1951: 9-10; ICEFI 2008). Coffee exporters paid an anecdotal sum to the 
Treasury (Adler, Schlesinger and Olson, 1951). 
By the end of the dictatorship of Ubico, the structure of taxes was highly regressive. 
Custom taxes accounted for about one fourth of total tax revenues. Taxes on alcoholic 
beverages and tobacco accounted for another fourth, and stamp duties and a collection of 
sales taxes and levies accounted for a further 25%. Export taxes represented about 15% of 
total taxes. Finally, the existing tax on business profits rendered less than 10%, and, despite 
the high concentration of wealth, land and property taxes contributed to a mere 3% of total 
(Adler, Schlesinger and Olson, 1951: 48-51). 
The powerful American companies operating in the country also went largely tax-
exempted. Banana, rail-road and power companies of American ownership benefited from 
generous land concessions and exemptions on land taxes, custom duties and import taxes, 
thus depriving the government of a profitable source of public revenues (Adler, Schlesinger 
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and Olson, 1951: 70).  
 
Building a broad coalition: 10 years of progressive reform 
Ubico resigned from the Presidency in June 1944 in a context of widespread social unrest 
in the capital city. Public servants, students and teachers marched demanding the 
restoration of constitutional rights. A group of 311 prominent citizens, including members 
of powerful oligarchic families, signed a letter demanding the resignation of the dictator 
and signalled the emergence of an inter-class democratic coalition. The existence of this 
coalition emboldened military factions who attacked loyal fortifications in October 1944. 
Losing the support of the core groups of his coalition (i.e. the oligarchy and the army) 
precipitated the fall of the caudillo and allowed for a regime transition.  
A “revolutionary junta" replaced Ubico and called a Constitutional Assembly to draft a new 
Constitution in late 1944. Presidential elections were called for 1945. Meanwhile, the Junta 
took a number of policy decisions including a throughout reform of the existing tax on 
business profits and a progressive tax on capital gains (ICEFI: 146-147).  
Juan José Arevalo, a prominent exile, was elected and proclaimed President for a six-year 
term beginning in 1945. A proponent of "spiritual socialism"—which he presented as an 
alternative to historical materialism—, Arévalo committed his government to a reformist 
programme aimed at transforming the country into a modern capitalist nation.  
The government of Arévalo enacted the first Labour Code (1947) and founded a Ministry 
of Labour and a Guatemalan Social Security Institute (1948)--providing coverage to up to 
60,000 urban workers. Projects for the government-led construction of public 
infrastructures were also launched. These measures gained Arévalo the support of the 
nascent labour movement, as well as ranks among public servers and the urban middle-
class. 
Arevalo also introduced significant innovations in economic institutions. These included 
reforming the existing Mortgage Bank and the National Bank of Guatemala (1945); 
enacting a new Monetary Law (1946), and creating a new Development Institute to provide 
credit to agricultural and industrial enterprises (1948). A Law of Industrial Promotion was 
enacted in 1947, derogating import taxes on machinery and raw materials and granting tax 
breaks for new industries (ICEFI 2008: 147, 152).  
The government of Arévalo was also notable for introducing a number of reforms in the 
Guatemalan tax code which targeted the assets and profits of upper classes. These included 
a re-evaluation of land and housing, assessed at the time at about 20% of its real market 
value (Adler, Schlesinger and Olson, 1951: 48; IBRD 1951: 268); a tax on luxury imports; 
new taxes on cars, public shows and plane tickets (ICEFI 2008); and, most significantly, a 
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new tax on coffee exports on top of the existing general exports tax. 
The new coffee tax increased the rate paid by exporters per pound of coffee from 0.16 cents 
of Quetzal (Q) to Q0.60 cents. Although this reform still left coffee exports below the level 
of taxes paid by other Central American producers, the landlords bitterly rejected the new 
burden (IBRD 1951: 269; ICEFI 2008: 146-47). The coffee tax was the most profitable 
measure for the government, for it occurred during a period of high international prices for 
coffee exports. Coupled with the gradual recovery of coffee and banana exports in the post-
war, these measures allowed the doubling of tax revenues in absolute terms from Q 17.6 
million in 1945 to Q43.7 million in 1951.  
The success of progressive tax reforms was constrained by the limited capacity of 
government to administer taxes (IBRD 1951: 267). A IBRD mission sent to the country in 
1949, for example, found that only 46 accountants were responsible to audit the books of 
some 1900 firms, and that the team had a four-year delay (Adler, Schlessinger and Olson, 
1951: 161, 162). Tax evasion was widespread, especially among medium-sized and small 
enterprises which usually under-reported inventories and retail sales (Adler, Schlessinger 
and Olson, 1951: 162).  
Similar difficulties were found in the collection of property taxes. The reassessment of 
properties advanced at a slow pace. By 1950, only about 25,000 urban properties had been 
reassessed, the rest still being valued at 1921 prices (Adler, Schlessinger and Olson, 1951: 
162). Moreover, because of lack of personnel, the state delegated in some regions the 
collection of property taxes on private agents in exchange of a fixed commission. Tax 
farming made the system inefficient and prone to corruption (Adler, Schlessinger and 
Olson, 1951: 163).  
 Continuing reformism 
Elections were called in 1950 and Arévalo was succeeded at the Presidency by Colonel 
Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán (1951-1954). The new president built on the coalition supporting 
Arevalo to deepen the reformist agenda of the revolutionary regime. The signature policies 
of the government of Árbenz were a bold attempt to redistribute land a decision to break 
American monopolies in strategic sectors. These policies cemented a strong base of social 
support for Árbenz, but put the government in a path of confrontation with agrarian elites 
and the US government.  
Following his inauguration, Árbenz announced the construction of a new road linking the 
capital city with the Atlantic coast, as well as a new port in the Caribbean, using funds from 
international loans. These investments affected the interests of American rail companies 
which had long monopolized the access to trade in the Atlantic coast. Similarly, Árbenz 
began the works for a major hydroelectric plant, thus threatening the monopoly of the US 
Company providing energy to the capital city.  
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Another major challenge to US interests took place after Árbenz passed an Agrarian 
Reform Bill in 1952. The law forced owners of large states to sell their idle land to the 
government at the value reported for taxation purposes. The expropriated land was to be 
distributed among landless peasants. This reform affected land possessions of the United 
Fruit Company as well as the patrimony of high-up oligarchic families. The expropriation 
of estates was followed by the distribution of lands to landless peasants and the foundation 
of an Agrarian Institute as well as an Agrarian Bank to provide credit to small producers—
granting up to 45,000 loans in a three-year period (IBRD 1955: 15).  
These policies provided Árbenz with a broad base of supporters among peasants, workers 
and city-dwellers. Like Arévalo before him, Árbenz strived to mobilize the disenfranchised 
urban and rural masses. The government of Árbenz promoted the organization of labour 
unions and cultivated positive relations with the leaders of labour organizations. The 
Agrarian Reform contributed to turn the peasantry into an active political actor. Popular 
organizations provided Árbenz the social support necessary to advance progressive tax 
reforms even against the will of economic elites.  
By contrast, Árbenz failed to build a solid base of support among emerging business 
groups. Economic elites disliked the "pro-worker bias" of the “democratic spring” 
government and bitterly opposed the enactment of the Labour Code, minimum salaries and 
wage increases (IBRD 1951: 98; Dosal 2005: 170). The government also introduced price 
controls on basic necessities, as well as a number of protectionist measures affecting the 
imports of foreign-manufactured goods (IBRD 1955). While the latter were well received 
by emerging industrialists, merchants rejected government intervention in the market and 
joined the ranks of opposition along with their agrarian peers (Dosal 2005).  
In the end, despite the efforts invested by both Arévalo and Árbenz to promote import 
substitution industrialization, industrialists aligned themselves with landlords in opposing 
the government. As Paul Dosal explains, at the time there was no distinction between the 
landed oligarchs and the modern industrial bourgeoisie, for they belonged to the same 
families (Dosal 2005). The most prominent manufacturers had investments in coffee, sugar, 
cotton and cattle production and many were affected by the Agrarian Reform of Árbenz 
(Dosal 2005 : 159-168). Contrary to the case of Honduras, in Guatemala there was no 
hegemonic dispute between landlords and groups involved in manufacturing, banking and 
trade (Dosal 2005: 145).  
The progressive tax reforms promoted by Árbenz contributed to tense the relations of the 
government with economic elites. Some of these reforms affected the interests of emerging 
manufacturers, like a tax on the production of bottled drinks (ICEFI 2008: 147). However, 
the real show of strength occurred when Árbenz increased the burden held by coffee-
exporters. Árbenz transformed the 1950 additional tax on coffee exports into an ad-valorem 
tax with a sliding scale increasing at par with sale prices. Against the will of coffee 
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exporters, which wanted local prices to be taken as reference, the new tax was based on 
current prices at the New York stock market (IBRD 1955). The tax was set at US$ 4 for 
prices between US$ 30 and US$ 40 per quintal (46 kg), but it doubled for a price above 
US$ 55 per quintal, with a further 25% increase for prices in excess of US$ 60 per quintal 
(IBRD 1955: 5). Because of high coffee prices, the new tax temporarily raised the share of 
export taxes from 8% to 20% of total taxes.   
Significantly, Árbenz also introduced an Income Tax bill to replace the tax on business 
profits established by Ubico in 1938. The bill was under discussion in Congress, and 
presumably about to be approved, when Árbenz was overthrown in June 1954 by a coup 
d’état. The fall of the government postponed the introduction of the income tax until 1962. 
Guatemala was the last country to adopt the tax in Latin America.  
Overall, the governments of the “democratic spring” enacted about one hundred fiscal 
changes, making the 1944-1954 decade the most active reform period in the history of the 
country (ICEFI 2008 : 146). As Adams puts it, popular support allowed Arévalo and 
Árbenz to displace the Guatemalan oligarchy from the core to the margins of political 
decision-making (Adams 1970: 330). A broad supporting coalition allowed reformist 
leaders to implement progressive taxation affecting the interests of the mighty agrarian 
elites, whose contribution in the form of export taxes was raised from 0.45% to 1.43% of 
GDP. Between 1950 and 1954, the share of direct taxes (including export taxes) went from 
19.8% to 25.6% of total taxes. This political equilibrium, however, would not last long.  
Conservative restoration 
The government of Árbenz was overthrown by a US-led coup backed by a coalition of 
agrarian elites, conservative politicians and the Church. President Árbenz announced his 
resignation on June 27th, 1954, following heavy US bombing of the capital city and after 
learning that top Army officials rejected fighting a small group of US-waged mercenaries 
entering the country from neighbouring Honduras. Meeting no armed resistance, the 
victorious "Liberation Army" walked into Guatemala City and proclaimed its leader, 
Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, Head of State with absolute powers. The caudillo abolished 
the 1945 Constitution, disbanded the Congress and ruled by decree until a new Constituent 
Assembly was called in 1956.  
The dictatorship of Castillo was the first in a succession of military governments which 
ruled the country until 1985. The counter-revolutionary coalition closed the political arena 
to the supporters of Árbenz, including peasants, workers organizations and members of 
political parties. Labour unions were outlawed and their members systematically persecuted 
by Castillo and his successors in the office, bringing the rate of unionisation down from 
10.33% of the active population in 1953 to about 1.6 % in 1975 (Dosal 2005: 193). Harsh 
reprisals were also taken against peasant organizations, which as a result remained mostly 
Pre-examination Thesis, July 18th 2016                Page 44 
demobilized until the 1970s (Marti 1994: 72, 73). The political arena was closed to the left 
and the ideology of anticommunism blurred the political centre (Villagrán-Kramer 1993: 
294, 295-296). 
Castillo did not abolish the institutions created during the "Democratic spring”, but he 
revoked the most controversial policies taken by his predecessors in the agrarian, labour 
and fiscal realms (IBRD 1955: 15).  
Castillo was eager to revise fiscal decisions affecting economic elites. He named Jorge 
Echeverria, a representative of agrarian business organizations, and a former Ubico loyalist, 
to the Ministry of Finance in 1954. During his first months in office, Castillo enacted up to 
twelve fiscal laws reducing the burden held by upper income groups (ICEFI, 2008: 156). 
These early decisions only worsened the fiscal crisis caused by political instability and 
Castillo was forced to cut public expenses and restore some of the abolished taxes a few 
weeks later (IBRD 1955: 13; IBRD 1957: 10). When the new government found itself at 
risk of being unable to meet the payroll of public workers in 1954, Castillo turned to the 
leaders of the private sector demanding contributions to sustain the new government, to 
wage and disband the members of the Liberation Army and to pay for reconstruction of the 
capital city (IBRD 1955: 14).  
In approaching the economic elites, Castillo argued that business owners were the main 
beneficiaries of the liberation of the country. After some initial resistance, business leaders 
agreed to a set of emergency, temporary “liberation taxes”. One-time surcharges were 
added to existing taxes on coffee, cotton, sugar and cattle exports, as well as to the sale of 
new cars (IBRD 1955a; ICEFI 2008; Streeter 2001: 147). The property tax rate was 
temporarily doubled, passing from US$ 3 to US$ 6 per thousand; a temporary 1% tax was 
introduced on the gross capital of corporations; a tax equivalent to one-day salary was 
established over high-income employees; finally, a 10% tax on the income of self-
employed professionals was enacted for one year (IBRD 1955: 18, 19).  
Notably, Castillo agrarian elites agreed on keeping the existing tax on coffee-exports and 
even introduced a US$ 3 surcharge in October 1954 (IBRD 1955: 18). Raising coffee prices 
during 1954-1955 increased the tax paid by exporters from US$ 8.65 per quintal in 1954 to 
US$ 18.3 in 1955 (IBRD 1955: 5). As a result, export taxes reached a record share of 25% 
of total tax collections in 1955. The collapse of international prices after 1955, however, 
drastically reduced the yield of taxes on coffee exports.  
Castillo was also able to renegotiate contracts with American companies after returning the 
lands Árbenz had expropriated along the Pacific Coast. For the first time in history, banana 
companies agreed to pay the Guatemalan government a 30% tax on profits (IBRD 1955: 
17; Villagrán-Kramer 1993: 264-265). This deal, however, coincided with the begging of a 
steady decline in the banana trade, so revenue gains resulted small in the long run.  
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The ability of Castillo to obtain temporary fiscal concessions from economic elites, coupled 
with good prices in international coffee markets, translated into a remarkable one-year 
increase in public revenues in relative terms. The country tax burden went up from 7.1% of 
GDP in 1954 to 9.1% in 1955. The figure went back to 8.4% of GDP in 1956 due to a fell 
in coffee prices and the expiration of temporary taxes.  
The domestic fiscal effort of 1954-1956 was surpassed by US loans and direct budgetary 
support to the Guatemalan government. The US State Department put Guatemala at the top 
of its hemispheric priorities after 1954. Taking Guatemala's anti-communist experiment to 
a good end was of great concern for President Dwight Eisenhower, who famously argued 
for the urgency of transforming Guatemala into a “showcase” of capitalist development 
(Handy 1984: 187). Between 1954 and 1957, official US aid to Guatemala reached about 
US$100 million—US aid to Latin America as a whole represented about US$60 million per 
year (Handy, 1984: 188).  
The influence of the US went well beyond the mere provision of financial resources. 
According to Dosal, it was the US who contributed to maintain the equilibrium of forces 
among members of the counter-revolutionary coalition (Dosal 2005: 179). During the 
Castillo administration, American aid agencies took part in major decisions on policy-
making, becoming a sort of parallel government (Dosal 2005: 181). A permanent 
representative of the IBRD was called to the country between 1954 and 1956 to assist a 
recently-created National Economic Council (IBRD 1957: 1). American tutelage was 
extended to policy areas including agriculture, finance, public security and public works 
(Handy 1984: 189).  
Although reforming the tax system ranked high in the policy recommendations made by 
American experts, the US government did little to enforce Castillo Armas’ compliance 
(Streeter 2001: 147). As a result, progressive tax reform was effectively halted in 
Guatemala after 1954. The introduction of an income tax, for example, was avoided overall 
until President John F. Kennedy made of progressive tax reform a condition for Latin 
American governments willing to receive a part of the multi-million funds of the US 
Alliance for Progress.  
A coalition without a leader 
Castillo was murdered in July 1957 in an isolated attack. The counter-revolutionary 
coalition assembled after 1954 survived the magnicide. However, the military leader which 
succeeded Castillo at the Presidential office did not enjoy the support of the conservative 
groups backing the “Liberation Government”. Elections were called three months after the 
murdering of Castillo. Although the members of the coalition were united in their 
determination to prevent the return of the heads of the “democratic spring”, they were 
unable to find an able leader to replace Castillo (Villagrán-Kramer 1993: 304).  
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The result of the 1957 elections favoured Miguel Ortiz Pasarelli, the candidate of the 
incumbent party (Movimiento Democratico Nacionalista, MDN), but the candidate who 
won the second place denounced the occurrence of an electoral fraud. Strikes and 
demonstrations followed in the capital city, and the army decided to stage a coup and call 
for new elections as a means to preclude the resurgence of the left (Ebel 1998; Villagrán-
Kramer 1993). A retired army General, Manuel Ydígoras, won the ballots. Unlike the MDN 
candidate, however, Ydígoras did not count with the support of the counterrevolutionary 
coalition, and lacked a basis of political support of his own. Unable to gain the confidence 
of the army, the landlords and the US government, the regime of Miguel Ydígoras was 
chronically unstable. 
As a mean to obtain political support among regime hard-liners, Ydígoras signed a power-
sharing pact offering the MDN a number of posts in the Cabinet, as well as guarantees of 
immunity over illegal actions committed during the counterrevolution (Villagrán-Kramer 
1993: 322). The creation of an “anti-Communist alliance” was thus announced in the 
National Congress and Ydígoras was sworn President for a six-year term in March 1958.  
Ydígoras found the government in the midst of fiscal emergency. High coffee prices and 
massive (foreign-financed) public investment had allowed the economy grow a spectacular 
27% between 1954 and 1957. But coffee prices plunged in 1958, as did American 
willingness to provide further grants to the government (IBRD 1957; 1962). When 
Ydígoras paid a short visit to Washington a few weeks after his proclamation, he learned 
that neither the US government nor the World Bank were willing to borrow to the country 
until it honoured the existing debt (Ebel 1998: 122).  
Coffee prices lost 40% of its value between 1957 and 1962. Tax revenues declined 
accordingly, passing from 8.5% to 6.5% of GDP between 1957 and 1963. Economic 
stagnation reduced consumption, which was the main source of government revenues. By 
1958 Guatemalan tax revenues depended heavily on custom duties (32%) and excises and 
stamp taxes (45%). By contrast, taxes on coffee exports contributed to a 13% of total taxes 
and the business profit tax to about 8%. Despite the reforms introduced by the 
revolutionary governments, taxes on capital (property, inheritances) still contributed a mere 
2% of total tax revenues.  
The options available to Ydígoras were limited. Sinking coffee prices and a struggling 
economy advised against raising trade taxes. Enforcing property taxation was likely to 
generate opposition from landlords and required major improvements in tax administration. 
And increasing taxes on consumption would likely induce popular protests. Introducing an 
income tax appeared as a more sound choice. Ydígoras had become a proponent of income 
taxation after serving a term as the Guatemalan Ambassador to the UK in the 1940s. 
Moreover, the tax seemed politically viable because it was likely to target a relatively small 
number of industrial and commercial businesses.  
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Contrary to his expectations, the Income Tax Bill was opposed by the business community 
in block. Business elites had created an umbrella organization (CACIF) in 1957 and part of 
its initial activities included opposing the income tax (Ebel 1998). Despite the pact signed 
with Ydígoras, the landlords-dominated MDN blocked the tax in Parliament and forced 
Ydígoras to retire the bill. Business opposition to the tax also defeated a second bill 
introduced by Ydígoras in 1961, even after Ydígoras named Ministry of Finance a 
prominent member of the Agrarian Chamber and reduced the progressive tax rates of the 
tax. 
With his income tax initiatives stalled in Congress, Ydígoras presented a parallel initiative 
aimed at doubling the rate of property taxes from 3% to 6% per thousand of the assessed 
value of estates. But Congress also aborted the law, suggesting instead making a full re-
appraisal of property assessments through a national survey—similar to the one president 
Arévalo had launched unsuccessfully a decade before (IBRD 1962: 17).  
Ydígoras failed to build any social support for his tax initiatives. A small government-
organized demonstration supporting the Income tax only evidenced the precarious base of 
support of the regime (Ebel 1998). The economic downturn associated to the collapse of 
coffee further eroded the popular support to the president, who soon became the victim of 
plotting (Villagrán-Kramer 1993). Extreme-right groups ostensibly liked to the MDN began 
a series of terrorist attacks in the capital city, and by 1961 Ydígoras had already survived 
several coups (Ebel 1998).  
When, in April 1962, a general strike violently repressed by the police threatened bringing 
the regime down, the Army intervened. Ydígoras was only allowed to finish his term by 
subordinating his government to the military. Army officials were designated to all but one 
Ministry. The post of Ministry of Finance was reserved to Raúl Reyna Rosal, a colonel 
which had occupied the same post in the months following the 1954 coup.  
It was under this new political equilibrium that the government sent a third income tax bill 
to the Congress in October 1962. This time, the government argued the compromises 
assumed by the country when signing up to be eligible to receive funds from the US 
Alliance for Progress. The law was approved within one month, retaining the progressive 
character of the existing profits tax, with the top bracket set at 37% (ICEFI 2008). 
However, firms involved in activities of export agriculture obtained significant exemptions 
and a unique rate of 10% (Guerra Borges 2006: 231). Similar exemptions were obtained by 
industries, as long as they could demonstrate that up to 50% of total raw materials used in 
production originated in Guatemala (Marti 1994: 125). As a result of these exemptions, 
income taxation only occasionally contributed to more than 15% of total taxes between 
1964 and 1980.  
The Income Tax Law was accompanied by a crucial concession to coffee-exporters, who in 
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October 1962 obtained one of their long-standing demands. The sliding scale linked to tax 
quotations in New York was replaced by a tax based on local market prices. The change 
was introduced despite the fact that international prices were low at the time. This was 
probably the most relevant fiscal measure agreed during the term of Ydígoras, if only for its 
negative long-term consequences. When coffee prices began rising again after 1963, the 
government failed to reap any substantial tax revenue from coffee exports (IBRD 1965: 
10). 
In preparation for the 1963 elections, Ydígoras announced he would allow former president 
Juan José Arévalo (1945-1951) to return from exile. Although Ydígoras presented the 
decision as a proof of his commitment to pluralism, contemporary observers interpreted it 
as a manoeuvre to divide the left and consolidate the conservative votes on the candidate of 
his own party (Villagrán-Kramer 1993). The army voiced its veto for the return of Arévalo, 
who a few days later appeared by surprise at a press conference in the capital city. In the 
afternoon of that day, Ydígoras was overthrown by his Ministry of Defence, Colonel 
Enrique Peralta Azurdia. Both Arévalo and Ydígoras were forced into exile and the military 
acquired direct command over the government after April, 1963.  
By the time of the coup Ydígoras had managed to alienate all the groups in Castillo's 
counter-revolutionary coalition (i.e.: business groups, conservative political parties, and the 
anti-Communist factions among the military). Demobilized labour organizations were as 
distrustful of Ydígoras as was the population at large, which saw the government as corrupt 
and ineffective. And the US perceived Ydígoras as a risk to stability in a region directly 
influenced by the developments in Fidel Castro's Cuba. According to some versions, 
President John F. Kennedy personally gave green light to the 1963 military coup (Black 
1984: 21; Dunkerley 1989: 443).  
Cementing a stable coalition 
The military coup of 1963 established the political prevalence of the army. As Schirmer 
notes, then the Guatemalan military went from “having a determinant presence in the 
civilian structure of the state to assume the control of the State itself” (Schirmer 1999: 44). 
In contrast to the 1957 intervention, this time the military kept the control of government 
until they decided the country was ready to concur to elections again (Adams 1970: 276).  
The de facto government of Peralta annulled the 1956 Constitution, dissolved the 
Parliament and the Judiciary, suspended the incoming 1963 elections and prohibited all 
political activities (Villagrán-Kramer 1993: 380). The existing state of siege was declared 
permanent. Henceforth repression increased notably, especially as a group of disenchanted 
army officials founded the first guerrilla group in the country (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, 
FAR) and began its military activities in an eastern region of the country. Counter-insurgent 
violence would produce victims by the hundreds during the next years.  
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The military takeover represented an opportunity to build a coalition similar to the one 
established after the 1954 counterrevolution. Representatives of all business sectors voiced 
their approval of the coup and their support to the de facto government of Peralta (Villagrán 
Kramer, 1993: 381, 382). Peralta promised that no land expropriation would happen 
aduring his term nd labour unions would be kept in check. He also voiced the commitment 
of his government to promote the “principles of free enterprise as fundamental for the 
democratic development of the national economy” (SIG 1964: 74, 88-90). The IBRD noted 
the success of the de facto government in “restoring an atmosphere of business confidence” 
(IBRD 1965: 1).  
The new political equilibrium translated into concrete actions on the part of the 
government. As Dosal notes, the government of Peralta was something of a “golden age” 
for business elites, for the military “essentially delegated policy-making to economic 
interest groups representing the private sector” (Dosal 2005: 178). Like Ydígoras, Peralta 
reserved the Ministries of Economy and Agriculture to figures linked to the private sector. 
Business representatives were included in government Planning commission, which helped 
direct public investment to infrastructure projects benefiting the private sector (Dosal 2005: 
196).  
Peralta committed to increase the share of manufacturing over the national product and 
promote agricultural diversification. Businesses involved in the cultivation and processing 
of cotton, beef and rubber benefited from increased credit support by public development 
banks and the Central Bank (IBRD 1965: 3). Between 1952 and 1963, the area devoted to 
cotton cultivation increased tenfold, and by 1963 cotton exports already accounted for a 
20% of foreign exchange earnings. 
Meanwhile, industrialists benefited from public subsidies and credit, protectionist 
restrictions and established tax exemptions. Peralta also authorized the creation of an 
Industrial Bank to promote investments in manufacturing. The capital of the Bank was to 
be provided by industrialists with the equivalent to 10% of the tax exemptions granted by 
Ydígoras in a 1959 Law of Industrial Development (Dosal 2005: 197).  
However, he relations between the military and business elites were not free from 
occasional friction. Under Peralta, the military tried to keep a certain degree of autonomy 
on fiscal matters. He reserved the Ministry of Finance for an army official, Major Jorge 
Lucas Caballeros, and repeatedly called business groups to contribute to the development 
of the country by paying taxes (Villagrán Kramer, 1993: 388).  
Ydígoras had left the government in the depths of a major fiscal crisis. Between 1960 and 
1962, tax revenues declined from 8.6% to 6.5% of GDP. In 1962 the government already 
owed several months of salaries to public workers–including the army ranks (SIG 1964: 26, 
27). Like Ydígoras and Castillo before him, fiscal hardship forced Peralta to introduce a 
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number of tax measures during his first months in government. Peralta ruled de facto and 
had the capacity to legislate on his own without seeking parliamentary approval (Villagrán-
Kramer 1993: 380). Between June and September 1963, the government passed a package 
of tax reforms aimed at increasing public revenues in the short term. Except for a 10% tax 
on cotton exports and essential oils, which targeted the profits of emerging economic 
groups, the most significant reforms affected taxpayers of all capacities. These measures 
included an across-the-board 300% increase in valuations of properties of all sizes; 
doubling the value of stamp taxes and stamped paper from 0.5% to 1%, and the 
transformation of the existing import tax on gasoline into an excise. The last measure was 
the most significant in terms of revenue gains, for the new excise augmented the yields 
produced by gasoline imports from US$ 1.5 million to US$ 6.8 million by 1966–or about 
eight percent of total taxes (ICEFI 2008). 
Notably, Peralta also introduced a reformed, sweetened version of the Income Tax Law 
approved under Ydígoras. The reformed tax included a reduction in maximum rates and 
excluded medium and small agricultural producers. Significantly, agro-exporters were 
allowed to deduce export taxes from their income tax liability (IBRD 1965: 8-9; Villagrán 
Kramer 1993: 388-389; SIG, 1964: 49-52; ICEFI 2008). Finally, Peralta refused to link 
again coffee export taxes to variations in international prices. As a result, high coffee prices 
after 1963 did not translate into substantial gains for the Treasury.  
CACIF voiced in block their opposition to some of the reforms, but direct confrontation 
was limited (McCleary 1999: 12; Marti 1994). Peralta did confront strong, isolated 
opposition by cotton exporters because of the new 10% tax. Although cotton growers and 
exporters protested the new tax, they failed to mobilize the private sector as a whole. In 
general cotton producers did not belong to traditional oligarchic families, for cotton was a 
relatively new enterprise in the country. After the introduction of the tax, prominent cotton 
growers formed the National Cotton Council in 1964, an interest group independent from 
CACIF. Fighting government taxes was set as one of its foundational aims (Adams 1970: 
364).  
Peralta called to elect members for a Constituent Assembly in 1964. A new Constitution 
was drafted in 1965 and elections were called for 1966. The new Constitution increased the 
costs of registering new parties and banned all political organizations with “communistic 
ideologies”, as well as parties inspired by “exotic ideologies”–including Social and 
Christian democratic programs (Black 1984: 22). The Army created a party (Partido 
Institutional Democrático, PID) to participate in the elections in coalition with hard-core 
MDN anti-communists, now grouped into the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN) 
(Villagrán Kramer, 1993: chapter IX).  
Méndez: a coalition captive 
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The PID-MLN designate lost the 1966 elections to the only civilian candidate participating 
in the polls, Julio César Méndez Montenegro. The unexpected victory of Méndez raised 
concerns for both business elites and the Army. Méndez was forced to sign a secret pact 
with the Army before taking the presidential oath. The pact granted absolute autonomy to 
the military in deciding upon issues of domestic security (Villagrán Kramer, 1993: Chapter 
X). As a result of the pact, the government of Méndez did little to reduce state violence 
against civilians. A massive counter-insurgent campaign led by Colonel Francisco Arana 
virtually wiped out the FAR guerrillas operating in rural regions.  
At the beginning, military ‘tutelage’ over Méndez was restricted to issues of domestic 
security. The president was allowed to name civilians to all Cabinet posts except the 
Ministry of Defence. Customarily, the President reserved the Ministries of Economy and 
Agriculture to individuals linked to the private sector. However, he reserved the rest of 
cabinet posts to professionals with no direct links to business or the military (Dosal 2005: 
199). The Ministry of Finance was headed by Juan Alberto Fuentes Mohr, a social-
democratic leader and a strong advocate of progressive tax reform.  
Peralta had left the government in a relatively strong financial position, but the new 
administration needed to increase public investment, which had remained depressed for 
most of the decade as a result of revenue shortages (IBRD 1968: 8). A first tax initiative 
was presented to the Congress in October 1966, a few weeks after Méndez was named 
President. The bill essentially aimed at boosting the share of direct taxes, which at the time 
accounted for 18% of total tax revenues. The core change was establishing a progressive 
scale to taxes on capital (property and land) in order to raise collections from US$3.3 
million to US$8 million (ICEFI 2008: 174). The bill also proposed taxing inheritances, 
donations and plane tickets, as well as eliminating income tax exemptions benefiting 
exporters (Marti 1994: 127).  
The private sector immediately expressed its disagreement (Dosal 2005: 200-201). The 
industrialists, for example, rejected the proposal arguing that the government should rather 
spend more efficiently and combat corruption (Dosal 2005: 201). Unable to build support 
for the tax package, Méndez hit a deal with business representatives in Congress in 
November 1966. The government obtained a temporary set of tax changes including small 
increases to property and income taxation, as well as on stamp taxes. New taxes were 
established on the purchase of air tickets and car sales (IBRD 1968: 8). In exchange, 
business groups benefited from an even more liberal regime of tariff exemptions for 
emerging industries, which in turn stimulated the widespread practice of fraudulently 
registering existing industries to take advantage of fiscal incentives (IBRD 1968: 7).  
A second tax reform initiative about a year later, this time focused on indirect taxes, also 
faced strong business opposition. In November 1967, the Executive proposed establishing a 
5% sales tax to all non-subsistence goods, a 20% sales tax to luxury products and 
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increasing stamp taxes from 1.5% to 2% of sales value (Dosal 2005: 202; ICEFI 2008: 
175). The reform also proposed maintaining the 1966 emergency taxes for a further year.  
Afraid of being deposed by the military because of what business representatives called 
"communistic reforms", President Méndez vetoed his own bill after the Congress had 
approved most of it (Dosal 2005: 202). He also ceded to business pressure to remove from 
Fuentes Mohr, the independent ministry of Finance (Fuentes 1971). The government 
managed to keep in force the 1966 emergency package for a further year, but severe 
expenditure cuts were included in the 1968 budget (IBRD 1968: 9). Finally, when in 1968 a 
new initiative to reform the income tax met renewed opposition in block by the private 
sector, Méndez declared he would not attempt to reform taxes for the rest of his presidential 
term.  
Although the military were ostensibly interested in strengthening state finances, they feared 
that business opposition could threaten regime stability and benefit the resurgence of the 
left. Army tutelage over the government became more intense at the end of the Presidential 
term of Mendez. An army colonel, Emilio Peralta, was named Minister of Finance in 1969.  
As a consequence of these failed reforms, tax revenues remained stagnant at about 7.8% of 
GDP between 1966 and 1970. At the end of the government of Méndez, the tax structure 
was basically the same left by the de facto government of Peralta, with indirect taxation 
accounting for 83% of total tax revenues and direct taxes for the rest. About one fourth of 
tax revenues originated from excises, another 25% from specific sales and stamp taxes, and 
a further 25% from custom duties. Export taxes accounted for 6% of total taxes. Finally, 
income taxes contributed to just 10% of total tax collections, and property taxation 4%.  
The militarized state, 1970-1978 
Méndez was succeeded at the Presidency by General Carlos Arana Osorio, the first of the 
five military leaders ruling the country between 1970 and 1985. As Black notes, Arana 
(1970-1984) can be considered the “founding father” of the militarized state in Guatemala, 
for the army consolidated its political prevalence during his term (Black 1984: 53). Indeed, 
all presidents between 1970 and 1985 were active army Generals. While Arana and his two 
immediate successors at the Presidency (both incumbent Ministries of Defence running on 
PID tickets) were elected in restricted or fraudulent elections, the last two were imposed as 
a result of coups precipitated by internal factionalism in the army.  
The relations between the military and business elites became more problematic as military 
encroachment over institutions increased. With the precedent of Peralta in mind, business 
elites assumed economic policy-making would be left in their hands again, while indirectly 
benefiting from the repression of organized workers, peasants and progressive political 
parties (Marti 1994; Dosal 2005). While the military did scale repression into full-fledged 
state terrorism, leading to one of the worst human rights records in the hemisphere, they 
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also grew increasingly autonomous on economic policy-making (Black 1984; Dunkerley 
1989; Dosal 2005).  
The ascent of Arana marked a sharp departure in the role of the military as protectors of 
private property. As Arana put it, “if the army are to combat subversion, they don’t have to 
be the employees of the rich, but their partners” (quoted in Dunkerley, 1989: 467). The 
gradual militarization of the state provided the Army High Command with numerous 
opportunities for graft and privilege, which transformed the military "from custodians of 
the wealth of others to an economic power in their own right” (Black 1984: 25).  
Corruption, which was not unknown to Guatemalans, reached new heights under the 
military regime (Black 1984: 32; Dosal 2005: 209-211). Members of the military were 
included in government posts of all ranks, which opened ample room for graft and 
corruption. Arana founded a bank (Banco del Ejército) whose board was composed by 
members of the high command. And Arana cultivated the support of rank-and-file troops by 
increasing salaries and founding a military pension and investment fund (Dosal 2005: 233). 
The army high command even appropriated a large part of the territory while developing a 
“Franja transversal” which crossed the country from west to east (Black 1984). 
Although the control of the army over other the state was gradual, the definitive breakdown 
of the post-1954 alliance took place at the end of the 1970 decade, when military officials 
ventured in economic parcels long monopolized by oligarchic families. Using their 
privileged political access, military leaders hoarded emerging business opportunities with 
foreign investors, blocked domestic competitors and invested in agrarian, industrial, 
commercial and financial parcels once reserved to oligarchic families (Black 1984). 
Military businessmen benefited from controlling customs and tax administration, and 
enjoyed a privileged access to public funds and loans (Black 1984; McCleary 1999). 
General Arana alone, for example, embarked in “meat processing, fisheries, timber, 
construction, vehicle importing, cement works, publishing, broadcasting and breweries” 
(Black 1984: 38).  
Tax reform under military regimes 
The governments of General Carlos Arana (1970-74), General Kjell Laugerud (1974-78) 
and General Romeo Lucas (1978-81) attempted to increase state activism in the economy. 
As Dosal explains, the policies implemented by the military were closer to Keynesianism 
than to the laissez-faire ideology dominant among business elites and conservative political 
groups (Dosal 2005: 226). Hence, the military increased public investment and engaged in 
deficit spending. While much of this effort was financed through foreign borrowing, the 
military also attempted to reform taxes.  
Arana was the mildest tax reformer among the three generals ruling the country during the 
1970s and enjoyed a positive relationship with the agrarian, commercial and industrial 
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elites (McCleary 1999; Black 1984). This was evident when he named Jorge Lamport 
Rodil, an economist linked to agrarian elites, to the Ministry of Finance. Lamport remained 
in the charge for 89 months—the longest term in the history of the country.  
Arana endorsed an ambitious five-year Development Plan elaborated largely without 
consultation to business groups, but it ignored all recommendations on tax reform. The plan 
recommended increasing income and property taxes, and substituting stamp taxes for a 
general sales tax (Dosal 2005; Black 1984). Arana, however, announced he would not to 
raise existing tax rates or establish new taxes during his term. Instead, his government 
opted to finance the workings of the plan by enforcing existing taxes and combating tax 
evasion and avoidance (IBRD 1970: 45). The government also ignored a comprehensive 
package of tax reforms designed by the Planning Office in 1973, which included a 
substantial increase in export taxation.  
A powerful exogenous shock at the end of the Presidential term of Arana, however, 
changed government's disposition towards tax reform. The Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) declared an oil embargo in October 1973, precipitating 
increases in the prices of gasoline and imported products. These, in turn, translated in a 
sharp inflationary spiral, with the price index raising from 0.57% in 1972 to 30% in 1974. 
After much internal deliberation, the government advanced a broad anti-inflationary 
programme on May 1974 which included an "excess profits" tax in exports of coffee, 
cotton, sugar, meat and shrimp (1974GUATEM03071_b).  
The government bill was processed by the tax committee in Congress within 24 hours 
arguing it was necessary to combating inflation and paying for popular subsidies in bus 
fares, basic grains and electric power rates. The Congress also demanded business tax 
compliance to finance development investment and to combat the subversives (ICEFI 
2008). Besides, they argued, there was enough room to expand the contribution of 
exporters, which had decreased from 10.7% of total taxes in 1960 to 5.8% in 1971 despite 
high prices in international markets.  
Surprised by the imminent approval of the initiative, business organizations organized a 
broad opposition campaign against the bill. Headed by coffee-growers, agricultural 
exporters threatened paralysing all agricultural activities in the event of the bill passing 
through the Congress or the president failing to veto it (ICEFI 2008). As in previous rounds 
of tax reforms, landlords' opposition was backed by representatives of economic sectors not 
directly affected by the proposal, including the Chamber of Industry. Business groups 
launched a large public relations campaign, which the US Embassy qualified as the 
"strongest in embassy memory", and manoeuvred behind the scenes to divide Congress 
(1974GUATEM03071_b).  
The pressure of business organizations forced the Congress to open a negotiation table in 
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early June, 1974. The talks, which according to Finance Minister Lamport basically 
allowed business representatives to write down the law details, resulted in a substantially 
weakened bill (Marti 1994: 131). At the end of the day, the parliament approved the new 
taxes, but the defeat of government was total: the new law actually reduced the rates paid 
by coffee exporters, left cotton and meat exports temporarily untaxed and established 
insignificant charges to sugar, shrimp and fish exports (Marti 1994: 132).  
The tax reform outcome signalled both the strength of business organizations and the 
degree to which Arana was unprepared to breach the military alliance with economic elites. 
The opposition of business groups to progressive tax reform endangered the stability of the 
military regime because it targeted the interests of one of the core members of Arana’s 
supporting coalition.  
This new lost battle had unexpected consequences, however, for a frost in Brazilian coffee 
states increased the prices of Guatemalan coffee in international markets, thus eventually 
making the revised tax scales profitable. While in 1974-75 a quintal of coffee (46 kg) was 
sold at an average annual price of US$ 65, in 1976 the price increased to US$ 142, and 
boomed to US$ 242 the following year. When peak prices reached US$ 300, coffee 
exporters had to pay up to 50% in taxes on the overprice per quintal, an outcome they did 
not anticipate when designing the tax scales (Marti 1994: 132). High coffee-prices in 1977-
1978 led to the highest tax revenues in the history of the country—10% of GDP.   
 Kjell Laugerud, 1974-1978  
Arana hand-picked his Ministry of Defence, Kjell Laugerud, to lead the PID-MLN 
Presidential ticket for the March 1974 elections. Laugerud lost the election but Arana 
fraudulently announced the partial victory of the incumbent candidate, who then was 
confirmed as President by a Congress dominated by the official party 
(1975GUATEM00019_b).  
The government of Laugerud had to deal with sharp price increases—inflation set at 30%. 
A few weeks after entering office, Laugerud presented an emergency economic 
programme. It included price controls, a cut in capital expenditures and a tax reform 
package. The tax bill included measures affecting consumers at large, such as a 33% rise in 
the stamp tax and increases in the rates of beer, liquor and cigarette taxes. But it also 
introduced a sliding scale for property taxation from 3% to 12%, a 10% surcharge on 
income taxes for yearly incomes above US$10,000, and additional charges to luxury goods, 
airport fees and motor vehicles.  
CACIF protested the bill but it was approved by Congress in late 1974. An additional law 
was approved to combat tax evasion and avoidance (ICEFI 2008: 183). Except for a 
temporary 50% increase in income tax collections, however, the tax package failed to 
produce any noticeable effect over total tax revenues.  
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A further show of strength occurred when the country was hit by a destructive earthquake 
in February 1976. A few days after the catastrophe, the government of Laugerud issued a 
set of compulsory "Bonds for National Reconstruction" which doubled the contribution of 
direct taxes to total taxes. These resources, coupled with heavy lending abroad, contributed 
to a vigorous rate of economic growth (7%), which in turn buffered consumption and tax 
revenues (ICEFI 2008: 184). The record-high price levels for coffee substantially increased 
export tax collections in 1977-1978, providing windfall revenues to the government.  
The ruling coalition falls apart 
Laugerud was succeeded at the office by his Defence Minister, General Romeo Lucas 
García. The government of Lucas marked the beginning of the definitive disintegration of 
the post-1954 coalition, for the military grew increasingly isolated from its civilian 
counterparts (Dosal 2005: 37; Black 1984: 49). Indeed, economic elites bitterly complained 
about the "Somosization" of the Guatemalan political system (in reference to the regime of 
Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua). Business leaders denounced military cronyism, 
corruption and the incursion of army figures in business formerly reserved for the oligarchy 
(McCleary 1999).  
Lucas even threatened to nationalize key business sectors and attacked the monopolies built 
by prominent oligarchic families. He attempted, for example, to make the Novella family to 
sell the only cement factory in the country by establishing price controls, setting production 
quotas and allowing for cement imports (Dosal 2005: 235). Business investment confidence 
slumped and massive capital flight started, putting the government in severe balance of 
payments problems which would last until the mid-1980s (Black 1984: 56).  
CACIF representatives gradually lost their influence over government decisions on 
economic policy and tax reform. Lucas reserved the head of the Ministry of Finance to a 
military official, Colonel Hugo Tulio Búcaro, who was unwilling to make concessions to 
economic elites. For example, although he agreed to exempt coffee exporters for sales 
below US$90 per quintal, Búcaro did not remove the tax ceiling, forcing exporters to pay a 
45% tax for prices over US$105 per quintal (ICEFI 2008: 185).  
Political violence against the opposition reached new heights, as state forces engaged in a 
systematic campaign of kidnapping and assassination affecting thousands of civilians in 
urban and rural areas. By the end of the 1970 decade the country had entered into a full-
blown civil war. Between 1978 and 1982, the Guatemalan tax burden decreased from 
10.2% to 7.2% of GPD. Unable to increase tax revenues in the context of a civil war, the 
government engaged in substantial lending abroad. If by 1976 public external debt matched 
tax revenues, by 1981 the ratio of debt to tax collections was 2:1. In 1985 it had increased 
to 5:1.  
Lucas was overthrown in 1982 during a coup staged by factions among the Army 
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officialdom discontent with corruption and ineffective government administration (Black 
1984: 60). Henceforth, General Efraín Ríos Montt ruled as Head of State until a new coup 
brought his government down a year later encumbering his Ministry of Defence, General 
Óscar Mejía.  
Both Ríos and Mejía ruled in a more complex context than former military leaders, for the 
civil war had extended to most of the territory. The display of regular troops and a one-
million strong paramilitary corps in the countryside to carry scorched-earth missions 
notably increased the financial needs of the army. In addition, the Guatemalan economy 
was shocked by the 1980 Latin American debt crisis. By 1984, tax revenues had halved 
from a record high in 1978 (10.2% of GDP) to 5.3% of GDP.  
Business representatives initially shown some support to the de facto government or Ríos, 
but their relations with the dictator cooled down when Ríos introduced price controls, 
import limitations and currency controls to avoid capital flight attempted, as well as a tax 
reform (McCleary 1999). In 1983, Ríos proposed reforming the income tax, transforming 
the existing sales tax into a Value Added Tax and establishing selective consumption taxes 
on industrial products (ICEFI 2007). Ríos also included in the bill a proposal to gradually 
substitute trade taxes for sales taxes (ICEFI 2007: 191).  
While the dictators attempted to avoid direct confrontation with agrarian groups on tax 
matters, a USAID-designed programme to promote agricultural development through a 
redistributive land reform antagonized landlords’ organizations. The initiative threatened to 
expropriate idle lands to large landowners in the fertile South Coast of the country. The 
agrarian reform was never implemented, for Ríos was ousted by the Army high-command 
in early 1983.  
General Humberto Mejía (1983-1985) also had stormy relations with the organized private 
sector (McCleary 1999: 56). Despite the critical budgetary situation of the government, 
Mejía announced his decision to reduce the VAT rate from 10% to 7% and introducing 
exemptions on about three hundred basic products (ICEFI 2007: 192). He also proposed 
making reforms to the Income Tax Law. The fierce opposition of CACIF forced Mejía to 
scale down his income tax proposal and introducing new exemptions for exports and 
imports (ICEFI 2007: 192).  
In early 1985, Mejía enacted four decrees introducing important changes in taxes affecting 
the business of prominent oligarchic families. These included suppressing the exemptions 
on poultry farming and increasing taxes over spirits and bottled water. A new, temporal 
export tax was also established on coffee exports made to countries which were not 
members of the International Coffee Organization. Finally, small changes were introduced 
in the Income Tax Law, stamp taxes and the VAT. All the government decrees, however, 
were abrogated a few weeks later out of the coordinated opposition of business 
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organizations (ICEFI 2007: 193). The government opened a dialogue table with the private 
sector, resulting into a tax package that produced few revenue gains to the Treasury (ICEFI 
2007: 194).  
The latter were the last failed tax reforms of the authoritarian era in Guatemala. Henceforth 
a Constituent Assembly was called and general elections took place leading to the election 
of a new legislature and a civilian president in late 1985. The authoritarian decades ended 
with one of the lowest tax burdens in the continent and a notably regressive tax system. The 
Guatemalan tax structure had shifted from one where trade taxes provided the bulk of 
revenues to another where general consumption taxes prevailed. The share of direct taxes, 
however, did not increase substantially over time, and by 1984 it represented less than 1% 
of GDP (17% of total taxes). Perhaps more importantly given the political economy of the 
country, the contribution of export taxes had declined to 0.3% of GDP by the end of the 
period (5.7% of total taxes) and would never recover.  
*** 
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b. Honduras 
 
As neighbouring Guatemala, Honduras went through a number of important 
transformations in the years following the end of the Second World War. An authoritarian 
caudillo ruling for 16 uninterrupted years was replaced in 1949 by a government with a 
clear mandate to modernize the country. Modernization implied to embark in a 
development agenda focused on substituting imports for local manufactures, agriculture 
diversification and increasing state functions. Modernization also required to reform the 
antiquated tax system inherited from the 1940s to finance increased expenditure. 
During the period studied here, Honduran tax policies were different to the ones 
implemented in Guatemala. Although government initiatives to reform taxes did not go 
without opposition, Honduran leaders were more successful than their Guatemalan peers in 
carrying out their most important reform initiatives. This was the case even when the 
proposed tax changes faced the opposition of prominent economic groups. Crucially, as this 
chapter will describe,.   
Between1949-1978, the share of taxes as percentage of Gross Domestic Product tripled in 
Honduras. This chapter argues that this outcome was only possible because intra-elite 
divisions allowed the Honduran government to build support among emerging capitalists, 
at the expense of the landed oligarchy. Authoritarian rules in Honduras built a broader 
coalition of supporters including industrialists and, in occasion, members of the labour and 
peasant movement.  
Antecedent conditions 
As in the case of Guatemala, the years leading up to the reform years of the mid-20th 
century were marked by the rule of a single authoritarian caudillo. General Tiburcio Carías 
Andino governed Honduras between 1932 and 1949. As Jorge Ubico in neighbouring 
Guatemala (1931-1944), Anastasio Somoza (father) in Nicaragua (1936-1956), and 
Maximiliano Hernández in El Salvador (1931-1944), Carías ascent into power occurred 
during the severe political crisis precipitated by the Great Depression of 1929.  
The presidency of Carías brought the longest period of stability to the republican history of 
the country (Booth and Walker, 1999: 52). A ruthless dictator in most accounts, Carías 
pacified Honduras after several decades of internecine violence, recurrent coups and 
frequent armed challenges to the weak authority of the Central government. Until the 
arrival of Carías, Honduran politics were ridden by conflicts, as different factions 
continuously competed to control the state and the meagre benefits associated with it. 
Between 1900 and 1933 (the year Carías arrived into power), there were 14 government 
changes and 159 episodes of civil war (Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 80-81) 
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Carías is also credited with extending the territorial reach of the state to the most remote 
regions in the country (Arancibia, 2001: 50; See also D’Ans, 2002). National integration 
was constrained by a rugged, mountainous geography, which hindered internal 
communications, distorted agricultural development and marked its politics with strong 
localisms (Bulmer-Thomas, 1990: 283; Funes, 2000: 44).  
Unlike neighbouring Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua, government initiatives to 
promote coffee production in Honduras in the late 19th century proved unsuccessful. Low 
population density, bad communications and large distances between producers and ports 
prevented the establishment of the monoculture. This, in turn, was detrimental to the 
formation of a strong national oligarchy comparable to those of Guatemala and El Salvador 
(Booth and Walker, 1999: 51; Funes, 2000: 44). Wealthy landholders lacked the cohesion 
of their peers in other coffee republics.  
A state existing more on paper than in reality, Honduras lacked a formal Treasury during 
the years that went from its independence of Spain (1821) until the 1880s. President Marco 
Aurelio Soto (1876-1883) introduced regular taxes on cattle trade, tobacco, and alcoholic 
beverages and ordered a throughout reform in the national customs, rising collections from 
270,000 to 700,000 pesos between 1875 and 1878 (D’Ans, 2002: 168). Importantly, these 
government revenues were used to pay the service of three large foreign loans acquired in 
1866, 1968 and 1870 to build a failed railroad (Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 92). As successive 
governments were unable to pay, outstanding debt was consolidated and bought by the US 
only in 1926. By that time Honduras owed nearly £30 million, having one of the highest 
external debts in the world on a per capita basis (Bulmer-Thomas, 1990: 284). The 
Honduran state only managed to complete payments in 1953 (MHCPC, 1953: 182).  
Highly indebted and lacking a stable financial base to play any role in promoting 
development, Honduran governments at the turn of the 20th century had little options but to 
grant generous tax exemptions to foreign investors interested in metal mining and exporting 
fruits. In this context, and thanks to recent technological advances in the development of 
steam-motors which shortened the time ships needed to transport fruit from distant places, a 
number of American companies began exporting bananas from the Honduran North Coast 
in the late 19th century (D’Ans, 2002). Contracts were signed between the Honduran state 
and American banana companies for periods up to 99 years.  
In the following decades, Honduras went from having a marginal position in the banana 
trade at the dawn of the 20th century, to becoming the first producer in the world by 1928. 
However, the Honduran state did not profit from the banana boom (Euraque 2001:41-42). 
The Honduran state did not charge taxes on the production of bananas until 1919. Indeed, 
according to Bulmer-Thomas, tax exemptions to banana companies reached a point after 
1919 where the amount exempted exceeded total government revenues from all sources 
(Bulmer-Thomas, 1990: 285).  
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The arrival of foreign investment displaced local entrepreneurs and further inhibited the 
formation of a national oligarchy (Isaula 1990: 58-59; D’Ans, 2002). Indeed, prominent 
members of the traditional landholding elites were enlisted in the payrolls of foreign 
companies (Morris, 1984: 7Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 70-71).  
The fortunes of the banana trade and of Honduras would dramatically change after 1929. 
As in Guatemala, the 1929 Great Depression had devastating consequences in the 
Honduran context. Coupled with the decline in banana production because of a pest, the 
crisis put banana exports on the brink of collapse, and with it the Honduran economy –
banana exports represented 85% of total exports in 1929. A major side effect was a sharp 
decline in the precarious state revenues, mainly as a consequence of a declining custom 
duties (Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 96-98). While in the fiscal year 1929-1930 the 
government had collected 14 million Lempiras (from all sources), in the year 1930-31 tax 
revenues decreased to L 11.8 million (a 20% decline), remaining below L 14 million until 
1945 (SHCPC, 1947: 108). The government incurred in deficits and enacted dramatic 
budget cuts, which only contributed to worsen the effects of the economic depression 
(D’Ans, 2002: 208).  
As a result of the global economic crisis, fruit companies closed plantations in Honduras, 
fired workers by the thousands and threatened with total foreclosure if they were not freed 
from contractual obligations with the Honduran government (D’Ans, 2002). Social unrest 
was widespread among the 22,000 workers the companies employed in the North Coast, 
thousands of which were seeing their salaries reduced unilaterally. As political protest 
mounted, so did repressive public responses to mobilization. It was against that backdrop 
that General Tiburcio Carías scaled into power as an alternative to political chaos (Morris, 
1984: 8).  
The social peace came at a high cost. Carías suppressed civil rights, restricted political 
activities, closed newspapers, blurred elections and smashed domestic political opposition. 
Honduras liked to say that Carías political opponents had only three options: “entierro, 
destierro, o encierro” (Burial, exile or jail) (Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 108-109; Funes, 
2000). Building on his direct command over the military, Carias appointed loyalists to the 
National Congress and the Supreme Court of Justice, managing to stay in power for sixteen 
years.  
The endurance of Carías regime was further tested by an exogenous shock when World 
War Two broke out. Because the economies of Central America were so dependent on 
agricultural exports, the disruption of international trade associated with war (especially 
with the American war efforts) had important impacts in the region. Public revenues were 
also affected, as custom duties declined from L 5.4 million in 1939 to L 4.2 million in 
1943. Export tax collections went from L 300,000 to L 96,000 in the same period (SEH, 
1955: 477; see also Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 110).  
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Carías did little in the way of reforming taxes to increase government revenues, opting 
instead to reduce public expenditures (from L 12.3 million in 1939 to L 11.1 million in 
1943) (SHCPC, 1948: 16-17). As Ubico in Guatemala, Carias also managed to reduce 
public debt, from L 28.6 million in 1933 to L 12,4 million in 1948 (SHCPC, 1948: 19). 
A modernizing regime 
The fall of Jorge Ubico in Guatemala and Maximiliano Hernandez in El Salvador (1944), 
coupled with a notorious change in US attitudes towards authoritarian caudillos after the 
Second World War, moved Carías to call for restricted elections in 1949 (Morris, 1984: 9; 
Barahona, 2005: 135-137). Elections were won by Juan Manuel Gálvez, the Ministry of 
War of Carías and a former employee of the Banana companies. Despite the tutelage of the 
caudillo, the new president allowed political exiles back, opposition parties to organize 
again, and unofficial newspapers to surge. Much as the “revolutionary” presidents in 
Guatemala (1944-1954), Gálvez adopted a modernizing program aimed at developing the 
country.  
Gálvez established a Central Bank (which first enforced the use of a single, national 
currency), a Development Bank (to provide credit to agricultural and industrial producers), 
and an Economic Planning Council (all under the close supervision of IMF’s advisors) 
(Barahona, 2005: 140). Between 1949 and 1953 the government of Gálvez founded the 
Ministry of Agriculture and a National Institute of Tourism; elaborated a Code of 
Commerce, founded the National Enterprise for Electric Energy (1957) and promoted a 
throughout educational reform (Barahona, 2005: 141; Arancibia, 2001: 55). The 
government also invested a large share of the new revenues on infrastructures, especially 
national roads and electricity, as both were seen as necessary conditions to industrialize the 
country (Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 131-132, 158). However, unlike Arévalo and Árbenz in 
Guatemala, Gálvez shied away from granting rights to workers, redistributing land or 
expanding social protection.  
When Gálvez took power state revenues depended mainly on customs taxes, which 
accounted for about 75% of total tax collections, stamp taxes (20%) and export taxes (3%) 
(SEH, 1955: 477). Other important sources of (non-tax) public revenues were public 
monopolies (Alcohol, spirits and powder).  
 Taxing the upper-income groups 
Once in power Gálvez proceeded to reform the fiscal system, an area long neglected by 
Carías. The Government invited an IMF mission which proposed three major changes in 
the tax laws. These included increasing tariffs, changing the existing law on inheritance 
taxes (in effect since 1938, but with null fiscal impact: L 10,934 over L 4 million total tax 
revenues), and introducing income taxation. The executive was unable to pass the first two 
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measures through Congress, but an Income Tax Law was approved in November 1949 
(SHCPC, 1949: 6- 7).  
The income tax represented a major incorporation to Honduras’ tax system, as it alone 
accounted for an increase in total tax collections from 15% of total taxes in 1950 to 25% in 
1954 (Calculated from SEH, 1955: 477). Part of that success was due to the compliance of 
the banana companies. The major banana company (UFCO) agreed to pay the corporate 
income tax (with a 15% rate, half the top rate for business) only after Gálvez gave it a new 
concession to diversify its portfolio to cacao, abaca and African-palm production--with the 
usual tax exemptions (Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 129). All in all, according to Bulmer-
Thomas, the income tax was the “single most effective way of increasing the return value 
from banana exports” for the Honduran government (Bulmer-Thomas, 1990: 296). 
It is important to note, however, that the share of taxes paid by banana companies only 
decreased in the following years, falling to 2.5% of total tax revenues by 1954. The change 
was due to declining production, a hurricane, a major labour strike and increasing 
participation of national income-tax payers (Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 130-131). In the eight 
fiscal years between 1947 and 1955, the taxes paid by banana exports decreased in absolute 
terms in six occasions. Gálvez attempted to rise export taxes to banana companies, but 
declining banana production made the measure redundant (D’Ans, 2002: 247). 
In sharp contrast with the case Guatemala, Honduran governments encountered fewer 
problems to tax coffee exports, a crop that was booming since the 1947. These were taxed 
the first time in 1948, and by 1955 coffee exporters already paid about 75% of export taxes. 
To a great extent the government’s success to tax coffee exports was due to the fact that 
coffee was produced and exported by small and medium-size businesses (Posas and Del 
Cid, 1983: 134). As noted above, Honduran coffee growers lacked the power and influence 
of their peers in Guatemala and El Salvador (Bulmer-Thomas, 1990: 295).  
During the government of Gálvez (1949-1955) tax revenues increased from L 22.3 million 
to L 38.8 million. The tax structure had changed slightly thanks to the incorporation of the 
income tax. Taxes on imports still accounted for almost 58% of total taxes, but now the 
income tax represented 25%, excises and stamp taxes about 15% and export taxes much of 
the rest. Public monopolies still were an important source of tax revenues, as these 
contributed to the Treasury about the same amount of Lempiras than stamp taxes (SHCPC, 
1955: 477).  
The reformism of Gálvez was possible because, in sharp contrast with Arévalo and Árbenz 
in Guatemala, he did not face the overwhelming opposition of conservative political parties 
(he was indeed a designate of a Conservative Party, Partido Nacional--PN), banana 
companies (he had long been a UFCO Lawyer) or powerful, cohesive business groups 
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(private-sector organizations would only emerge in the mid-1960s). Gálvez was also noted 
for restricting access to the political arena to labour unions and peasants.  
  
Changing political conditions 
The term of Galvez coincided with the emergence of political forces that would become 
determinant in the following years. First, like in most of Central America, the army began 
its gradual transformation into a formidable repressive machine to counter social unrest 
from the left. As Funes argue, before 1949, Honduras experienced “militarism without a 
professional army” (Funes, 2000: 16). The US had been providing training and equipment 
to the Army since 1942, as well as a whole new doctrinaire body, but the transition between 
caudillo-ridden, rural militias towards a professional army was only completed after Carías 
left power (Argueta, 2009: 78-79; Funes, 2000).With Galvez, US military cooperation 
allowed for the professionalization of the army ranks (D’Ans, 2002: 227; Barahona, 2005: 
187-188).  
Secondly, new economic elites were emerging. Public credit channelled through the 
National Development Bank for agricultural diversification allowed large-scale plantations 
to begin producing cotton, sugar and coffee (Arancibia, 2001: 52; Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 
133-134; Bulmer-Thomas, 1990: 296). These policies propitiated the broadening of the 
landed class, as well as the emergency of a new, small national bourgeoisie not directly 
linked to traditional landlords (Bulmer-Thomas, 1990: 297). Equally important, major 
commercial and industrial interests were emerging in the North Coast among immigrant 
populations, which had even weaker links to traditional landed elites (Euraque 2001).  
The end of the term of Galvez also coincided with the emergence of labour unions as a 
political actor (Barahona, 2005: 166-170; D’Ans, 2002: 253-259). Workers of banana 
plantations launched major strike in 1954 in demand of better wages and working 
conditions. The strike was effective in paralyzing the export economy and forced the 
government to negotiate the enactment of a Labour Chart legalizing unionism and the 
foundation of a Ministry of Labour (Arancibia, 2001: 56-57; Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 143-
144). In February 1955, the government legalized 50 labour unions (Euraque 2001: 186). 
The nascent labour movement coincided in time with the progressive “debananization” of 
the Honduran economy (D’Ans, 2002). Honduran banana exports were dragged by a 
tropical hurricane that devastated plantations in the North Coast in 1954, the massive 
workers strike, and the emergence of Ecuador as a major player in the banana trade. The 
influence of the American banana companies in politics would be felt at least until the late 
1970s, but as Isaula argues, by the 1960s the centre of political power definitely moved 
from the Banana offices “to the US embassy in Tegucigalpa and to the barracks” (Isaula 
1990: 67).  
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Unlike Carías, Gálvez did not attempt to get re-elected, and general elections took place in 
October 1954. The vote was won by Ramon Villeda Morales, but his Liberal Party failed to 
obtain the simple majority necessary to be named president. The National Congress then 
proceeded to elect Julio Lozano, a National Party leader and Galvez’ Vice President, for a 
four-year term.  
Lozano did not challenge the modernizing, developmentalist orientation that Galvez gave to 
public policy. He called a Council of State comprising 59 representatives of all political 
parties to advice on major issues, (Bulmer-Thomas, 1990: 299; Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 
147). Following a recommendation of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean, a National Economic Council was founded to direct economic policy 
and planning, including relevant Ministers, the presidents of the public banks and 
representatives of different factions among the private sector (Euraque 2001: 134, 135; 
Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 148; SEH, 1955: 6, 7).  
The council recommended Lozano reforming the Income Tax Law (1955) to increase the 
rates applied to the American Banana companies from 15% to 30% (the top rate), 
harmonizing the rates of the individual and corporate income taxes, introducing a pay-as-
you-earn system for individual taxpayers, and broadening the tax base (SEH, 1955: 5-6; 
Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 130). These measures failed to mobilize additional revenues, 
however, in large part owing to the decline in the banana trade. Income tax collections 
decreased from L 9.2 million in 1954 to L 4.6 million in 1955. The government of Lozano 
also raised custom duties and the existing tax on inheritances in 1956, but changes failed to 
increase tax revenues (Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 149-150; SEH, 1955: 6).  
 The military enter the scene 
The government of Lozano faced growing social unrest linked to economic hardship. The 
government responded with police repression, the exiling of Liberal Party leaders and 
outlawing the Honduran Communist Party. Elections were called to nominate members of a 
Constitutional Assembly where 90% of the seats were assigned to Lozano’s National Party 
(Barahona, 2005: 181-182; D’Ans, 2002: 261).  
The Constitutional Assembly, was blocked after the Army staged a coup in December 
1956. That intervention marked a historical turning point. The refurbished, recently 
professionalized army demonstrated its capacity to intervene in domestic politics to secure 
order. As Morris argues, after that day “the military was no longer the private army of a 
strong political leader, but rather was an organic part of the State” (Morris, 1984: 35). 
Besides, the coup was supported by many Hondurans because of the unpopularity of 
Lozano, (Euraque 2001: 130; Funes, 2000: 186). The military junta declared a general 
amnesty for all political prisoners. 
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The junta did not introduce a significant shift in the orientation of economic and social 
policies. They granted ministerial rank to Lozano’s Economic Council and founded the first 
national agency to audit state expenditures (Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 159-160). They also 
continued with the ongoing efforts to build national roads and established a national electric 
enterprise. Finally, the junta also founded a Housing Institute to provide workers with 
subsidized houses (Funes, 2000: 190; Barahona, 2005: 194).  
The junta called for elections to form a Constitutional Assembly in September 1957. After 
drafting a new constitution, the Assembly turned itself into the National Congress and 
confirmed the leader of the Liberal Party, Ramon Villeda Morales, President of the republic 
(Morris, 1984: 37). Importantly, the 1957 constitution included provisions that, albeit 
formally recognizing the president of the Republic as the Army Commander-in-Chief, in 
practice placed decision making on Army issues in the hands of senior military officers. 
Indeed, according to Funes, a secret pact was signed between the military leadership and 
the Liberal Party: in exchange for accepting the designation of Villeda, the military gained 
formal autonomy from the Executive (Funes, 2000: 194). The evolution of Honduran 
politics in the following decades can be traced back to that agreement (Barahona, 2005: 
189).  
A new reformist impulse 
The Liberal Party won the presidency after 24 years of political persecution, a fact that may 
explain Villeda’s enthusiastic proclamation of a “Second Republic”. Although Villeda did 
not challenge the development program launched after 1949, he attempted to deepen the 
social profile of the state, thus entering into confrontation with some of the conservative 
sectors that had backed Carías and Galvez. These included landlords and the National Party 
leadership, which soon pictured Villeda as a communist in disguise because of his social 
reformism, as well as many members of the Army officialdom, who were loyal to the 
National Party (D’Ans, 2002: 267).  
The 1957 Constitution gave the state additional powers to intervene in economic matters, 
and Villeda used them widely (Barahona, 2005: 190). His government founded the 
Honduran Institute for Social Security (1959), and drafted a new Labour Code enhancing 
the Chart enacted by Lozano in 1955. Equally important, Villeda addressed the problem of 
land concentration by enacting an Agrarian Reform Law (1962). Villeda relied on the 
expertise of the National Economic Council more than any of his predecessors (Euraque 
2001: 134-135). 
An Industrial Development Law (1962) reinforced an incipient process of industrialization 
begun in the late 1940s (Argueta, 2009: 141; Barahona, 2005: 194). With that law, the 
government attempted to promote development by enacting tax exemptions and fiscal 
privileges to entrepreneurs. Between 1958 and 1970, the state fiscal sacrifice increased 
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from L 320,792 to L 11.2 million (about 25% of import tax collections) (SEH 1962: 18; 
Murga 1977: 598). Partly as a result of these measures, the share of manufacturing over the 
GDP doubled from 7% to 14% between 1948 and 1963 (the last year of Villeda) (Bulmer-
Thomas, 1990: 301). 
The enactment of the Development Law was part of the process of regional economic 
integration promoted by the ECLAC since the early 1950s. In 1958 Villeda signed a treaty 
with Guatemala and El Salvador granting tariff reductions for intra-regional trade (Bulmer-
Thomas, 1990: 301). Two years later the Honduran Congress ratified a regional treaty that 
led to the creation of a Central American Common Market (CACM) in 1962 (D’Ans, 2002: 
269: SEH, 1966: 96). 
Many of the new industries were established in San Pedro Sula, a city that benefited from 
its closeness to the banana enclave in the Northern departments of the country. Between 
1964 and 1975, the industrial area of San Pedro Sula increased by 417%, and by 1968 it 
alone accounted for 49% of the manufactures of Honduras (Euraque 2001: 146). Those 
developments would strengthen a modern, vigorous business elite in San Pedro Sula, which 
would play a prominent role in Honduran politics in the years to come (D’Ans, 2002: 249; 
Euraque 2001:109). 
Despite his active stance in many areas, Villeda’s policies were not accompanied by major 
tax reforms. Besides tariffs, the government introduced changes on import taxes on 
gasoline, as well as new levies on “sumptuary” objects of consumption (SEH, 1961: 12). In 
December 1960 the government presented an initiative to introduce a “complementary” tax 
for higher incomes (a 20% over the current income tax), but it was rejected by the Congress 
(SEH, 1962: 14). Unable to increase tax revenues, the government opted to lend money 
abroad (SEH 1961: 12-13).  
To finance its reformist policies, Villeda also counted with some late US government’s 
cooperation. When President John F. Kennedy launched his Alliance for Progress, the 
Honduran government agreed to reform its tax system in order to have access to the 
American funds. However, it was the successor of Villeda who introduced the changes 
demanded by the Alliance. The Honduran tax system during the term of Villeda changed 
little in relation to previous governments. In 1963 the Honduran tax structure remained 
biased towards indirect taxation, as import taxes was still the single most important tax 
(about 50 % of total tax revenues), followed by excises and taxes on production (25%); 
income and property taxes (16%), and export taxes (6%) (SEH, 1968: Anexo H-12). 
 Forging a winning coalition 
Failing to gain the support of the military and traditional economic elites, Villeda 
approached emerging business groups from the North Coast, which were mostly aligned 
with the Liberal Party. In a process parallel to the development of the enclave economy in 
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the Northern departments, a number of immigrant families had built fortunes on the small-
scale, import-export business. While major importers operated under the privileges of 
banana companies, and sold their products in plantation stores, immigrants of various 
origins (especially Arabs and Europeans) dominated small retail sales and, as the time 
passed, began investing on light industries for the domestic market (Euraque 2001: 80-88). 
By the time Villeda gained power, these actors constituted a powerful, distinctive group in 
the Honduran political arena, resentful of the privileges of banana companies and in many 
occasions at odds with the demands of the distant central government in Tegucigalpa.  
Villeda also cultivated the support of peasant organizations thanks to the Agrarian Reform 
of 1962 and the foundation of a National Agrarian Institute (Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 174). 
The demand of lands had increased following massive dismissals of banana workers after 
1954, as well as the appropriation of peasant-occupied lands on the part of landlords 
(Barahona, 2005: 200; Booth and Walker 1952: 52). Moreover, both Kennedy’s Alliance for 
Progress and the UN ECLAC advanced the cause of agrarian reforms to incorporate 
peasants into productive employment and enhance the market for local manufactures 
(D’Ans, 2002: 274-276; Hernández, 2007: 34).  
The Agrarian reform would be a prominent issue in the Honduran political agenda at least 
until the late 1970s, despite the commitment of Villeda to restrict land distribution to 
unoccupied public lands (Arancibia 2001: 62; Argueta, 2009: 184). The political weight of 
peasant organizations grew accordingly. The agrarian reform fostered the emergence of a 
National Federation of peasants (FNCH, 1962), set up by former banana workers 
(Barahona, 2005: 212; Funes, 2000: 209). The government also supported the creation of 
other organizations and supported “free and democratic” labour-unions (as opposed to 
class-based organizations).  
Government support to unionism gradually alienated conservative sectors, despite the 
efforts of Villeda to proclaim its anti-Marxist stance (Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 181). As an 
way to appease these fears, the government persecuted alleged communist militants, 
pursued non-aligned labour unions, and launched a broad censorship campaign of any 
printed material containing traces of dangerous “foreign ideologies” (Funes, 2000). Villeda 
also cut diplomatic relations with Havana after Cuban revolutionaries deposed Batista in 
1959. However, as Bulmer-Thomas explains, even though Villeda feared the consequences 
of the Cuban revolution, “the real threat to his regime came from the traditional right” 
(Bulmer-Thomas, 1990: 302).  
A coup was staged in 1959 by radical members of the National Party and dissident military. 
The failure of the army to repel the attack moved Villeda to form a two-thousand men 
militia under his command (Funes, 2000: 228). There he apparently made a definitive, fatal 
mistake. The new body, roughly composed of two thousand men, soon began clashing with 
army units in bloody clashes. As the relations between the military and the Liberal Party 
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became more stringent, Villeda unarmed his guard. But it was too late, as he was 
overthrown by a military coup in October 1963, ten days before general elections in which 
a new Liberal victory was expected (D’Ans, 2002: 281).  
 The military take command 
Colonel Oswaldo López Arellano seized all powers after successfully commanding the 
coup, and immediately proceeded to dismantle Villeda’s National Guard, with dozens of its 
members massacred while defending the government. The coup was received with 
sympathy by hard-minded landlords, conservative business groups and the American fruit 
companies, which resented the closeness of Villeda with workers and the industrial elites 
from the North Coast—his supporting coalition (Euraque 2001: 136; Posas and Fontaine, 
1980: 50; Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 189).  
The coup meant the temporarily displacement of Villeda’s coalition and the return of the 
landlords-dominated National Party to the centre of the political stage. The leadership of 
Villeda’s Liberal Party was jailed or forced into exile, thus leaving the political ground 
clear for the National Party, the natural partners of the Army in a tactical alliance (Bulmer-
Thomas 1990: 304). The very day of the coup the army assaulted the offices of the 
peasant’s FNCH, and jailed the leaders of a number of labour unions (Posas and Del Cid, 
1983: 192, 193). Preceding the style of Pinochet in Chile, López converted the national 
stadium into a temporary concentration camp for political opponents (Funes, 2000: 235). 
The takeover of López Arellano prevented any form of organized opposition and marked 
the beginning of military hegemony in Honduras (Funes, 2000: 17). 
López anticommunism was more based on American influence than any real domestic 
threat. Honduras lacked a strong Marxist movement, although by 1963 there were growing 
levels of organization among labour unions, peasants, teachers, students and public workers 
(Funes, 2000: 239). US military cooperation greatly enhanced the anti-Communist 
character of the Honduran military. Despite the absence of any form of armed opposition, 
the US emphasized national security and counterinsurgency in training and funding the 
Honduran military (Booth and Walker, 1999: 53).  
Despite the restoration of conservative rule, the institutions set in place by Villeda and his 
predecessors remained in place. In Contrast to what Castillo Armas did in Guatemala 
(1954), López went ahead with the projected Agrarian reform and redistributed national 
lands to peasants. He did not, however, attempted to expropriate land from traditional 
landlords or the banana companies (Bulmer-Thomas, 1990: 305). 
López governed de facto for about a year and a half. In 1965, new elections were called for 
a new Constitutional Assembly to draft yet another Constitutional text. The National Party 
won the rigged elections and the new Assembly meekly confirmed López as the 
Constitutional President for the period 1965-1971.  
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 The tax reforms of the military regime 
The fiscal policies of the regime of López Arellano were remarkably independent. On 
December 1963, within weeks after deposing Villeda, the government of López introduced 
various major changes in the tax laws. First, the Income Tax was reformed to make it 
applicable to all foreign business domiciled in Honduras. The top income tax rates paid by 
banana companies were also increased (Decree-Law 25) (Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 130). 
Secondly, the government changed the 1938 tax law on inheritances and donations, 
augmenting the rates with the aim of increasing its share of tax revenues (Decree-Law 26). 
Third, the government tried out a new tax on “unused lands”, but because of the minimal 
amount of money collected it was abandoned after 1964. Finally, the government 
introduced a new tax on retail sales, the fist in Central America. The tax was imposed with 
a rate of 3% and included many exemptions (mainly on food and basic consumption items) 
to reduce the regressive nature of the tax. It also excluded smaller retailers from the 
obligation to register and pay the tax. Because the tax only reached a small number of big 
retailers (about 1808 by the early 1970s), tax revenues from the sales tax were relatively 
minor (Due, 1972: 269). 
The “progressive” orientation of these tax reforms may seem counterintuitive in view of the 
composition of the supporting coalition of López. However, these measures were enacted 
as a consequence of the need of López to please the US government, which has rejected 
granting official recognition to the de facto government of López. Moreover, Honduras had 
subscribed the 1961 of the “Punta del Este Bill”, where Latin American countries accepted 
to reform their tax systems to qualify for multi-million “Alliance for Progress” funding 
(SEH, 1963: 8). However, after those initial reforms, the government of López declared its 
intention not to introduce new taxes or increasing the rates of the existing ones, opting 
instead to improving tax administration (SEH, 1966: 95).  
The only significant tax change after 1963 was a 1967 decree transforming the existing tax 
on gasoline imports into a sales tax (SEH, 1972: 168). In addition, in 1968, López signed 
the “Protocol of San José”, thus deepening the links of Honduras with the Central 
American Common Market. As part of the compromises assumed in that document, the 
Central American countries agreed to further increase tariffs to extra-regional imports, and 
establishing higher consumption taxes for “sanctuary” goods and products imported from 
countries outside the CACM (Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 213; Morris, 1984: 40).  
The new tariffs to imported goods increased the prices of consumables and provoked the 
opposition of labour unions, which called a general strike on September 1968. The strike 
was supported by the business groups of the North Coast, which had a difficult relation 
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with the government of López and opposed the deepening of Central American integration. 
(Barahona, 2005: 208; Funes, 2000: 252). By 1968 it was already evident that the common 
market was a bad deal for Honduras manufacturers, ill-prepared to compete with the 
industries of Guatemala and El Salvador.  
When the strike broke, the government of López declared a state of siege for 30 days, sent 
extra army units to the Northern departments, and jailed union leaders and a few business 
representatives (D’Ans, 2002: 287-288). Fines were set for business supporting the strike 
and the government threatened with expelling from the country business leaders of foreign 
origin (Euraque 2001: 235-236).  
The reaction of López only contributed to incense business and labour opposition and to 
cement an unprecedented collaboration between “free and democratic” labour unions and 
corporate business chambers from the North Coast (Bulmer-Thomas 1990). Although 
opposition to tax changes were the key factor sparking protests, according to Posas and del 
Cid the tactical alliance is best understood as a broad reaction against the neglect of the 
military of the previous developmentalist role of the state (Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 204-
207; See also Barahona, 2005: 207). The protest movement grew during the months 
following the declaration of state of siege, and a new general strike was called for June 
1969. 
 An exogenous shock 
Providentially, at least for López, a war exploded with neighbouring El Salvador in July 
1969, leading to a fundamental reconfiguration of the coalition that supported the regime. 
The Honduran military had decided to exclude peasants from El Salvador living in 
Honduras from the benefits of the Agrarian Reform, expelling them back to their country. 
The government of El Salvador, however, lacked the capacity to reintegrate its nationals, 
many of which had left the country as political refugees. The crisis reached its peak when 
the military from El Salvador decided to invade the frontier zones and bombed the capital 
city of Honduras, Tegucigalpa. The “football war” lasted for about one hundred hours and 
claimed three thousand lives before the Organization of American States was able to break 
a ceasefire.  
Despite the notorious ineptitude of Honduran senior military officers to resist the 
Salvadorian invasion, the war propitiated an unprecedented sense of national unity behind 
the Army (Barahona, 2005: 208-209). In the aftermath of the war, the military emerged as 
the “people’s defenders” against the Salvadorian enemy. The war propitiated an atmosphere 
of relative unity between classes, class factions and social groups, many of whom 
supported the war effort by buying National Bonds for National Defence for up to L 15 
million, equivalent to about 10% of total tax revenues in 1969 (SEH, 1970 : 97; Posas and 
Del Cid 1993: 222). The business groups of the North Coast assumed a leading role in 
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promoting the sales of the emergency bonds, while the labour unions declared workers to 
be “civilian troops” at the orders of General Arellano (Euraque 2001: 270-271). A 
relaxation of political repression followed, as well as a rapprochement between emerging 
social groups and younger military factions influenced by the Peruvian model of military-
led social reform (Morris, 1984: 41; Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 222, 223). 
The new consensus culminated in the joint drafting of a Plan for National Unity by the 
Honduran Confederation of Workers (CTH, founded in 1964) and business groups from the 
Northern elites organized in a new National Council of Private Enterprise (COHEP), 
founded in 1967 (D’Ans, 2002: 299). The two platforms presented the plan to López, who 
subscribed it and sent it to the representatives of the National and Liberal Parties in 
December 1970. Essentially, that pact committed the winner of the projected 1971 elections 
to form a “government of unity” by appointing cabinet members on the basis of their 
professional merits instead of their party affiliations (Posas and Fontaine, 1980: 50; Funes, 
2000: 262-265).  
This configuration of a political coalition under authoritarian regime has no parallel with 
the cases of Guatemala and Nicaragua (Bulmer-Thomas, 1990: 304; Posas and Fontaine, 
1980: 49).The military realized that the backing of the National Party was not enough to 
secure stability, and saw in the Liberal Party and its ties with labour organizations an 
opportunity to form a more comprehensive coalition (Bulmer-Thomas 1990: 305). General 
López Arellano sensed the potential of building on the support of these actors at the end of 
his term (Euraque 2001: 287).  
The tax policies of a broader coalition  
Ramón Cruz, a leader of the National Party, was elected President in June 1971. The two 
main parties subscribed a pact to decide the distribution of public offices and their 
respective budget allocations (Barahona, 2005: 221). The resulting government was far 
from stable, though, the budget of the ministries controlled by the Nationals tripled those 
controlled by the Liberals (Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 236).  
Cruz attempted to make a tax reform, but it was boycotted by the Parliament and opposed 
by both business and labour groups. The reform included the restitution of property taxes to 
the National government (in detriment to the local governments). Perhaps more 
symptomatically, during the discussions of that reform, the National Party presented a 
proposal to establish a 50% cut on tax exemptions granted under the Law of Industrial 
Development (and subsequent laws related to the CACM).  
The later move reflected the divide that existed between the National Party and economic 
sectors supporting modernization (Posas and Del Cid, 1983: 261 –footnote 80- ). Indeed, 
according to Barahona, both the pacto and the government of Cruz are best understood as 
temporary equilibriums in the latent conflict between reformist and conservative political 
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factions in Honduran politics. In the end, however, the election of Cruz allowed 
conservatives to regain the upper hand in politics (Barahona, 2005: 210). 
On the other hand, Cruz counted with little popular support. New protests were staged by 
organized social groups, and teachers called for a national strike. The peasant movement 
increased the occupation of lands after the evidence of a languishing agrarian reform, 
triggering repressive responses on the part of the Army (Funes, 2000: 266). The discontent 
of both the CTH and the COHEP for the failure of Cruz to introduce reforms only increased 
regime instability (Barahona, 2005: 221; D’Ans, 2002 300). Cruz was rapidly overthrown 
by a military coup in December 1972, on the basis of accusations of government paralysis 
and ineffectiveness. The military would remain in power for the next decade. 
 General López reassume power 
López Arellano was installed again as Chief of State following the 1972 coup. López 
disbanded the Congress and displaced traditional political parties from government 
institutions, conforming a Cabinet which included some reformist-minded technocrats 
eager to implement progressive social and economic policies (Morris, 1984: 45; Euraque 
2001: 301-304). In the first year of his government, López drastically changed the 
orientation of the government, adopting a reformist stance in line with the progressive 
agenda of both the CTH and COHEP, his new partners in government (Bulmer-Thomas 
1990: 309).  
Under the new circumstances, López attempted to build himself a support coalition which 
could accommodate progressive factions among the Army officialdom, the CTH and its 
peasant affiliate, as well progressive factions among the Honduran private-sector, 
especially industrialists and merchants from the North Coast (Morris, 1984: 85; D’Ans, 
2002: 306-307). Ironically, these were the same groups that López had targeted for 
repression after the 1963 coup (Barahona, 2005: 226; Euraque 2001: 301; Posas and Del 
Cid, 1983: 271-272).  
As a way to further gain the support of the peasantry, López gave a new boost to the 
languishing agrarian reform, issuing a Presidential Decree which forced landowners to rent 
or transfer idle or “inadequately utilized” land. It was during López second term that the 
Honduran Agrarian Reform received its greater impulse, distributing up to 79,000 ha. of 
land to 18,000 landless families (D’Ans, 2002: 307).  
The government of López extended credits and tax exemptions granted to business under 
the 1958 development law (Morris, 1984: 46). Despite the opposition of American banana 
companies, the government of López increased income tax rates from 30% to 40% and in 
1974 enacted an export tax of US 0.50 per bunch of bananas. The latter changes were 
agreed by the Union of Banana Exporter Countries (UPEB), of which Honduras was part, 
but it was reduced to US 0.25 after Banana companies launched a boycott (D’Ans, 2002: 
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314-315). Finally, in 1974 López also established a new “Treasury Police” (Policía de 
Hacienda) to combat smuggling and customs fraud, and created a National Tax register to 
give each taxpayer a sole identification number as a means to reduce tax evasion (SEH, 
1974: 24). 
As the administration of López advanced, some of the sectors that initially supported him 
began feeling increasingly uneasy with his government. In 1975 a new Agrarian Reform 
Law was introduced, with a mixed reception. Peasants considered it insufficient and partial, 
while landlords demanded its annulment and threatened with a national strike (Funes, 2000: 
273). Business elites, bitterly divided in the late 1960s, had managed to solve some of its 
internal disputes, and began airing their worries for the “leftward” rift of the military 
(Morris, 1983: 46-48). Behind that shift in postures was the gradual displacement of the 
original COHEP leadership by the conservative landlords’ association (FENAGH) (D’Ans, 
2002: 310; Morris, 1984: 78). 
Conservative factions among the military, as well as conservative civilians close to the 
National Party, began plotting against the government of López (Morris, 1984: 85). By 
1975 the coalition assembled by López was already crumbling, “fraught with collisions 
between impatient reformists and angry, fearful conservatives” (Morris, 1984: 47; Posas 
and Del Cid, 1983; D’Ans, 2002).Widespread criticisms about the way in which the 
government had dealt with the devastation that followed a Hurricane (Fifí, 1974), as well as 
growing concerns about the integrity of the armed forces affected the institutional cohesion 
of the military. In March 1975, a movement of young officers forced the retirement of forty 
senior officers and reorganized the command structure of the military into the Superior 
Council of the Armed Forces (CONSUFFAA), a body composed of mid-rank officials. The 
CONSUFFAA formally displaced López from the head of the Army, while he was on an 
official trip, in favour of Col. Juan Alberto Melgar (Barahona, 2005: 226; see also Posas 
and Del Cid, 1983: 274). 
The coup de grace for Lopez arrived when an article in the Wall Street Journal revealed 
that high-ranking government officials (including General López), had accepted a US$1.25 
million bribe from a banana company in exchange of reducing the banana exports tax 
(saving the foreign companies up to US$ 75 million per year in taxes) (Morris, 1984: 47). 
López and his government were widely regarded as corrupt, but it was the “bananagate”, as 
the episode was locally known, what costed López the Presidency. He resigned in April 
1975 and was replaced as head of state by Colonel Melgar (Morris, 1984: 49). 
 Conservative restoration 
Given that the CONSUFAA had much influence over Melgar, the personalist style of 
Lopez was gradually replaced by a collegial type of authority. The rise of Melgar was 
received sympathetically by the Honduran conservatives, especially among business elites 
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and the National Party, with whom he had strong links. However, with Melgar the military 
tried to maintain some degree of autonomy from economic elites. According to Morris, 
Melgar hesitated between continuing the momentum of the reforms of López and 
“appeasing the conservative biases of the Honduran civilian and military political elites” 
(Morris, 1984: 48-50).  
At the end he clearly conceded in favour of conservative groups, consolidating a highly 
repressive regime in line with the interests of landlords and reactionary factions among the 
Army (Morris, 1984: 50; Funes, 2000: 283; D’Ans, 2002: 319). Melgar directed the 
repressive policies of the army against the social basis that had backed the reformist 
program of the military between 1972 and 1975, especially labour unions and peasant 
organizations, as well as civil society organizations. Almost all strikes called in between 
1976 and 1979 were declared illegal by the military government and repressed accordingly 
(Barahona, 2005: 229). 
The situation became explosive on the agrarian issue. Civil unrest mounted as landless 
peasants launched a wave of occupations of (uncultivated) private lands. In 1975, some ten 
thousand peasants from the National Peasant Union (UNC) invaded about one hundred 
haciendas. Melgar ordered to stop invasions but restrained of a full-fledge repression 
campaign. Relations between his government and the landlords’ FENAGH became more 
stringent as the months passed. According to Morris, “active resistance from large 
landowners, the important multinationals, and sympathetic army officers kept Melgar and 
CONSUFFAA off balance” on the agrarian issue (Morris, 1984: 49). Melgar abandoned the 
agrarian reform project in the latter part of his period as Head of State. 
Under the leadership of Melgar, the military demonstrated autonomy from the once all-
powerful banana companies (Bulmer-Thomas 1990: 310). The Honduran government 
established new controls on the North Coast docks by a new National Port Enterprise 
(ENP); expropriated rail lines from the fruit companies; set up an Advisory Commission for 
Banana Policies and founded a Honduran Banana Corporation (COHBANA). Moreover, in 
1976 the military threatened to expropriate some 35 thousand ha from the UFCO, but it 
backed out at the end (Barahona, 2005: 222) 
In December 1975 Melgar introduced various reforms on existing taxes (Decree 287). 
These included changes to the Income Tax Law, and an increase in the royalties and taxes 
paid by mining industries, as well as the rates applied to the export of minerals—a sector 
that had remained untaxed since the 1950s (Euraque 2001: 38). Similarly, the government 
tied coffee export taxes to variations in international coffee prices. Taxes on the production 
and sale of beers and cigarettes were also raised. Finally, the government reformed the 
existing sales tax, broadening its base by transforming it into a Value Added Tax. The rate 
of the tax was kept at 3% (as in the original law of 1963) as well as the exemptions to basic 
food products.  
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The Honduran tax structure did not change substantially during the term of Melgar, 
although tax revenues increased thanks to the gains of export taxes as well as strong rates of 
economic growth (8.8% between 1976 and 1979). In order to finance public investments on 
infrastructure, the government acquired substantial external debt, which increased from L 
335 million in 1973 to L 1079 in 1978.  
Elections were called in mid-1979, but later postponed until 1980. The conservative 
national press began airing claims about military complicity in the massacres of peasants, 
collusion with the banana companies, and involvement in illicit drug trafficking (Morris, 
1984: 50; D’Ans, 2002: 325). Disputes within the military officialdom led to another coup 
in August 1978, as the CONSUFFAA announced the resignation of Melgar and the 
installation of a triumvirate led by General Policarpo Paz García. The new military junta 
ruled for two years. 
 The 1978-1980 military junta 
The military reformism of the early 1970s was finally buried with the arrival of the new 
military junta (Hernández, 2007: 18). The support bases of the junta were the already 
hegemonic conservative factions in the army (which had taken control of the 
CONSUFFAA, displacing all remnants of reformism), business associations of landowners 
and stock raisers, and the National Party (D’Ans, 2002: 327-328). According to Morris, 
“the period was characterized by more conservative economic and social policies, a 
concern for social peace and political order, and consolidation of [military] control over the 
state apparatus” (Morris, 1984: 51). Regional Development Councils were created under 
the authority of the regional military commanders, thus consolidating the civilian 
subordination to the Army (Funes, 2000: 288).  
The authoritarian drive of the Honduran military regime was deepened by the political 
developments in the region, as Honduras became a major ground for the US “low intensity 
war”. After the Sandinistas overthrew Somoza in neighbouring Nicaragua in 1979, 
President Jimmy Carter decided to transform Honduras into the main anti-Communist US 
partner in Central America. Official bilateral economic aid skyrocketed: of the US$ 450 
million received by Honduras between 1944 and 1982, US$ 284 were disbursed after 1980 
(D’Ans, 2002: 341). The eastern regions of Honduras became a safe haven for the 
counterrevolutionary army financed by Reagan (the contras) (Barahona, 2005, Funes, 
2000).  
The mobilization of the counterinsurgency policies contrasted with inaction in economic 
policy-making. Reformist legislation was not derogated, but its enforcement was halted. 
The Junta governed Honduras in what would be the latter stage of the developentalist state, 
as neoliberalism would soon dramatically change the orientation of state action.  
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Elections were called to elect a Constitutional Assembly in 1980, with Paz declaring to 
have no intentions to run for the presidency. With an alleged turnover of 80%, the assembly 
was set to draw a new Constitution, the fourteenth since 1838. The Assembly named Paz 
provisional president of the Republic and, for the first time in twenty-five years, called for 
general elections in November, 1981, which were won by Roberto Suazo, a civilian leader 
of the Liberal Party.  
Overall, between 1956, the date of the first Army intervention, and 1982, when civilian 
Roberto Suazo was elected, the military exercised direct political control for 19 years 
(Funes, 2000: 159). The context the new civilian government encountered was one of a 
stagnant economy, a public deficit of about US$ 100 million, and an external debt 
estimated in US$ 1 billion (Norris 1984: 58). Indeed, the 1980s are considered a lost 
decade: Honduran GDP growth began contracting in 1979, and after 1982 growth became 
negative. Inflation grew to three digits and per capita GDP was reduced by 20% between 
1980 and 1984. (D’Ans 2002: 347-348). The weight of the VAT in general tax revenues 
only continued increasing as taxes on international trade declined.  
*** 
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c. Nicaragua 
Like other countries in Central America, Nicaragua emerged from the 1930s under the rule 
of a personalist dictator. But unlike his fellow autocrats, Nicaragua’s Anastasio Somoza 
García managed to set the foundations of a political dynasty which would rule the country 
for forty years. It took a revolution to finish-off the saga.  
This chapter analyze on the politics of taxation under the rule of the Somozas. It explains 
changes in the orientation of tax policies as a result of changes in the composition of the 
coalition supporting the regime. The rule of the first Somoza was long enough to allow for 
significant shifts in the relations between the government and economic elites. Luis 
Somoza succeeded his father and tried to accommodate rival business factions. The last 
dictator of the dynasty, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, broke with economic elites and was 
deposed by a revolutionary coalition including prominent members of traditional oligarchic 
families.  
The long-term evolution of the Nicaraguan tax system was similar to that of other Central 
American countries. A tax structure strongly biased towards trade and sales taxes was 
gradually replaced by one where taxes on consumption prevailed. Direct taxation in the 
form of income or wealth taxes was not significant during the period studied here.  
Antecedent conditions 
Anastasio Somoza García ruled Nicaragua with an iron fist between 1937 and 1956. Unlike 
other Central American dictators of the 1930s, Somoza emerged strengthened from the post 
war and effectively demobilized political opposition to his regime. After 1950, it was 
Somoza himself who introduced dramatic policy changes aimed at modernizing the 
country, diversifying agriculture, substituting imports and building public infrastructures. 
He was also the reformer introducing the first Income Tax Law in the country following the 
advice of foreign experts.  
A coffee-grower of modest family background, Somoza used political power to build an 
economic empire. His political career began in 1933, when the US representative named 
him to head the Guardia Nacional--a professional army created by the US after the 
dissolution of the national army and police forces (Walter 1993: 29, 30). Until 1933, 
Nicaragua was a de facto American protectorate with a permanent deployment of US 
Marines (Torres-Rivas 1983: 118; Velázquez 1983: 190). Strong US oversight over 
domestic politics was strategic in order to prevent the construction of an alternative route to 
the Panama Canal through Nicaragua.  
Somoza built strong loyalties among the National Guard rank-and-file and gradually 
displaced potential rivals among the officialdom. He also plotted to displace political 
adversaries among the Liberal Party and murdered Augusto César Sandino, the mythical 
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guerrilla leader who had successfully resisted the US Marines in the Nicaraguan 
countryside. Acting as the Head of the National Guard, Somoza orchestrated a coup in May 
1936 to depose President Juan Sacasa (1933-1936). He was proclaimed president on 
January 1st, 1937, after winning elections that took place without a rival presidential 
candidate (Fitzgibbon 1940: 215). 
Once at the office, Somoza manoeuvred to secure the survival of his regime by putting 
allies at the top of the Judiciary and concentrating decision-making on the Executive. As 
Solaún argue, under the Somoza regime the elected Congress became mere “club of sorts of 
loyal ‘friends’ of El Jefe” (Solaún 2005: 34; Chamorro 1957: 57).  
Somoza was proclaimed the President of a country where tax revenues represented less 
than 4% of GDP and tax policies were defined by American administrators. In 1910 the US 
government had established an American Collector in Nicaraguan customs to supervise the 
timely servicing of US-owned debt. As a result, Nicaraguan governments could only 
dispose of a fraction of custom duties, the most profitable source of public revenues (Millet 
1977: 74). A High Commission with heavy representation of US delegates was created in 
1917 to decide on monetary policy, import tariffs, government budgets and public works 
(Bulmer-Thomas 1990: 319; Velázquez 1983). Later, the High Commission was decisive in 
prioritizing Guardia outlays over other expenditures despite the fiscal crisis associated to 
the impacts of the 1929 Great Depression, and a devastating earthquake which hit the 
country in 1931. 
By the time Somoza ascended to power, the Nicaraguan tax structure was similar to that of 
other Central American countries. Up to 60 percent of total taxes depended on custom 
duties and import taxes, while export taxes accounted for a mere 7% of total taxes. Taken 
together, taxes on liquors, lights, tobacco, cattle and stamp taxes contributed a further 20%. 
Specific excises represented about 9%. Finally, property taxes, the only direct taxes in place 
at the time, accounted for about 2% of total taxes.  
Somoza was noted by using political power to accumulate a great fortune. Within three 
years after 1937, Somoza became the wealthiest man in Nicaragua (Millet 1977: 315). As 
Walter explains, “from his first years in power it is evident that Somoza made no 
distinction between public service and private gain” (Walter 1993: 110). Somoza began by 
accumulating public lands which then benefited from government investments in 
infrastructure. He also harassed private owners to sell their lands at a discount by enforcing 
abusive taxes or through physical intimidation (Chamorro 1957: 207; Millet 1977: 315-316; 
Rouquié 1987: 262-263; Wheelock 1980: 168).  
The dictator benefited from his control over state institutions to accumulate substantial 
rents. He took personal control over the Nicaraguan railroads and monopolized trade at the 
main commercial port in the country, manipulating cargo rates to block competitors and to 
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advance his investments (Walter 1993: 85). Members of the Somoza family were put on the 
boards of public enterprises providing water, electricity, hospitals and railroad services. 
Moreover, public revenues were used by Somoza to pay workers at his own plantations 
(Chamorro 1955: 125-126, 208; Wheelock 1980: 166; Rouquié 1987: 263).  
An additional source of rents was the personal control Somoza exercised over the allocation 
of credit by public banks. Somoza benefited from the Nationalization of the National Bank 
of Nicaragua 1940 and vetoed the creation of new private banks (IBRD, 1953; Walter 
1993: 76). As a result, private lenders had to negotiate directly with the dictator in order to 
obtain credit, while public banks provided much of the liquidity Somoza needed to advance 
his own investments. The results of a1940 law allowing the National Bank to provide credit 
to new industries are a telling example of the reach of Somoza: by 1950 the Bank had 
provided just one grant under the new law; the beneficiary was a cement factory owned by 
Somoza (IBRD 1953: 105).  
The regime of Somoza was based on patrimonial practices. Loyal leaders of the official 
party (Liberal Party) received Congressional seats while rank-and-file members obtained 
jobs, privileged relations with local authorities and protection from Guardia (Walter 1993: 
89, 90). Party membership became a means of personal advancement. As Solaún explains, 
the Liberal Party became a political machine of Somoza, well lubricated with “bossism, 
clientelism, patronage, jobs, and contracts” (Solaún 2005: 41). As a result, the bureaucracy 
grew increasingly loyal to the regime, becoming a political block able to be mobilized to 
further the political objectives of the dictator (Walter 1993: 90).  
Military leaders also obtained important personal gains after Somoza put the Guardia in 
charge of health, post, radio and telephone services, the National Railroads, the 
immigration office and the newly founded Navy and Air forces (Millet 1977: 303; 316-317; 
Walter 1993: 81). National guards also benefited from “dirty taxes” applied to gambling, 
prostitution and smuggling (Wheelock 1980: 165; Rouquié 1987: 263; Gonzalez 1998: 70). 
The businesses of rank and file Guardias included systematic bribery, cattle smuggling and 
plain extortion and burglary, especially in rural areas (Millet 1977: 317).  
 Tax reforms during the early “Somocismo” 
During the first part of his regime, Anastasio Somoza built on the deep fractures which 
divided Nicaraguan economic elites. A regional rivalry had historically confronted the 
elites of the cities of Granada and Leon, whose interests were represented respectively by 
the Conservative and Liberal parties. The absence of a significant indigenous population 
had prevented the formation of a unique ethnic identity among economic elites (Crawley 
1979: 138-139). While the introduction of coffee in the late 19th century had empowered 
prominent families among the Liberal Party, US intervention displaced Liberals from 
power in favour of Conservative leaders traditionally involved in trade and cattle rising 
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(Wheelock 1980: 142-146; Velázquez 1983: 188-189).  
Somoza was a member of the Liberal Party, so during the first years at the office he 
supported Liberal coffee growers, the key group in his supporting coalition. In 1937, 
Somoza introduced a series of currency devaluations, taking the Córdoba from par to five 
per US Dollars. This provided substantial gains to exporters at the cost of importers and 
merchants (Bulmer-Thomas 1990: 335; Walter 1993: 67-72). He also reduced the existing 
tax on coffee exports after 1937, thus letting the country main export crop basically 
untaxed.  
By contrast, Somoza used state powers to intervene in economic sectors traditionally 
dominated by families linked to the Conservative Party, such as cattle rising, sugar 
production and trade (Wheelock 1980: 156-157; Barahona 1983: 226; Walter 1993: 106-
107). In 1937 the dictator introduced a five-year ban on cattle exports and forced ranchers 
to sell excess cattle to his own companies, which later smuggled this same cattle into Costa 
Rica and Panamá (Wheelock 1980: 168; Walter 1993: 73). Somoza soon become the 
country major rancher and the largest producer of pasteurized milk. He also invested in the 
production of sugar, a stronghold of Conservative families since the 1890s.  
Somoza also regulated trade establishing price and foreign exchange controls. In 1939 the 
government introduced import restrictions and an emergency law to limit foreign exchange 
operations. Although the dictator justified restrictions as a necessary to prevent inflation 
and balance of payments imbalances, controls were applied selectively (Walter 1993: 201). 
Moreover, Somoza was often accused of smuggling imports into Nicaragua to provision his 
own commercial houses (Wheelock 1980: 165).  
Not surprisingly, Somoza also used fiscal policy to advance his interests. He merged 
various tax offices into a single department that then was put under the control of a 
National Guard officer. During his first years at the office, Somoza increased taxes on the 
sales of matches, alcohol, tobacco and sugar, products on which Somoza had investments. 
The yields of his companies were sell to public monopolies that then offered the products in 
domestic markets (Wheelock 1980: 169). The only progressive tax measure taken by 
Somoza was creating a tax on capital in 1939, although it was largely ineffective (Comisión 
1961: 45). 
Somoza manoeuvred in 1938 to dissolve Congress and called a Constitutional Assembly to 
draft a new Constitutional text. The new Constitution was enacted in 1939, forbidding re-
election and establishing direct Presidential control over the Guardia. The Constitutional 
Assembly turned itself into the national Congress and proclaimed Somoza president for a 
further eight-year term (Fitzgibbon 1940: 216).  
In consolidating his regime, Somoza also benefited from the unrestricted support of the US 
government, who saw in the dictator an ally capable of maintaining order at its backyard. 
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As Millet explains, the survival of the regime was long based on the “capacity of the family 
to maintain the control over the Guardia and to convince Washington that their “law and 
order” was better for the US than the possibility of a nationalist regime less favourable to 
US interests” (Millet 1977: 387; Crawley 2007). After his 1939 re-election, Somoza was 
received in Washington by President Franklin D. Roosevelt with full honours (Bulmer-
Thomas 1990: 336).  
US Military cooperation was further increased when Nicaragua declared war to Japan, 
Germany and Italy in 1941. An American air base was set up and Nicaraguan ports fitted 
out for US military ships. Losing access to the German market affected Nicaraguan exports, 
especially of coffee, but soon the government began exporting fruits and rubber to the US. 
Somoza took advantage of the war situation to arrogate the numerous properties 
expropriated to German nationals in Nicaragua (Rouquié 1987: 263).  
By the end of the war the properties of the Somoza family had increased from a few coffee 
estates to “51 cattle ranches, 46 coffee plantations, two sugar plantations, an airline, a gold 
mine, a milk plant and factories producing textiles, cement and matches” (Bulmer-Thomas 
1990: 337). It was rumoured that Somoza controlled ten percent of the arable land in the 
country (Rouquié 1984: 261). By 1944, estimates of the fortune of Somoza made by some 
of his former ministers had climbed to US$ 10 million—the equivalent of one and a half 
times the 1994 tax revenues of the Nicaraguan Central government. (Walter 1993: 135; 
Wheelock 1980: 169).  
 The critical juncture: a crumbling winning coalition 
The success of Somoza in building a stable coalition of supporters was called into question 
after the beginning of the Second World War. Soaring foreign reserves and disrupted 
imports contributed to increase inflation by 325% between 1939 and 1948 (Bulmer-Thomas 
1990: 335). Deteriorating economic conditions induced popular discontent and political 
opposition began airing open criticisms to the regime in 1940, albeit in a rather 
disorganized fashion. Somoza took advantage of the war situation to declare a state of siege 
and repress prominent opponents (Millet 1977: 321).  
The tenor of protests increased after 1943, when Somoza began manoeuvring to change the 
constitution to allow for his re-election after 1947. Members of the leadership of both the 
Liberal and Conservative parties opposed the move, but Somoza overcame their opposition 
by threatening expropriation and definitive license cancelations to their businesses (Millet 
1977: 323). Massive demonstrations followed in various cities, leading to a political crisis 
that forced Somoza to announce that he would not seek re-election (Walter 1993: Chapter 
4).  
Somoza kept the unrestricted support of the Guardia, but a fundamental change occurred in 
the US allegiance towards the regime after the election of President Harry Truman in 1947. 
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The US opposed the 1947 presidential campaign of Somoza, who then imposed a puppet 
candidate of his own party (Díaz 2002: 156). Seventy-two year old Leonardo Argüello 
assumed the presidency in May 1947, after another blatantly fraudulent electoral process 
(Millet 1977: 334). Somoza kept his ascendancy over the National Guard intact. 
When the new president distanced himself from the figure of the caudillo and attempted to 
make him resign from the Guardia, Somoza attacked the presidential palace and imposed an 
interim government (Dunkerley 1988: 124; Walter 1993: 160). A new Constitutional 
Assembly was called and, despite the boycott of the Conservative Party, a new president 
was designated. The new president, Victor Román y Reyes, was an uncle of Somoza. 
Henceforth Román y Reyes took care of administrative tasks, while Somoza remained the 
power behind the throne (Díaz 2002: 171).  
 Securing a stable coalition 
The turbulent 1940s had shown Somoza that the support of the military and loyal factions 
among the Liberal Party was not enough to secure the survival of his regime. In 1948 he 
began manoeuvring to reconfigure the coalition that supported his government. Following a 
failed armed uprising in September, 1947, Somoza looked for a rapprochement with the 
Conservative oligarchs of Granada (Walter 1993: 238). In February 1948, he reached an 
accommodating, power-sharing deal with the moderate wing of the Conservative Party, 
who gained governmental participation in the government of Román y Reyes, in the 
Congress and in the Judiciary, as well as in the boards of some public enterprises. In 
addition, Somoza decreed a general political amnesty (Walter 1993: 172, 173).  
The agreement served Somoza to accommodate a part of the political opposition, but a 
large number of Conservatives still opposed the dictator. Somoza then convinced General 
Emiliano Chamorro, the main figure behind conservative opposition to the regime, to agree 
on a power-sharing deal (Díaz 2002: 168). After years of opposing the dictator, Chamorro 
signed a pact with Somoza during the electoral campaign of 1950. The agreed on 
celebrating presidential elections and calling yet another Constitutional Assembly (the third 
since 1939)--granting the Conservatives a third of the seats. Somoza also offered the 
Conservatives a third of the posts in the new administration, as well as fixed representation 
in the other government branches (Solaún 2005: 50).  
In what later would be known as the “Pact of the Generals”, Somoza finally managed to 
neutralize the Conservative leadership in April 1950, “thereby binding the oligarchy within 
a dominant bloc controlled by the dictator” (Dunkerley 1988: 124). Significantly, the pact 
was preceded by a business deal: a few days before signing it the dictator and Chamorro 
had become respectively President and Vice-president of the biggest milk-processing 
facility in Nicaragua (Walter 1993: 275 footnote 37). A new Constitution was enacted and 
general elections took place on May 21st 1950. Somoza, who was acting as interim 
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president because of the sudden death of Román y Reyes on May 7th, officially received the 
Presidential shahs in May 1951 (Millet 1977: 345).  
 Freedom of commerce 
Chamorro only subscribed the pact after receiving a promise on the part of the dictator that 
the regime would secure “freedom of commerce and guarantees for particular interests” 
(Wheelock 1980: 157). In practice, that plight meant that henceforth Somoza would share 
the benefits of economic growth with rival economic elites (Torres-Rivas 1983: 131). Thus, 
according to Bulmer-Thomas, the basis of the survival of the Somoza dynasty was set, for 
“the 1950 pact finally resolved the division of labour between the Somoza family and the 
traditional elite and ensured the latter’s support for the regime for the next twenty years” 
(Bulmer-Thomas 1990: 339).  
Although Somoza continued intervening on imports and foreign exchange transactions, he 
did agree to end his monopoly on banking and credit. Coffee producers benefited from 
credit lines, a further devaluation of the Córdoba and increasing prices in international 
markets. After 1950 Somoza instructed the National Bank to implement an active credit 
policy to promote exports and agricultural diversification. Chief among these ventures was 
the cultivation of cotton.  
Until 1949 cotton had been a marginal crop in the exports profile of Nicaragua. However, 
the Korean War distorted international prices for the crop, which doubled between 1950 
and 1951. Nicaraguan cotton growers seized the opportunity to expand production, and 
cotton exports increased from about ten thousand quintals a year to one million quintal 
between 1950 and 1955 (IBRD 1960: 3). By 1955 cotton had already displaced coffee as 
the main Nicaraguan export.  
The loans provided were plentiful. Outstanding debts to the National bank quadrupled in a 
four years period (IBRD 1973: 25). Together, cotton and coffee accounted for about 80% of 
the crop loans authorized by the National Bank between 1951 and 1955 (IBRD 1973a: 
Table 7.9). Remarkably, in the case of cotton the National Bank provided loans to cover up 
to 80% of total production costs, which were repayable upon the harvesting and sale of 
cotton (IBRD 1955: 3-4). In addition, the National Bank implemented import programmes 
for machinery and agro-chemicals necessary to increase the productivity of cotton yields.  
Strong, diversified exports allowed economic groups other than traditional coffee exporters 
to thrive, providing financial surpluses that fuelled an expansion in industry and commerce 
(IBRD 1955: 2). Hence, the period 1949-1955 was one of great economic success after 
three decades of near economic stagnation.  
Notably, the economic expansion also propitiated the growth of finance. As part of his new 
“freedom of commerce” approach, Somoza authorized prominent Conservative families to 
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found a commercial bank, the Banco de América (BANAMER) in July 1952. According to 
Wheelock, the surnames of the “Conservative bank” founders included prominent families 
in the orbit of Granada’s oligarchy traditionally involved in cattle-raising, commerce and 
import-exports activities, as well as sugar and alcohol production (Wheelock 1980: 156; 
Strachan 1976: 8-9).  
About a year later, a group of notables involved in the cotton business founded another 
private bank in the city of Leon, the Banco de Nicaragua (BANIC). The “Liberal bank”, as 
the BANIC would be informally known, initially concentrated in cotton activities (IBRD 
1958: 5). But when Somoza lifted restrictions on bank activities a few years later, the new 
banks became the nuclei of extensive business conglomerates with investments in agro-
exports, finance, commerce, construction and manufacturing.  
The 1950 pact fundamentally changed the political economy of Nicaragua. By the 1960s it 
was possible to clearly identify three main economic groups in the country: the 
BANAMER, BANIC and Somoza groups (Strachan 1976; Wheelock 1980: 146-176). 
While the latter had privileged political access and continued to enjoy special treatment 
from public banks, private banking allowed traditional elites to benefit from economic 
growth, hence reducing political confrontation with the dictator.  
The economic progress of Nicaragua also benefited from the dismantling and repression of 
workers organizations on the part or the Somoza regime. Producers were allowed to 
blatantly ignoring the enforcement of the 1945 Labour Code. Moreover, in contrast to the 
case of Guatemala, in Nicaragua there was no discussion of an Agrarian Reform nor 
minimum wages (Bulmer-Thomas 1990: 340; Solaún 2005: 56).  
 Taxing the bonanza 
Nicaraguan state finances had suffered considerably since the early 1940s, mostly as a 
consequence of the distortions the Second World War brought to international markets. The 
fiscal balance of the government had been negative during the entire decade, with the 
National Bank financing most deficit spending (IBRD 1951: 9). Lending at home was hard 
for the government, mainly because of the distrust of Nicaraguan elites, of which the IBRD 
argued “it is impossible to sell them government bonds” (IBRD 1958: 6).  
As a result of financial constraints, public investment was low and expenditures were 
limited to administration and defence. By 1950 the Guardia’s budget, including the 
military, police and aviation forces, “the largest and best equipped in Central America”, 
still exceeded 30% of total government disbursements (IBRD 1951: 10). Somoza had been 
reluctant to introduce any major tax reform through the 1940s. Minor changes included 
mild shifts in tax rates or adding surcharges top of existing taxes to finance specific 
expenses like a new National Stadium, a hospital, or “public improvements” of sorts. By 
1950, tariffs were still parcel of the American General Collector of Customs, and Somoza 
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rejected increasing taxes to exporters.  
The disposition of Somoza to reforming tax laws changed following the 1950 pact. A 
positive economic cycle had begun for Nicaraguan exports after 1949 and the economy was 
showing signs of strength. In October 1950 the government introduced a US 3.00 tax on 
coffee exports, earmarking its yields for the construction of a road. Along with the new tax, 
Somoza introduced a head tax (Impuesto proletario), to be paid by each male Nicaraguan 
between 21 and 60 years. The personal tax was a total failure, but the tax on coffee actually 
made the share of export taxes increase from 3.3 % to 8.8% of total taxes between 1950 and 
1951 (Garvy 1952: 23).  
The tax on coffee exports was supplemented in late 1951 with a more ambitious tax on the 
net profits of coffee and cotton producers (IBRD 1953: 77-78). Coffee profits had increased 
from C11 million to C80 million between 1949 and 1951, but in the end the profits tax only 
reported the equivalent to 1% of government revenues (IBRD 1953: 78; IBRD 1955: Table 
8).  
Like neighbouring countries, at about 1950 Nicaragua began receiving the visit of experts 
sent by recently-created international organizations promoting institutional modernization 
and a more activist role of the state in the economy. As a result of an explicit request from 
the Nicaraguan Government, a permanent IBRD mission was installed in Nicaragua in June 
1951 to produce a “Five-year General Program for Economic Development” (IBRD 1953). 
The plan devised a comprehensive set of policies including a through restructuring of the 
public sector and an overhauling of its planning and fiscal practices.  
The IBRD mission provided Somoza with a detailed set of recommendations to 
fundamentally reform the tax system. The special fiscal advisor of the mission produced a 
study of the Nicaraguan tax system noting the “absence of any progressive features”, as it 
relied disproportionally on excises and import duties whose burden was “undoubtedly” 
passed on to final consumers (Garvy 1952: 3). The study found “no evidence of a 
systematic effort to obtain revenue from individuals or businesses which, in spite of recent 
substantial rises in income, have remained almost entirely exempt from taxation” (Garvy 
1952: 3-4). Large agricultural producers and cattlemen, who received the lion’s share of the 
national income, were mostly subject only to the nominal, ineffective property tax. The 
existing tax on the gross sales of major merchants was also largely evaded, and the 
contribution of business taxes to total taxes was negligible. Even though agricultural land 
was the main source of the national income, property taxation was insignificant (Garvy 
1952: 19, 20). For Garvy, the tax system had become an “obstacle to the economic 
development of the country” (Garvy 1952: 22). 
The IBRD recommended a through reform of tax administration, enacting a Tax Code and 
bringing customs back to the control of the government. It also suggested a review of the 
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tariff (unchanged since 1918) to include products and services not on the original list; 
simplifying the tax system by eliminating low-yielding excises; eliminating the “most 
oppressive consumption taxes” which hurt lower income families; reforming the property 
tax by increasing rates and changing assessment methods; and, last but not least, 
introducing a personal and corporate income tax, “the foundation stone of all modern tax 
systems” (Garvy 1952: 8-11).  
As it happened, Somoza ignored most of the recommendations of Garvy except for 
updating the tariff and introducing an income tax in 1952 (IBDR 1955: 6). Significantly, 
the new tax allowed farmers to deduct profits invested in agricultural and industrial 
activities. The income tax provided new revenues to the Treasury in the following years, 
but these paled when compared with the gains of taxes on external trade (IBDR 1955: 6). If 
by its second year (1955), income taxes provided the Treasury about C16 million and 
import taxes contributed C108.6 million.  
Booming agricultural exports provided the necessary resources to finance public 
expenditures, thus reducing the urgency of deeply reforming the tax system (IBDR 1955: 6; 
Comisión Fiscal 1962: 2). By 1956, the lion’s share of taxes were paid by consumers, who 
were the final bearers of the burden of import taxes (58.6% of total taxes) and excises 
(16.6%). The regressive bias of the tax system had decreased thanks to the addition of the 
income tax and, after 1955, an additional tax on coffee exports taking advantage of good 
international prices. The share of direct taxes (property and income tax collections) 
increased from about 3.3% of total taxes before 1952 to about 10% by 1956. The coffee 
export tax contributed 7% of total tax revenues during 1956. Government revenues 
increased fourfold between 1950 and 1956.  
Flourishing public revenues allowed Somoza to make important infrastructural works. 
Substantial resources were invested in building roads and electric power facilities, as well 
in doubling the capacity of the main port of the country. According to a 1960 IBRD report, 
during the 1950s the length of ”all-weather” roads had increased from 330 to 1150 
kilometres, while paved roads increased from 150 to 550 km. Similarly, the generating 
capacity of the public electricity companies jumped from 8MW 48MW over a ten-year 
period. Between 1951 and 1955, the government was even able to accumulate substantial 
savings at the National Bank (IBRD 1960: 9).  
Somoza emerged from the crisis of the late 1940s as the undisputable national caudillo, 
with no rivals at sight and having incorporated the Conservative opposition to the ruling 
coalition. Confident about the strength of his regime, he announced that he was ready to 
concur to general elections in 1957. However, Somoza’s re-election plans would be 
suddenly brought to an end on September 20th 1956. A young Nicaraguan student, 
Rigoberto López, shot the dictator during the official launch of his campaign at the city of 
Leon. The caudillo was immediately dispatched to Panama to be treated by American 
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specialists sent expressly by US President Dwight Eisenhower. Somoza died nine days after 
the attack, but his regime outlived him.  
An ordered succession  
There was no power vacuum in the immediate aftermath of the attack. The heirs of 
Somoza, Luis and Anastasio, took their father place within days after the shooting. Thirty-
four year old Luis Somoza was appointed by the National Congress to finish the 
Presidential term of the death patriarch, and the Liberal Party acclaimed him as its 
presidential candidate for the incoming elections. His younger brother, Anastasio Somoza 
Debayle, was confirmed as the Head of the Guardia.  
According to Chamorro, after 1956 the regime became bi-cephalous (Chamorro 1957: 232-
234). The division of labour seemed natural to Nicaraguan observers. Luis had long 
assumed a political profile, leading the Liberal Party and acting as the president of the 
National Congress between 1952 and 1956. The temperamental Anastasio, by contrast, was 
more of a Guardia man. While the first had studied engineering at a US university, the latter 
was a West Point graduate named General Army Inspector at age 21, chief of the National 
Military Academy at 23, and Chief Director of the National Guard at age 32 (Torres-Rivas 
1983: 142).  
From the very night of the attack, Anastasio launched a broad terror campaign targeting 
prominent political opponents. He also declared the Martial Law and kept it for the entire 
duration of the presidential term of his brother (Rouquié 1987: 266; Walter 1993: 235). He 
also proceeded to purge the Guardia officialdom of potential rivals (Chamorro 1957: 235; 
Millet 1977: 358). The two brothers framed their security policies as a part of the 
“continental struggle against communism” led by the US. They both became ardent anti-
Cubans after Fidel Castro deposed Dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959. Anticommunism 
also served to galvanize support to the regime from reactionary economic elites. Like in 
Guatemala, the targeting of prominent members of the progressive opposition precluded 
“any fundamental change in the social and economic structures of the nation” in the long 
term (Millet 1977: 393).  
The Somoza brothers also manoeuvred to maintain the support of domestic economic elites. 
The death of the dictator coincided with the beginning a period of decline for Nicaraguan 
exports. Cotton and coffee exports slowed after 1956, and economic growth declined from 
an annual rate of 6% between 1950 and 1955, to just about 2% between 1956 and 1959 
(IBDR 1960: 3). Luis Somoza increased the exchange rate for cotton growers, created a 
“cotton pool” to secure higher prices for Nicaraguan producers and, after 1957, granted 
direct subsidies to the sector (IBRD 1960: 3). Despite the fact that up to 50% of the Bank’s 
agricultural portfolio was delinquent by 1959, Luis Somoza continued providing generous 
credit lines to cotton producers (IBRD 1960: 12-13). Crucially, Luis Somoza also reformed 
Pre-examination Thesis, July 18th 2016                Page 89 
the export tax to reduce the burden paid by coffee exporters and raised the exchange rate 
applicable to the sector (IBDR 1960: 3, 8; IBRD 1973: 69).  
Luis “el Bueno” 
Luis Somoza took a more open approach to politics during his six-year presidential term. 
He released political prisoners and gradually relaxed the strict press censorship that had 
followed his father’s death, enacting a “Law of freedom of expression” in 1960 (Crawley 
1979: 125). In a sharp departure from the policies of his father, and against the opinion of 
his brother Anastasio, Luis Somoza also ordered a twenty percent reduction in the 
Guardia’s budget. Remarkably, Luis also expressed his determination to end direct family 
rule over the country, delegating government affairs in the official party (Crawley 1979: 
125). His regime, he declared, was deemed to be a transitional one towards democratic rule 
(Solaún 2005: 55). Notably, in what may be interpreted as an effort to curb his brother’s 
political aspirations, Luis Somoza banned blood relatives of the President to run in 
presidential elections (Millet 1977: 352).  
Luis Somoza also introduced important social reforms in areas long neglected by his father. 
These included founding a Social Security Institute in 1957 and, in the context of the 
launch of Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, a Law of Minimum Wages—the first in the 
history of the country. These measures were followed by a non-confiscatory law of 
Agrarian Reform and the founding of an Agrarian Institute. Although the real benefits these 
measures brought to the masses are debatable, the very fact that were introduced marked a 
departure from the policies followed by the founder of the dynasty and were interpreted as 
an attempt to reduce potential political unrest brought about by economic hardship 
(Chamorro 1983: 256-257).  
The economic slowdown after 1955 had reduced public revenues, mostly because of a fall 
in the yields of both import and consumption taxes. The government used reserves 
accumulated during the expansive years to finance the large public deficits incurred during 
all fiscal years between 1955 and 1961. When reserves were exhausted, the government 
began borrowing from the National Bank, cutting expenses and increasing taxes.  
The tax reforms introduced by Luis Somoza were less driven by political considerations 
and targeted taxpayers of all capacities. In 1959 the government introduced customs 
surcharges of five, ten and fifteen percent on semi-essential and non-essential imports, a tax 
on air tickets and a rise in consular fees. The income tax top rate was also raised from 18% 
to 30% and a new tax on coffee exports was introduced in 1960 (IBRD 1960: 10-11). In 
April 1961 the turn was for the tax on beer, which was increased from US$ 0.20 to US$ 
0.60 per litter, followed by a rise to the tax on the retail sale of cigarettes from 36 to 42 
percentage points (Comisión Fiscal 1962: 49).  
In 1961 Luis Somoza commissioned an inter-ministerial group to produce a report with 
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confidential recommendations to reform the tax system. With technical assistance of the 
International Monetary Fund, the 1962 report echoed the conclusions Garvy had presented 
a decade before, depicting the tax system as old-fashioned (it included taxes enacted during 
colonial times); unfair (most of the burden fell on consumers through consumption and 
import taxes); inefficient (it lacked adequate mechanisms to collecting taxes); and inelastic 
(it was highly dependent on exports) (Comisión Fiscal 1962).  
The report went on to criticize the early decision to abolish taxes on exports of coffee and 
cotton, despite the weight of these crops in the gross national product, as well as the 
inadequate design of the income tax and the minimal contribution of property taxation. Key 
recommendations were increasing the burden on high income groups, simplifying the tax; 
coding the tax laws and modernizing the government's fiscal administration (Comisión 
Fiscal, 1962). Other recommendations were substituting the 1939 tax on capital for two 
different taxes, one for real estate and other for movable capital. Remarkably, the 
commission also recommended to introduce a five-year break in income tax payments for 
coffee, cotton, cattle and lumber producers, setting instead new ad-valorem export duties on 
each (i.e. taxes that rise and fall depending on the export price). Finally, the commission 
recommended to simplify the law on stamp taxes (Comisión Fiscal 1962: 67-70).  
Luis Somoza complied with some of the most important recommendations of the 
Commission. He replaced the uniform tax on capital with two separate taxes, one for real 
estate and other for movable capital. He also enacted the first Tax Code in Nicaragua. But 
the most important measure came in January 1962 in the form of an executive decree 
introducing three-percent retentions on the proceeds of the main export crops, to be credited 
to the final income tax liabilities of the (IBRD 1962: 7). The measure turned out to be 
largely irrelevant in terms of revenue, but it increased the number of taxpayers and 
improved the administration of the tax (IBRD, 1968). Finally, additional consumption taxes 
were imposed on sugar and cement.  
The tax reforms enacted by Luis Somoza were relatively successful. Between 1961 and 
1963 the Nicaraguan tax burden increased from 8.9 to 10.6 as percentage of GDP. 
However, the Nicaraguan tax structure remained severely biased towards regressive taxes, 
with import and consumption taxes still accounting for 82% of total revenues (OAS-IADB 
1967).  
 The trustworthy René Schick (1963-1967) 
Luis Somoza called for elections in 1963 and was succeeded at the office by René Schick, a 
former personal secretary of his father and a prominent member of the Liberal Party. The 
Presidential candidacy of Anastasio Somoza Debayle was openly rejected by President 
John F. Kennedy, and thus Somoza offered the Liberal ticket to Schick, who won the 
elections by a landslide (Crawley 1979: 129; Rouquié 1987: 268). Schick gave continuity 
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of the policies of Luis, cultivating harmonious relations with the main economic groups in 
the country.  
Schick benefited from the renewed impulse cotton exports gave to the national economy. 
Between 1961 and 1965, the Nicaraguan economy grew at an annual rate of 8%--the 
highest in Latin America. Cotton-growers quadrupled their output between 1961 and 1965 
and helped unleashing a new economic boom which lasted until 1966. Policies of industrial 
promotion strengthened national manufactures and fuelled an expansion in domestic 
consumption. Emerging industrialists benefited from preferential credit, tax breaks and 
special tariffs (Strachan 1976: 10-11). Needless to say, the Somoza Group also used 
industrial incentives and regional integration instruments to advance their own industrial 
ventures (Wheelock 1980: 171-172).  
Government revenues reflected the buoyant economic situation. Between 1961 and 1966 
tax revenues almost doubled, passing from C.234 million to C.421.7 million. The 
contribution of indirect taxes grew by a full percentage point of GDP, with consumption 
taxes increasing from C.47 million in 1961 to C.131.7 million in 1966. Although the yields 
of the taxes applied on imports also increased from C.136 million to C.169 million during 
the same period, their relevance in total taxes began a steady decline after 1965. Part of the 
lost duties was substituted by domestic consumption taxes.  
Schick was less active than Luis Somoza in reforming the tax system. In March 1964 a 
presidential decree extended the validity of the 3 percent withholding tax to agricultural 
exports, (OAS-IADB 1967: 16). Despite the government's efforts, the problem of 
widespread evasion continued largely unresolved, and by 1966 agricultural producers and 
cattle raisers still contributed with a mere 4.9 percent of total income tax collections, as 
compared with commerce (39.2), manufacturing (16.7) and mining (33.6) (IBRD 1973: 
Table 5.15). Other than that, the only important measure taken by Schick was beginning a 
large-scale cadastral survey to increase the yields of property taxes. The cadastre, however, 
was never completed.  
The government of Schick passed without major frights, but the months before the 1967 
elections were marked by confrontation between the Guardia and opposition groups. For 
the first time in years, the opposition managed to assemble a credible coalition to run 
against Somoza. The Unión Nacional Opositora (UNO), included factions of the 
Conservative and Liberal parties, as well as other small political groups. The UNO 
launched its campaign in an increasingly charged political atmosphere (Crawley 1979: 
133). Violence peaked in January, 1966, when the Guardia massacred hundreds of 
participants in a demonstration that gathered forty-thousand people in Managua (Millet 
1977: 366). Despite the massacre, presidential elections took place in February 1967. 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle defeated the opposition candidate with 70% of the votes amid 
allegations of fraud.  
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Breaking a ruling coalition 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle ruled Nicaragua between 1967 and 1979. The early death of 
Luis Somoza in April 1967 left the control of the Liberal Party in the hands of the incoming 
president, who also maintained his personal control over the Guardia for the entire duration 
of his rule (Medina 2009: 56-57). Anastasio also benefited from cosy relations with the US 
government, whose support to the Central American dictator increased after Richard Nixon 
was sworn as US President in January 1969.  
The seams of the coalition supporting the regime were not as tight as before. Factions 
among the Liberal Party soon began airing their will to revive Luis Somoza’s line about 
institutionalizing party control of government as an alternative to dynastic rule (Crawley 
1979: 145). A large number of members of the Conservative Party became politically active 
and mobilized against Somoza during the electoral campaign.  
Facing increasing opposition, Somoza attempted to build support among the opposition by 
offering the Conservative Party a power-sharing deal. Like in the Pacto de los Generales, 
the Conservatives were offered a third of the seats at the Supreme Court and at the boards 
of each Ministry and Autonomous Agency, as well as in other government bodies. A 
Constitutional Assembly was programmed to be called 1972, with a third of the seats 
already allocated to the Conservatives. Like his father twenty years before, Somoza pledged 
not to seek for re-election, ceding the stage to the main political parties (Crawley 1979: 
145-147). The Conservatives signed the agreement in November 1970.  
The main private sector groups were suspicious of the intentions of Somoza, who was 
active in improving the financial position of the family. During the 1970s the Somoza 
group further expanded its investments in agriculture, manufacturing, construction and 
finance. The group produced export commodities on their vast lands, which were said to 
occupy an area about equal in size to neighbouring El Salvador. They also dominated meat 
exports, enjoyed a monopoly in the production of alcohol and were major players in sugar 
production. By the end of the decade, the Somoza family owed the twenty-six largest 
industrial companies in the country and had shares in about 120 corporations. The Somoza 
group also owned the Nicaraguan shipping line and airline, and were the local 
concessionaries of Mercedes Benz, the main government provider of motor vehicles. 
Estimates of the Somozas’ wealth varied between US$ 400 million and US$600 million 
(Crawley 1979: 141-142; Wheelock 1980: 163-176: Rouquie 1984: 261-262). As Wheelock 
put it, at the time there was “not a single branch of economic activity where the group does 
not hold important interests, and even in fields previously exclusive for BANIC and 
BANAMER, the group has deeply penetrated, threatening the stability of its competitors” 
(Wheelock 1980: 174).  
If Schick had benefited from good general economic conditions, the government of 
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Anastasio Somoza coincided with a new economic downturn. After 1966, the main 
agricultural exports were hit by weakening markets, unfavourable weather and disease. 
Cotton was particularly affected, as its share of total exports declined from 60% to 20% 
between 1966 and 1970. As it had happened before, weak exports initiated a downward 
spiral in the whole economy, and the government incurred in deficit spending after 1966.  
At the beginning Somoza tried to resolve the fiscal hardship being careful not to hurt the 
interests of business groups. He borrowed abroad at short and medium terms and 
introduced a 5$ sales tax on specific products and substantial changes in consumption and 
import taxes. The tax changes failed to substantially increase the government revenues. 
Thus, in May 1970 Somoza ordered changing the 5% specific tax for a general sales tax. 
The tax exempted products of “first necessity” and services, and was to be paid by retailers 
with annual sales above C.420, 000. The new tax did not substitute the other existing sales 
and excises taxes and together contributed to increase tax revenues from C.487 million to 
C.631 million between 1969 and 1971.  
“The world’s greediest ruler” 
The Congress dissolved itself in May 1972 and a Constituent Assembly was elected to draft 
a new constitution (with two thirds of the seats assigned ex ante to the Liberal Party). 
Meanwhile, Anastasio Somoza officially handed over the Executive to a bipartisan 
Triumvirate which included a Conservative Party leader and two Liberal Party 
representatives. Officially, Somoza only retained the direction of the Guardia (Crawley 
1979: 147). In practice, thanks to the Liberal Party’s majority in both the Executive and 
Legislative, the dictator managed to keep direct control over the political process. Somoza 
even continued representing Nicaragua in official meetings (Millet 1977: 371).  
The triumvirate was supposed to rule between May 1972 and December 1974, when new 
elections would be called under the new constitutional order. But then an unexpected 
exogenous shock took place that shifted the prevailing political equilibrium. A devastating 
earthquake hit the city of Managua in December 1972. With a toll of 10,000 deaths, half a 
million people left homeless and widespread destruction at the city centre, Somoza found a 
good excuse to end the political masquerade. He sat himself at the front of a National 
Emergency Committee and acquired emergency Executive Powers. With Somoza 
personally commanding reconstruction, the bipartisan Triumvirate became irrelevant.  
The earthquake was a historical turning point because it eroded the alliance of Somoza with 
the main economic groups of the country. The dictator took advantage of his position at the 
Emergency Committee to divest emergency funds to his own business. Instead of sharing 
reconstruction funds with the other groups in the private sector, Somoza channelled most of 
the international help to his enterprises involved in the production and distribution of raw 
materials, machinery, planning and construction of houses and public infrastructure 
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(Wheelock 1980: 174-175). Reconstruction also opened ample opportunities for graft and 
corruption on the part of Guardia members, alienating significant groups of the population 
which had generally been tolerant of the dynasty (Chamorro 1983; Solaún 2005). 
The size of the business was massive. A World Bank report estimated the total flow of 
funds aimed to reconstruction in 1973 and 1974 in the neighbourhood of C2.5 billion, more 
than twice the annual tax revenues for 1974 (World Bank 1975: 4). About 90% of the 
money needed for reconstruction was obtained from foreign sources, including official aid 
and onerous credits from commercial banks in the US (World Bank 1975: 4). The 
remaining ten percent was acquired via emergency taxes.  
Following the earthquake Somoza decreed an emergency exports tax of 10 percent and a 
tax on wages of public servants equivalent to a monthly salary. According to the IBRD, the 
choice of taxes was due to its easy enforceability. The workers tax was modified in 1974 to 
exclude lower wage earners. But the export tax directly affected the profits of agro-
exporters. The contribution of export taxes rose from C4.5 million in 1972 to C131.4 
million in 1974. The tax would be abolished after 1974, bringing the share of export taxes 
to total taxes back to pre-earthquake levels (C.6.9 million).  
Targeting the mighty agro-exporters was consequential for the survival of the dictatorship, 
for it opened a major fissure among the members of the coalition that had sustained the 
regime since the 1950s (Crawley 1979: 148-150; Bulmer-Thomas 1990: 348; Millet 1977: 
393; Wheelock 1980). According to Rouquié, “from then on the bourgeoisie joined the 
opposition; the dynasty no longer guaranteed the overall interests of the propertied classes. 
[…] the family became isolated” (Rouquié 1987: 263).  
The general economic outlook had improved after 1970, and the stimulus provided by 
reconstruction activities, coupled with a further expansion of export agriculture, led to a 
rate of economic growth above 6% between 1972 and 1977 (World Bank 1978: 3-4). 
However, in 1974 business representatives called a National convention in Managua to 
discuss the situation of the country. The convention gathered prominent members among 
the industrial and merchant elites, who, for the first time, “sat openly to talk about politics” 
(Chamorro 1983: 264). Both the BANIC and the BANAMER groups, along with the 
recently founded Council of Private Enterprises, began publicly accusing the Somoza 
family of unfair competition (Bulmer-Thomas 1990: 348; Crawley 1979: 150).  
Political opposition became active again when Somoza made it apparent that he would run 
at the 1974 presidential elections. Prominent opposition leaders formed a new coalition, the 
Democratic Liberation Union (UDEL), which included a wide spectrum of political parties, 
as well as groups from the bourgeoisie, middle classes and popular sectors. Even the 
traditionally accommodating Catholic Church, which had long supported the regime, 
condemned the intentions of Somoza and backed UDEL (Millet 1977: 372; Chamorro 
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1983: 259-265).  
Social unrest was also in the rise, especially as new organizations of workers emerged in 
urban areas and among rural workers linked to export agriculture (Bulmer-Thomas 1990: 
348). Somoza’s armed opposition, represented by a growing Marxist guerrilla (Frente 
Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN), recruited people from different social origins 
which included disaffected members of some prominent oligarchic families (Crawley 1979: 
150).  
None of this deterred Anastasio Somoza. A new Constituent Assembly was formed in early 
1974 to enact a new Constitution and call for elections in September 1974. The new 
constitution banned direct re-election, but that provision left Anastasio unaffected as it was 
the Triumvirate which formally wielded power. In order to overcome the constitutional 
veto for active military, he temporarily quit from his headship of the Guardia a few weeks 
before elections, to resume full control as “Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces” after 
winning elections. Somoza was sworn as constitutional president of Nicaragua in December 
1974, this time for the period 1975-1981.  
Just a few weeks before the installation of Anastasio at the presidency, a new tax package 
was introduced to compensate for the revenue losses produced by the expiry of the 
emergency taxes. The reform involved both indirect and direct taxes. It eliminated 
consumption taxes on non-essential products and substituted it for a single-stage tax to be 
collected at the importer or manufacturer level. Besides, the rate of the general sales tax 
was increased from 5 to 6 percent, extending its application to luxury services and 
commodities which were previously excluded (World Bank 1975: 12).  
The reformed taxes also included income and property taxes. Both the lower and top 
brackets of the income tax were increased (from 4 to 6 and from 20 to 30 percentage points 
respectively). The rates due to property taxes were augmented from 0.5 to 1 percentage 
point and the assessment methods changed. However, weak tax administration precluded 
substantial revenue gains from these new measures (World Bank 1978: 16).  
A 1978 World Bank report argued that weak tax administration still was at the core of 
Nicaragua’s fiscal problems. The tax authorities lacked any effective system for periodical 
revaluation of assets for levying property taxes, and overly-generous and arbitrary tax 
exemptions for industries seriously eroded income and import taxes. Besides, there were 
indications about extensive tax evasion, partly due to inadequate staffing of the revenue 
authorities and to the lack of effective mechanisms to enforce the collection of income 
taxes (World Bank 1978: 23).  
Although it soon become evident that the 1974 package failed to compensate for the 
elimination of the 10% exports tax, henceforth Somoza would not attempt to seriously 
reforming the tax code. Increasingly isolated, he would instead choose to take the expedite 
Pre-examination Thesis, July 18th 2016                Page 96 
way of contracting debt at foreign markets.  
 The coalition falls apart 
The new presidential period of Anastasio began with a major blow by the Sandinistas, who 
managed to take captive a group of Nicaraguam notables during a dinner in Managua. After 
ceding to the Sandinista demands (hostages included the Nicaraguan ambassador to the US 
and other ministers, businessmen and Somoza relatives), the dictator decreed a state of 
siege which lasted for the rest of his term, introduced press censorship, set up military 
tribunals and began a widespread repression campaign (Crawley 1975: 151-152; Chamorro 
1983: 266-267). Somoza also continued investing substantial resources into the Guardia, 
which saw its membership increase from 7000 to 13000 members between 1974 and 1978 
(Chamorro 1983: 266).  
Henceforth, the political situation would only worsen, as the Guardia began a scorched-
earth campaign which lead to widespread human-rights violations across the country. As a 
side effect, political opposition to the regime was strengthened, especially through the 
growingly vocal UDEL (Crawley 1979: 155).  
Increasing political repression was accompanied by failed attempts to broaden the support 
basis of the regime (Wheelock 1980: 138-139). In 1975 Somoza founded the Institute of 
National Rural Welfare (INBIERNO) to provide credit to small farmers. Although the 
financial effort required to implementing INBIERNO was not carried by the treasury but by 
external donors, its founding came as a genuine reorientation of agriculture policies: up 
until then all state efforts had been directed to aid big and medium landowners involved in 
export agriculture (World Bank 1978: i, ii). By 1978 it was estimated that about 7500 small 
farmers had received credit from the program.  
The economic situation worsened in 1977. The share of taxes as percentage of GDP had 
been falling since 1974. Public deficits had increased from 3.5 to 6.5% of GDP between 
1974 and 1977, but the government was reluctant to reform taxes. Instead, the government 
financed deficit spending by acquiring debt abroad at commercial private sources. By 1977 
the size of public external debt was already higher than during the reconstruction years of 
1973, 1974 (World Bank 1978: 16-17). The direct cost of servicing external debt increased 
from 9% to 18% of total public revenues between 1972 and 1977 (World Bank 1978: iii, 
iv).  
Anastasio Somoza seemed increasingly unable to deter the insurgent operations of the 
Sandinistas, who launched a countrywide offensive on October 1977. Soon afterwards, the 
Sandinistas issued a call to the formation of a “broad Anti-Somoza front”. A group of 
notables from different social origins signed a manifesto (the document of the 12) calling 
for an interclass alliance and demanding the resignation of the dictator. The new group was 
galvanized by the murdering of a prominent anti-Somoza journalist, Pedro Joaquin 
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Chamorro, in January 1978. A broad opposition front (Frente Amplio de Oposición, FAO) 
was announced and a general strike called by business groups to boycott the Somoza 
regime.  
Despite the economic hardship, Somoza was reluctant to introduce any changes on the tax 
on coffee exports to take a share of the windfall gains produced by a 1976-1977 boom in 
international coffee prices (World Bank 1978: 22). The value of Nicaraguan coffee exports 
rose from US 48.1 million in 1975 to US119.4 million in 1976 and US198.8 in 1977. While 
other countries in the region increased the tax burden by taxing the windfall gains of coffee 
exporters, the contribution of taxes to the Nicaraguan economy actually declined.  
The private sector became vocal when Somoza proposed new tax reforms in May 1978. 
Notable among the proposals was a change in the assessment of agricultural property, so 
that the potential productivity of the land was to be taken into account during valuations 
(World Bank 1978: 7). The private sector boycotted the taxes and the government pulled 
out. Private capital began flying away from Nicaragua in massive amounts.  
Facing an increasingly hostile society, Somoza pledged to leave power after ending his 
presidential term in 1981. Once more he attempted to strike a deal with the opposition, but 
this time both the Conservative Party and business organizations declined to take part in 
any negotiations and demanded his immediate resignation. An Organization of American 
States mission sent by the US to mediate failed to find a settlement.  
Crawley summarizes the situation at the end of the Somoza regime as as follows:  
“Somoza, already perhaps the wealthiest man in Central America, had allowed his 
insatiable greed to alienate the support he once enjoyed among the Nicaraguan 
moneyed classes, and his lust for power had pushed even the most accommodating 
of his political adversaries into an alliance with a left-wing revolutionary 
organizations. Not even the Somozas’ very own ‘constituency’, the 8,000-strong 
Guardia Nacional, remained an entirely trustworthy ally” (Crawley 1979: 166).  
Indeed, in August 1978 Anastasio had crushed a Guardia mutiny that involved some 
twelve senior Guardia officers and about 200 men (Crawley 1979: 164). A further 
humiliating moment arrived in August 1978, after a Sandinista commando spectacularly 
assaulted Managua’s National Palace capturing 1500 hostages. Captives included all 
Members of the Congress, some Ministers and a number of relatives of the Somoza. The 
dictator was forced to concede to the demands of the Sandinistas, whose membership 
increased by the thousands.  
By late 1978, Somoza’s control over the country was largely at doubt. Except for the Guard 
and hard-core loyalists among the Liberal Party, Anastasio was basically isolated. In May 
1979 the Sandinistas famously launched their “final offensive”, bringing about a general 
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insurrection that culminated with their victorious march over Managua on the 19th of July. 
The total toll of the war was set around the thirty thousand casualties.  
As theories of political survival predict, the fall of the leader only took place after key 
members of her winning coalition abandoned the regime in favour of a credible challenger. 
The price paid for getting rid of the Somoza regime was a ravaged economy in which GDP 
fell by 26.4 per cent in 1979 (on top of a decline of 7.8 per cent in 1978). International 
reserves were drained out of the country, and Somoza had left a $ 1.6 billion debt. 
Agricultural exports were relatively undamaged by the civil war, but industry was greatly 
affected (Bulmer-Thomas 1990: 353; World Bank 1981).  
The flight of the dictator signalled a total military victory for the broad anti-Somoza 
coalition, which proceeded to form a “Government of National Reconstruction”. Led by the 
Sandinistas, the new government pledged to endorse a mixed economic model, with an 
increased participation of the state in the economy. Commercial banks were expropriated 
and nationalized (including both BANAMER and BANIC), as were the properties of 
Somoza and his allies--about one fifth of all farm land in Nicaragua. New public enterprises 
were created, and the machinery of government was extensively reorganized. Within two 
years after the revolution, estimates of the share of the public sector (including General 
government, autonomous agencies and public enterprises) as percentage of GDP had 
increased from 15% to 37% (World Bank 1981: 7).  
Despite the strong distortions brought about by the war, the new government managed to 
substantially increase tax revenues in a short period of time. Indeed, when measured in 
constant terms, by 1980 these had increased by about 50% in relation to the 1978 levels. 
Part of the new revenue gains were driven by new taxes, especially by the introduction of a 
number of direct, progressive ad-valorem taxes on coffee, beef, sugar, bananas and sesame 
exports introduced between 1979 and 1980.  
Existing taxes were also subject to major reforms: low corporate income tax rates were 
substituted by a flat 40% rate; the annual property tax rate was increased from 1% to 2%; 
sales taxes were changed from the previous 6% tax on selected transactions to a 8% general 
sales tax; finally, excises and other levies on most alcoholic beverages were also increased 
(World Bank 1981: 13-14). The immediate post-revolutionary tax reforms greatly increased 
the yields of most taxes, although the direct-indirect tax mix remained largely unchanged.  
Notably, according to the report of a 1981 World Bank mission, the rise in tax collections 
was also buffered by a notable change in taxpayers’ compliance in the months following 
the revolution. The number of persons presenting income and property tax declarations 
grew substantially from one year to the following. Moreover, when the government 
introduced a partial tax amnesty allowing delinquent tax payers to declare formerly 
unreported liabilities and paying half of it, the measure proved profitable.  
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4. Conclusions 
 
Central America entered a critical historical turning point after the end of the Second World 
War. The displacement of old dictators and the subsequent changes in the composition of 
the ruling coalition allowed for the enactment of a number of long-delayed reforms. Within 
a decade, the institutional landscape had fundamentally changed in Guatemala, Honduras 
and Nicaragua. Governments entered the age of planning and new institutions were 
founded to carry tasks associated with the functioning of modern states, including Central 
Banks, Development Banks, Social Security Institutions, and an array of Ministries and 
specialized government bodies.  
Chief among the areas in need of reform were the old-fashioned tax systems. Until 1944, 
the national tax burden remained below 5% of GDP in all three countries, with excises and 
custom duties providing the lion’s share of public revenues. In Honduras and Nicaragua the 
Treasuries were under direct American command, while in-kind, personal exaction was still 
used in Guatemala to carry out public works. Despite being present in public debates since 
the 1930s, income taxation was avoided, and existing taxes on property and wealth were 
not enforced on upper-income groups. 
The missions of experts sent to the region at mid-century by the new International Financial 
Institutions invariably pointed at weak tax administration and an unfair distribution of tax 
burdens as major obstacles for economic and social development. The recommendations of 
these experts emphasized introducing income taxation, reforming and enforcing taxes to 
wealth and property and targeting the yields of agricultural exports, the backbone of Central 
American economies at the time.  
The different ways in which Central American governments reformed taxes aimed at 
“soaking the rich” constituted the main focus of this thesis. While Guatemala, Honduras 
and Nicaragua introduced reforms at roughly the same point in time and following similar 
policy models, the resulting outcomes varied across cases. This variation, in turn, is 
explained as a consequence of differences in the nature of coalitions supporting political 
regimes.  
In Guatemala, the ousting of Jorge Ubico and the democratic election of reformist leaders 
in 1944 and 1950 opened room for enacting progressive tax reforms. These included 
property taxes, luxury taxes, a tax on export crops and an Income Tax bill, the first in the 
history of the country. In Honduras, the displacement of dictator Tiburcio Carías allowed 
for the introduction of a number of policy reforms, although with a less progressive profile 
than in neighbouring Guatemala. An Income Tax Law was approved in 1949, and a new tax 
on coffee exports allowed the government of Juan Gálvez to almost double total tax 
collections between 1949 and 1955. In Nicaragua, by contrast, Dictator Anastasio Somoza 
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ignored the recommendations of foreign tax experts and used the fiscal power of the state to 
harass competitors and advance his own economic interests. In 1950, the dictator reached a 
pact with opposition groups to incorporate rival elites into the governing coalition. 
Although Somoza introduced the first Income Tax Law in 1952, and additional taxes on 
coffee exports in 1955, he tried to accommodate the interests of economic elites for the rest 
of his term.  
Although domestic contextual factors played an important role in the timing of changes in 
tax laws, general outcomes seem to confirm the intuitions of the logic of political survival. 
Available evidence shows that narrow coalitions prevented the introduction of progressive 
taxation, while broad coalitions opened room for taxes aimed at increasing the burden held 
by upper-income groups. Changes in the nature of coalitions over time were traceable in 
some decisions on tax policy. 
While in Guatemala a broad coalition allowed reformist governments to carry out 
progressive tax reforms between 1944 and 1954, a narrower coalition limited the degree to 
which authoritarian leaders could raise the tax burden held by upper-income groups 
following the counterrevolution in 1954. Military dictators shied away of “soaking the rich” 
through progressive taxes fearing that business opposition could threaten regime survival. 
Guatemalan leaders faced the opposition of a remarkably cohesive economic elite, capable 
of coordinating at crucial times to oppose government tax reforms in block. As a result, 
business elites could pose a credible threat to military leaders who needed their support to 
secure their own survival. The coalition fell apart when the military grew autonomous from 
economic elites.  
By contrast, business elites in Honduras lacked the cohesiveness and strength of their 
Guatemalan peers. The families involved in manufacturing and commerce were generally 
unrelated to those involved in agriculture. Moreover, the export of bananas and fruits, the 
most important economic sector during the first half of the 20th century, functioned as an 
US enclave in Honduran territory. Thus, authoritarian political leaders were able to build 
support on some groups among economic elites (i.e. industrialists and merchants, with 
higher prominence in the North Coast) to carry their reform initiatives, in occasions at the 
expense of landed elites and foreign investors. Similarly, building support among social 
and popular organizations prevented the radicalization of politics that feed the 
consolidation of “reactionary despotism” in Guatemala, allowing instead for the emergence 
of Honduran military reformism. 
In Nicaragua, the Somoza regime took advantage of the historical division of Liberal and 
Conservative groups. While at the beginning the regime supported the former at the 
expense of merchants and cattle-raisers aligned with the Conservative Party, the dictator 
used the access to public office to build an economic empire of his own. “Unfair 
competence” by the Somoza group generated opposition that threatened regime survival, 
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which moved the dictator to include rival elites into the governing coalition after 1950. The 
accommodation of economic interests of traditional groups and emerging capitalists linked 
to cotton and sugar production secured regime stability until 1967, when the younger son of 
Somoza took the office. The breakdown of the equilibrium established by his father is at the 
root of the final demise of the regime in 1979, as renewed “unfair competence” alienated 
economic elites and sent prominent oligarchic families to the ranks of the opposition.  
Finally, there are also important differences in the ways in which Central American rulers 
attempted to obtain the support of the masses. While in Guatemala, the reactionary, 
repressive character of military regimes limited the capacity of authoritarian leaders to 
build support among popular groups and social organizations, military leaders in Honduras 
included them in tactical alliances at specific junctures and the heirs of Somoza attempted 
to include workers and peasants into their coalitions by providing benefits. As theories of 
political survival would predict, when coalitions broadened to include labour and peasant 
organizations, policy-makers had a greater room of manoeuvre to introduce progressive 
taxation. However, the incorporation of popular groups into the regime coalition did not 
last long in any of the three countries, which turned instead to repression to keep social 
organizations at bay.  
This thesis relied on both primary and secondary sources to look for observable 
implications of theories of political survival in the real world. While available evidence on 
major tax reforms allowed establishing inferences on the relation between configurations of 
leader-coalition and decisions on tax policy for a relatively long time-span, additional 
research is necessary to further confirm theory implications. First, specific research should 
be devoted to understand the functioning of legislatures under authoritarian regimes. While 
some decision on tax policy were enacted as Executive decrees, others were discussed in 
the National Congress. The internal working of institutions under authoritarianism may 
challenge the fundamental intuitions of theories of political survival. Secondly, additional 
research could focus on social protection policies, which also allowed leaders to provide 
private and public goods to the members of their supporting coalitions.  Finally, subsequent 
research may be conducted in countries with different political economies, including those 
where governments benefited from rents originated in the exploitation of natural resources 
and strategic assets.  
 
*** 
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7. Annexes 
Annex 1. Tax structure 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua: Income + property + export taxes as % of total taxes.  
 
Source: Reports of Ministries of Finance and Central Banks, Various years.  
 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua: Income Taxes as % of total taxes.  
 
Source: Reports of Ministries of Finance and Central Banks, Various years.  
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Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua: Property Taxes as % of total taxes 
 
Source: Reports of Ministries of Finance and Central Banks, Various years.  
 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua: export taxes as % of total taxes: 
 
Source: Reports of Ministries of Finance and Central Banks, Various years.  
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Annex 2. Tax structure in the three countries under study, 1945-1980 
GUATEMALA 
        (CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES) 
        Percentages 
        
 
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
              Direct tax revenues 13,2 11,8 8,2 10,6 15,6 16,7 21,2 15,1 
         Taxes on income, profits and capital gains 10,8 9,5 6,5 8,2 12,5 12,6 18,2 14,0 
         Taxes on property 2,5 2,3 1,7 2,4 3,1 4,1 3,0 1,0 
     Indirect tax revenues (Taxes on goods and services) 28,9 33,0 24,7 29,2 28,3 27,6 22,1 17,1 
         General taxes on goods and services 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
         Taxes on specific goods and services 28,9 33,0 24,7 29,2 28,3 27,6 22,1 17,1 
     Taxes on foreign trade 39,6 46,0 53,5 51,9 40,5 31,2 30,4 38,2 
         Import taxes 23,3 38,0 28,3 40,5 32,7 24,7 20,0 16,2 
         Export taxes 16,3 8,0 25,3 11,4 7,8 6,5 10,4 22,1 
     Other taxes 18,2 9,2 13,6 8,2 15,5 24,5 26,3 29,6 
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HONDURAS 
        (CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES) 
        Percentages 
        
 
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
              Direct tax revenues 3,51 13,38 11,60 16,45 18,65 27,97 31,00 33,88 
         Taxes on income, profits and capital gains 2,15 12,80 10,32 15,42 16,95 27,07 29,86 32,85 
         Taxes on property 1,36 0,58 1,28 1,04 1,70 0,90 1,15 1,03 
     Indirect tax revenues (Taxes on goods and services) 40,64 30,91 25,92 28,33 33,86 39,90 33,62 26,15 
         General taxes on goods and services 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
         Taxes on specific goods and services 40,64 30,91 25,92 28,33 33,86 39,90 33,62 26,15 
     Taxes on foreign trade 55,67 55,45 62,08 54,98 47,38 32,07 35,30 39,93 
         Import taxes 53,02 52,57 57,22 49,89 41,97 28,48 25,60 21,49 
         Export taxes 2,65 2,88 4,86 5,09 5,41 3,59 9,69 18,44 
     Other taxes 0,18 0,26 0,40 0,24 0,10 0,06 0,08 0,04 
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NICARAGUA 
        (CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES) 
        Percentages 
        
 
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
              Direct tax revenues 5,24 3,95 11,71 13,49 20,72 21,56 22,57 19,23 
         Taxes on income, profits and capital gains 
  
8,73 9,42 13,16 10,72 14,90 11,13 
         Taxes on property 5,24 3,95 2,99 4,07 7,57 10,84 7,67 8,10 
     Indirect tax revenues (Taxes on goods and services) 31,50 32,98 21,41 18,93 30,79 42,58 45,50 50,30 
         General taxes on goods and services 0 0 0 1,0 0,8 5,8 15,5 12,6 
         Taxes on specific goods and services 31,50 32,98 21,41 17,92 30,00 36,82 30,02 37,75 
     Taxes on foreign trade 57,89 58,57 63,53 63,42 43,03 33,92 29,92 22,37 
         Import taxes 54,86 54,81 58,56 61,04 41,15 32,96 29,34 15,44 
         Export taxes 3,03 3,76 4,97 2,38 1,88 0,95 0,59 6,92 
     Other taxes 5,36 4,50 3,34 4,16 5,46 1,95 2,01 8,10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
